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Abstract 
Recent findings suggest that individual differences, particularly social preferences, 
systematically influence people’s behavior when own interests are at conflict with others’ 
interests (i.e., social dilemmas). Extending previous work, this dissertation addresses how 
social preferences affect cognitive capacities and processes in social dilemmas by studying 
eye movements in social interactions. It shows that individuals with a prosocial value 
orientation invest more effort in learning about their interaction partner’s previous behavior 
and therefore are more likely to recall their behavior. When facing situations with a strategic 
component, prosocial individuals weight their partner’s outcome more heavily than 
individualists and exhibit a stronger gaze bias towards eventually chosen strategies. Drawing 
from this, the current work reveals that exogenously guiding attention (bottom-up) 
successfully predicts other-regarding choices, while most of the variance of the link between 
attention and choices is explained through top-down preference formation. In sum, this 
dissertation extends previous knowledge on social dilemmas as it sheds light on the impact of 
social preferences on underlying cognitive processes and develops a preliminary 
understanding of attention as a driver and byproduct of social decision making.  
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Zusammenfassung 
 
 
Bisherige Forschungsbefunde zeigen, dass individuelle Unterschiede, insbesondere soziale 
Präferenzen, das Entscheidungsverhalten von Menschen systematisch beeinflussen, wenn 
eigene Interessen mit den Interessen von anderen Personen im Konflikt stehen (soziale 
Dilemmas). Die vorliegende Dissertation untersucht inwiefern soziale Präferenzen kognitive 
Kapazitäten und Prozesse in sozialen Dilemmas beeinflussen, indem sie Augenbewegungen 
in sozialen Interaktionen untersucht. Die Untersuchung zeigt, dass Menschen mit einer 
prosozialen Wertorientierung sich stärker bemühen, Informationen über das Verhalten ihrer 
Interaktionspartner aufzunehmen und somit dieses Verhalten besser abrufen können. Sie zeigt 
auf, dass prosoziale Personen in Situationen mit einer strategischen Komponente die Folgen 
für ihren Partner stärker gewichten als individualistische Personen und, dass sie eine stärkere 
Tendenz dazu haben die Strategie anzusehen, die sie letztendlich auswählen. Darauf 
aufbauend zeigt die Untersuchung, dass soziale Entscheidungen durch die Beeinflussung von 
Aufmerksamkeit vorhergesagt werden können; gleichzeitig erklärt Aufmerksamkeit basierend 
auf zugrundeliegenden Präferenzen weiterhin den größten Varianzanteil von der Beziehung 
zwischen Aufmerksamkeit und Entscheidungen. Die Arbeit trägt zum Verständnis von 
sozialen Dilemmas bei, indem sie den Einfluss von sozialen Präferenzen auf kognitive 
Prozesse beleuchtet und die Rolle von Aufmerksamkeit in sozialen Entscheidungen 
untersucht.   
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Summary 
Chapter I of this dissertation thesis shows that social preferences shape the ability to 
remember their interaction partner’s behavior in social dilemmas. Three pre-registered studies 
reveal that prosocial individuals are more likely to correctly recall their social interaction 
partner’s behavior than proself individuals. A mediation analysis further indicates that the link 
between memory ability and social preferences is partly driven by the extent of information 
search during encoding. Specifically, prosocial individuals exhibit more information search 
effort when encoding information about their partner’s behavior than proself individuals. In 
sum, the results of Chapter I suggest that prosocial individuals are better able to identify free 
riders, which could protect them from being exploited in future interactions.  
Chapter II points out that social preferences not only affect memory performance, but 
are also able to explain systematic differences in strategic cognitive processes. Prosocial 
individuals were more likely to direct their attention to the other player’s payoff and the 
cooperative strategy than individualists. Cooperative choices were associated with shorter 
information search and increased attention to the cooperative strategy than defective choices. 
Taking temporal gaze patterns into account, the results successfully replicate the gaze cascade 
effect in strategic decision and additionally show that this effect tends to be stronger for 
prosocial individuals. In sum, Chapter II suggests that attention patterns reflect weighting 
processes associated with individuals’ social preferences and their final choice.  
A two-channel mechanism connects attention and choices (top-down and bottom-up) 
and Chapter III tests the respective magnitude of each channel. To disentangle these two 
drivers of the correlation between eye gaze and choices behavior, eye gaze is used to predict 
other-regarding and moral choices in two high-powered eye-tracking studies. The results 
show that final fixations successfully predicted choices when experimentally manipulated 
(bottom-up). While part of the link between attention and choices is driven by exogenously 
guided attention, most of the variance is explained by top-down preference formation. 
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Introduction 
Social dilemmas have extensively been used to study human decision. In a large literature, it 
is argued that many social interactions and societal problems can be distilled into a social 
dilemma. Specifically, social dilemmas are situations where individuals must decide whether 
to behave selfishly or cooperatively in consideration of outcomes for others and the future. 
For example, the global climate crisis can be described as a social dilemma: While everyone 
individually benefits from the short-term advantages of using a car or taking long showers, 
there are detrimental long-term consequences for everyone, such as the exasperation of the 
greenhouse effect or water shortages, if all individual decision makers decided to act purely 
according to their own interest.  
The frequency with which social dilemmas are encountered in real-life roused strong 
scientific interest in a systematic investigation of human’s behavior in such situations. 
Research on social dilemmas is at the intersection of various disciplines (e.g., psychology, 
economics, biology, law and sociology). The current dissertation adopts a perspective that is 
mainly based on findings from psychology and behavioral economics.  
 This dissertation aims to bridge the gap between the two fields by employing 
methodologies from both areas – economic games (economics) and eye-tracking (psychology) 
– to shed light on the cognitive processes that underlie people’s decisions in social dilemmas. 
More specifically, it focuses on how individual differences, social preferences in particular, 
shape such decision processes. Even though there has been a fair amount of research about the 
effects of individual differences on decision making, it is not clear that they are fully 
understood yet (Appelt, Milch, Handgraaf, & Weber, 2011). The present research takes 
individual differences in the process of information search into account. Studying the inter-
individual differences of how individuals search for, weight and remember information has 
become even more pertinent with digitalization being on the rise in our everyday lives, 
because more information than ever is available to decision makers.  
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Beyond individual differences, visual attention was identified as a crucial factor in 
other-regarding decisions (e.g., Fiedler, Glöckner, Nicklisch, & Dickert, 2013). Recently, 
there has been a debate as to whether the link between and attention and choice behavior is of 
a causal nature (Armel, Beaumel, & Rangel, 2008; Pärnamets et al., 2015, but see Newell & 
Le Pelley, 2018). This topic has become more relevant with the recent discussion on the 
involvement of psychological targeting in the US elections 2016 (González, 2017; Matz, 
Kosinski, Nave, & Stillwell, 2017). Supposedly, people were presented with specific pieces of 
information based on their digital records, in attempt to influence their political opinion. Here, 
it is crucial to understand the extent to which external influences have the power to influence 
choices via attention. Therefore, the present research systematically investigates previous 
causality claims and estimates whether exogenously determined characteristics of the decision 
situation can drive choice behavior.  
In sum, the current dissertation adopts a perspective that is mainly based on findings 
from psychology and behavioral economics. Both disciplines have contributed to 
understanding cooperation in social dilemmas, but at times fail to acknowledge one another. 
To integrate the answers this research provides to the questions outlined above into the larger 
relevant literature, this introduction first reviews explanations of cooperation behavior from a 
theoretical and a methodological perspective. Next, it sheds light on the historical and 
theoretical developments of understanding cognitive processes underlying choices. Here, a 
special focus is placed on eye-tracking, which is the methodology used throughout this 
dissertation to capture eye movements. A brief overview of the auxiliary assumptions and 
theoretical models regarding visual attention is given. Finally, this dissertation draws special 
attention to the use of open and transparent research practices.  
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Cooperation behavior in social dilemmas 
Economists have utilized a game-theoretic approach to study cooperation behavior in social 
dilemmas (for a review see Camerer, 2003). Using formal models, the conflict people 
experience in social dilemmas is captured. In its most basic form, a dictator game, two players 
enter a game (Kahneman, Knetsch, & Thaler, 1986). One of them is assigned the role of the 
dictator, while the other is the receiver. The dictator is endowed with an amount of money and 
can decide how much of this endowment he transfers to the receiver. The receiver has a 
passive role. In one of the adaptations of this game, the ultimatum game (Güth, 
Schmittberger, & Schwarze, 1982), the receiver can accept or decline the amount that is 
transferred. In case the transfer is accepted, both players receive their respective share of 
money. If, however, the transfer is rejected, both players receive nothing.  
Adding another strategic element to the game, in the prisoner’s dilemma both players’ 
outcomes depend on the other players’ behavior. The prisoner’s dilemma is frequently used to 
capture the conflict individuals experience between self-interest and collective benefits 
(Rapoport & Chammah, 1965). It constitutes a two-person game in which both players can 
either cooperate or defect when interacting with each other, without knowledge of the other 
player’s choice. The combined choices determine the payoffs for each player. While mutual 
cooperation always yields the maximum joint payoff, unilateral defection yields the maximum 
individual payoff for the defector (Rapoport & Chammah, 1965).  
These game properties are reflected in many real-life scenarios. For example, the 
global climate crisis has been can be described in terms of a prisoner’s dilemma (e.g. 
Böhringer & Vogt, 2003). All countries benefit from implementing policies reducing CO2 
emission (mutual cooperation). At the same time, any single country is often reluctant to 
restrict CO2 emission while still profiting from other countries’ sacrifice (unilateral 
defection). From a methodological viewpoint, economic games have been a popular tool to 
understand complex social interactions. They are mostly implemented in laboratory studies, 
INTRODUCTION 
 
14 
ensuring anonymity and fully incentivized decisions. Such controlled settings offer high 
internal validity and thus, this dissertation utilizes economic games to investigate social 
interactions in Chapters I and II.   
 
Theoretical frameworks of cooperation behavior 
In attempt to explain cooperation behavior in social dilemmas, a number of theoretical 
frameworks were proposed. Both formal models and psychological theories have contributed 
to the understanding of human cooperation. As this work is focused on the intersection of 
economics and psychology, the most relevant theories of both areas are described in the 
following. 
The classic game-theoretical assumption suggests that humans act as homo 
oeconomicus – rational and payoff maximizing. Based on this premise, the dominant strategy 
in any social dilemma is to keep all resources to you. In numerous experimental studies, 
however, people were found to cooperate with their counterparts in social dilemmas even if it 
was not payoff maximizing to do so (for overviews see Balliet, Parks, & Joireman, 2009; 
Bogaert, Boone, & Declerck, 2008). In order to explain these deviations from rational 
strategies, theories of social preferences were proposed. A number of theories have 
formalized that individuals’ utility is not exclusively determined by one’s own payoffs but 
also the other person’s payoff. One of these formalizations models the influence of inequality 
aversion on utility and has been referred to as the Fehr-Schmidt model (Fehr & Schmidt, 
1999). A person is inequality averse if she gets disutility from earning less than others and, 
possibly, gets disutility from earning more than others. The Fehr-Schmidt model captures 
individual’s aversion against disadvantageous inequity (envy) and advantageous inequity 
(guilt) and assumes complete information. That is, all players have full knowledge regarding 
the other player’s behavior and the number of a game’s rounds is disclosed in the beginning. 
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Formally, consider a set of n players indexed by i ∈ {1,…, n} and let π = π1,. . . , πn denote the 
vector of monetary payoffs. The utility function of player i ∈ {1,…, n} is given by  
𝑈! =  𝜋! − α!  1𝑛 − 1 max 𝜋! −  𝜋! , 0! !! −  β!  1𝑛 − 1 max 𝜋! −  𝜋! , 0! !!  
Two parameters capture the disutility from earning less than others (α) and the disutility from 
earning more than others (β). The model assumes that αi ≥ βi ≥ 0, meaning that a person gets 
more disutility from others’ being better off than others’ being worse off; and βi < 1, meaning 
that nobody would burn money to reduce inequality when the other is worse off. Another 
model that incorporated inequality aversion in behavioral predictions was formalized by 
Bolton and Ockenfels (2000). A key feature that distinguishes the two models: While in the 
Fehr-Schmidt model own payoffs are compared to payoffs of individual others, it is a group 
average in the Bolton and Ockenfels model. Going beyond inequality aversion, other models 
focus on reciprocity to explain cooperation behavior in social dilemmas. For example, in 
Rabin’s reciprocity model (Rabin, 1993) players reward kind and punish unkind intentions. 
More specifically, other players’ kindness is evaluated based on the amount of resources they 
share compared to what they were expected to share. Here, beliefs about other players’ 
actions (first-order) and beliefs about other players’ beliefs (second-order) enter directly into 
the utility function. 
Overall, the formalization of social preferences in terms of utility is an important 
foundation for a systematic investigation of decision making because it sharpens the notion of 
human behavior in social dilemmas.   
 
Social Value Orientation 
People were found to exhibit stable inter-individual differenced in their social 
preferences. While most people are sometimes prosocial and sometimes behave selfishly, 
others are always prosocial or always selfish. Specifically, it has been suggested that 
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individuals differ in the degree that they only care about resources allocated to themselves 
(self-interest) or also care about resources allocated to other people (Fehr & Fischbacher, 
2002). One construct capturing these individual differences is the idea of Social Value 
Orientation (SVO; Liebrand & McClintock, 1988). SVO refers to how people approach social 
dilemmas (Cox, Slockin, & Steele, 1999; A. J. Stewart & Plotkin, 2016). Depending on their 
SVO, people vary in the weight they attach to the outcomes they receive themselves and the 
outcomes allocated to other people. In terms of utility, the concept of SVO not only assumes 
that individuals gain utility from own payoffs (pown) but also from other’s payoffs (pother). This 
assumption is formally expressed in the following utility function (Liebrand & McClintock, 
1988):  𝑈 = 𝑤! × 𝑢 𝑝!"# +  𝑤! × 𝑢 𝑝!"!!"  
 
where u indicates a utility transformation function of outcomes and w indicates the weights 
assigned to own outcomes (w1) and other’s outcomes (w2).  An individual’s SVO is 
represented by an SVO angle, which is a continuous measure computed using the weights 
assigned to own and other’s outcomes. Based on the SVO measure typically four types of 
people are differentiated: Altruists, that only value the other’s outcome, cooperators that 
assign equal weights to their own and other’s outcomes, individualists that only assign 
weights to their own outcome and competitors that value their own outcomes as well as 
other’s gaining less (Liebrand & McClintock, 1988; McClintock, 1972). Mostly, individuals’ 
preferences fall between these two extreme types by weighting their own payoffs higher than 
the other’s payoff, but not ignoring other’s payoffs completely. Methodologically, the concept 
of SVO is based on an experimental economic game approach, assessing individuals’ 
preferences by a series of allocation tasks. Depending on the allocation of money in a set of 
24 tasks, an SVO angle is assigned to an individual. The continuous nature of the SVO angle 
measure offers a fine-grained prediction of behavior.  
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SVO has been shown to be related to individual differences in concepts associated 
with a range of prosocial behaviors such as empathy and perspective taking (Declerck & 
Bogaert, 2008), fairness concerns (De Cremer, Tyler, & Ouden, 2005), and a sense of social 
responsibility (De Cremer & Van Lange, 2001). Furthermore, studies using social dilemmas, 
have found that individuals with a more prosocial SVO are more likely to cooperate in both, 
laboratory and field settings (for overviews, see Balliet et al., 2009; Bogaert et al., 2008).  
In sum, applying game theory to social dilemmas and formally integrating social 
preferences in individuals’ utility functions has contributed enormously to the understanding 
of decision making. At the intersection of economics and psychology individual differences in 
decision making are explained through the concept of SVO, which draws heavily on 
economic methodological advances.   
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Cognitive processes underlying social preference choices 
Beyond economic models of social preferences, psychological theories offer 
explanations of cooperation behavior in social dilemmas from an additional perspective. 
Instead of purely taking choices into account, psychological research has begun to examine 
the cognitive processes underlying cooperation behavior.  
 
The cognitive revolution 
The interest in processes underlying decision-making was sparked in a movement 
referred to as the “cognitive revolution” in the 1950s. Until then, psychology had been 
defined as the science of behavior and the most prevalent line of thinking was driven by the 
idea that cognitive processes are not observable and therefore cannot be considered objective 
evidence. According to Miller (2003) the cognitive revolution “brought the mind back into 
experimental psychology” (p. 142). The key figures of the cognitive revolution were 
researchers interested in opening the black box of people’s minds to learn about the 
underlying drivers of human behavior. Mischel (1973) was one of the first researchers who 
argued that it is individual differences in cognition that account for differences in behavior. 
His social-cognitive perspective on personality emphasizes cognitive processes in the 
development of personality. Prior to his work, it was argued that behavior is mostly dependent 
on traits, which are expected to be consistent across situations. The “trait” versus “state” 
question has long shaped the debate psychology with its roots in ancient philosophy. Moving 
away from a dichotomous view, Mischel (1973) suggested that it is not one of the two but 
rather a combination of the two, proposing that behavior fundamentally depends on the 
characteristics of a situation and the related cognitive processes.  
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Theoretical frameworks of cognitive processes 
In attempt to advance theoretical developments and offer an explanation for behaviors, a 
number of theoretical frameworks regarding underlying cognitive processes of decision 
making were proposed. While the following is not an exhaustive listing of these theories, it 
rather provides a comprehensive overview of theories related to the research presented in 
Chapter I to III.  
With growing research on cognitive processes, H. A. Simon (1972) was one of the 
first to identify information processing as one of the boundary conditions of rational behavior. 
The bounded rationality framework he proposed constituted a relaxation of the traditional 
rationality assumption. According to the bounded rationality framework, humans are limited 
in their cognitive capacities and can therefore only act rationally to a certain degree. Thus, it 
is argued that decision processes are limited by individual information processing. The 
framework is based on the assumption that the human mind has evolved in adaptation to 
evolutionary challenges. By ignoring information that is irrelevant to the decision, fitness-
enhancing decisions can be made under constraints of time and resources. In line with the 
notion of limited processing capacity, the adaptive toolbox provides a framework for non-
optimizing visions of bounded rationality and models heuristics on the actual cognitive 
abilities an individual has (Gigerenzer & Selten, 2002). As part of the adaptive toolbox a 
number of heuristics were identified that help humans to find a search direction, stop search 
and make a decision.  
Most decision heuristics involve a conscious consideration of given information and 
do not speak about unconscious processes. An approach that takes account of such processes 
is the dual-process cognitive framework (for an overview see Evans, 2008). Here, decisions 
are conceptualized as resulting from the interaction between intuitive or reflective decision 
processes. While intuitive processes are usually described as fast, effortless and automatic, 
reflective processes refer to slower, more effortful and deliberative processes. Dual-process 
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models are based on the concept of a two-systems framework, generally referred to as System 
1 and System 2 (e.g., Kahneman & Frederick, 2002). Here, System 1 includes processes that 
are unconscious, rapid and automatic whereas System 2 includes conscious, slow and 
deliberative processes. Relating back to heuristics judgments, these are assumed to be 
associated with System 1 rather than System 2.  
In line with the notion that decision require both automatic and deliberate processes, 
the parallel constraint satisfaction (PCS) model was developed (Glöckner & Betsch, 2008). 
Its key assumption is that decisions are constructed by maximizing the coherence of the 
mental representations of the decision problem (coherence shift). Here, information 
supporting the emerging decision in valued higher than contradictory information. The choice 
is made when a critical threshold of consistency is reached. The PCS model successfully 
predicts fast intuitive memory-based decisions (Glöckner & Hodges, 2011) and an extension 
of the model (PCS model for decision making) accounts for individual differences in 
adaptation with a sensitivity parameter (Glöckner, Hilbig, & Jekel, 2014).  
The PCS model is related to more general evidence accumulation models of decision 
making, for instance the decision field theory (Busemeyer & Townsend, 1993). Similarly, 
they assume that evidence is accumulated over time until a threshold is reached and a choice 
is made. Within their approach, deliberation processes that results in overt choices are 
modeled via diffusion processes. It is in line with neural models and in contrast to algebraic 
utility theories. Decision field theory has frequently been employed to explain risky (e.g., 
Fiedler & Glöckner, 2012) and consumer choices (e.g., Berkowitsch, Scheibehenne, & 
Rieskamp, 2014).  
Focusing on cognitive processes in social decisions, the social exchange theory 
proposed by Cosmides and Tooby (1989) is based on the assumption that cognitive capacities 
have evolved in adaptation to natural selection. Here, social exchange is defined as 
“cooperation between two or more individuals for mutual benefit” (p. 52). The authors argue 
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that the ability to engage in successful social exchange requires a number of cognitive 
capacities. Besides other cognitive abilities, memory has been identified as one of the crucial 
capacities for cooperation. Social exchange theory has proposed that people possess a so-
called cheater module, i.e., a heightened ability to remember people that cheated on them  — 
which protects cooperative individuals from being exploited (Cosmides & Tooby, 1989). 
However, although some studies have found support for a cheater module (Chiappe, Brown, 
& Dow, 2004; Mealey, Daood, & Krage, 1996; Yamagishi, Tanida, Mashima, Shimoma, & 
Kanazawa, 2003), the ability to remember some people better than others does not seem to be 
specific for cheaters (Barclay & Lalumière, 2006; Buchner, Bell, Mehl, & Musch, 2009; 
Volstorf, Rieskamp, & Stevens, 2011). Chapter I of this dissertation suggests that memory 
benefits may not only be a function of the interaction partners’ behavior but also depend on 
the prosocial orientation of the individual.  
Thus, research on decision processes has provided a number of valuable theoretical 
frameworks that can be employed to discuss and integrate novel findings. Going beyond 
choices, theories of cognitive processes offer a more fine-grained study of decision making.
INTRODUCTION 
 
22 
Eye movements as predictor of choice behavior 
Investigating cognitive processes in even more detail, the number of studies measuring eye 
movements has recently spiked (Duchowski, 2017). Visual attention is defined as selectivity 
in perception (Orquin & Mueller Loose, 2013) and is the key interest of researchers studying 
eye movements (Wedel & Pieters, 2008). Research on eye movements is mostly based on the 
underlying assumption of the eye-mind hypothesis (Just & Carpenter, 1980). The eye-mind 
hypothesis proposes that “There is no appreciable lag between what is fixated and what is 
processed” (Just & Carpenter, 1980, p. 331). In other words, it assumes that what is visually 
attended at a specific moment is being processed in working memory at that moment. There 
has been some debate as to how closely related attention and eye location really are. 
Seemingly counterintuitive at first, attention can be moved without eye movement (Posner, 
1980). The decoupling of attention from eye location has been referred to as covert attention, 
which is the opposite of overt attention. Even if covert attention can be observed in simple 
discrimination tasks (Posner, 1980), it was argued that in more complex information 
processing tasks, the link between attention and eye location is likely to be high (Rayner, 
1998). These caveats have led to the formulation of less strong versions of the original eye-
mind hypothesis in which a one-to-one relationship of attention and cognitive processing is no 
longer assumed (Huettig, Olivers, & Hartsuiker, 2011).   
 
Theoretical frameworks 
Many of the assumptions concerning the link between eye gaze and choice behavior 
are based on the attentional drift-diffusion model (aDDM), originally proposed by Krajbich et 
al. (2010). The aDDM is an evidence accumulation model, which assumes that directing the 
gaze towards a specific option resembles the process of collecting evidence in favor of that 
option. Evidence accumulation models would predict that a decision is made by accumulating 
stochastic information over time, until the net evidence in favor of one alternative exceeds a 
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pre-specified threshold and a decision is made (see Figure 1). Another key idea of the aDDM 
is that fixations affect the value comparison process by introducing a temporary drift bias 
towards the fixated item in the positive domain. More precisely, fixations supposedly have a 
causal effect on the value comparison process. It proposes that appetitive items that are 
fixated on more are more likely to be chosen eventually. In particular, the relative decision 
value changes according to  𝑉! =  𝑉!!! + 𝑑 𝑟! −  𝜃𝑟! +  𝜀! 
where 𝑉! is the value of the relative decision value at time t, 𝑟! denotes the value of the fixated 
item, 𝑟! denotes the value of the unfixated item, d is constant that controls the speed of 
integration, 𝜃 is a parameter that reflects the bias toward the fixated option (between 0 and 1), 
and 𝜀! is white Gaussian noise.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Due to its parsimonious approach and specific processing predictions, the aDDM has 
increasingly been applied to explain decision processes. Previous studies have shown that this 
model can provide a highly accurate quantitative account of the correlation between fixations 
and choices for binary and trinary choices (Krajbich et al., 2010; Krajbich, Lu, Camerer, & 
Figure 1. Attentional drift-diffusion model (aDDM). The relative decision value evolves 
over time with a bias towards the fixated item. When the respective threshold is reached, a 
choice is made. Adapted from Krajbich, Armel, and Rangel (2010).  
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Rangel, 2012; Krajbich & Rangel, 2011; Towal, Mormann, & Koch, 2013). Additional fMRI 
studies also lend support to the idea of the aDDM by showing that value signals computed in 
ventromedial prefrontal cortex at the time of choice, and widely thought to drive choices, are 
attentionally modulated (Lim, O'Doherty, & Rangel, 2011). 
The ideas underlying the aDDM are closely related to the so-called gaze cascade effect 
as it also assigns eye gaze an active role in attractiveness preference formation (Shimojo, 
Simion, Shimojo, & Scheier, 2003). The probability of looking at the eventually chosen 
option increases as the point of decision comes closer – this is, it is assumed to “cascade” up 
until the decision point with a particularly strong correlation between fixations and choice in 
the last second prior to the decision being made. The gaze cascade effect has been 
successfully replicated in the same context (Bird, Lauwereyns, & Crawford, 2012), as well as 
in the domains of risky choices (Fiedler & Glöckner, 2012; Glöckner & Herbold, 2011), 
moral choices (Pärnamets et al., 2015), consumer choices (Atalay, Bodur, & Rasolofoarison, 
2012), photographs (Glaholt & Reingold, 2009), and strategic choices (N. Stewart, Gächter, 
Noguchi, & Mullett, 2016).  
Overall, by capturing the role of attention in decision making, these models indicate 
how behavior can be predicted more accurately by taking eye movements into account.  
 
 
Measuring cognitive processes via eye-tracking 
 
Self-reported measures have been extensively employed to study decision processes (e.g., 
think-aloud protocols). As the limitations associated with self-reports (e.g., due to social 
desirability) became more prevalent (e.g., Donaldson & Grant-Vallone, 2002), the need for a 
more unobtrusive measure to systematically investigate decision processes aroused. In this 
vein, eye-tracking represents a promising tool to gather process data on a fine-grained level. 
Eye-tracking devices allow researchers to record participants’ eye movements during their 
information uptake process. In other words, “eye movement research is beginning to take 
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center stage as a means to trace the cognitive processes underlying judgments and decisions” 
(Ashby, Johnson, Krajbich, & Wedel, 2016, p. 2). First eye-tracking techniques were 
developed in the 1950s and required participants to wear contact lenses (Yarbus, 1967). 
Devices such as small mirrors and wires were attached to the lenses. Although this technology 
provided a sensitive measure of eye movements, limitations due to the invasive nature of 
wearing contact lenses were apparent. Current, non-invasive techniques of eye-tracking rely 
on video recordings of eye movements and continuously improve regarding their accuracy, 
usability and cost of acquisition. With the development of more user-friendly software, 
advancements of the hardware, and a decreased cost associated with the relevant technology, 
measuring eye movements is becoming more feasible to a larger number of researchers.  
The human visual system can divided into three regions: foveal, parafoveal and 
peripheral (Rayner, 1998). The fovea is the central part of the retina that has the highest 
density of sensory neurons and therefore the greatest acuity. Visual acuity decreases in the 
parafoveal and is lowest in the periphery. The field of view is inspected through continuous 
brief eye movement, called saccades. This allows perceiving a stimulus through the fovea 
where acuity is very high. The time in between saccades when the eyes are relatively still are 
referred to as fixations that are about 200-300 ms long (Rayner, 1998). Previous research has 
shown that humans cannot obtain new information during saccades but only during fixations 
(Rayner, 1998) and therefore analysis of eye-tracking data in the present work focuses on 
fixations.  
The eye-tracking system used in the following studies is based on the pupil-center/ 
corneal reflection method to determine eye gaze. This method captures voluntary, saccadic 
eye movements that fixate a target object on the fovea. An infrared-sensitive video camera, 
positioned below the computer monitor, observes the subject’s eye and specialized image 
software generates x and y coordinates for the gaze point on the monitor screen. The corneal 
reflection of a light source is measured relative to the location of the pupil center (Duchowski, 
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2017). In order to distinguish between eye and head movements, two points of references on 
the eye are required – the pupil center and the corneal reflection. While the distance between 
the two points remains relatively stable with head movements, it changes with eye 
movements. Calibration procedures enable eye-tracking devices to identify these two points 
of reference and the corresponding gaze location on the computer screen. 
 
Dependent measures of eye-tracking 
Considering the wealth of data that is produced by measuring eye movements, it is especially 
important to define the dependent measures that are relevant to a specific question (for an 
extensive overview of eye-tracking measures see Holmqvist et al., 2011). While there are 
numerous measures that can be used, the following brief overview focuses on measures that 
were employed in the studies of this dissertation. 
 One of the most widely studied measures is the position of a fixation, which is 
essential for the interpretation of eye-tracking data (Meißner & Oll, 2017). The x and y 
coordinates provided by the technology reveal the position of a fixation on a computer screen. 
In order to facilitate interpretation of the data, researchers commonly define areas of interest 
(AOIs). AOIs can either be defined a priori through a software by physically drawing AOI 
boundaries around stimuli or by assigning fixations to AOIs post-hoc based on their 
coordinates (for a discussion see Orquin, Ashby, & Clarke, 2016). First recommendations on 
constructing AOIs include that they should be kept maximal to avoid false negatives 
(Holmqvist et al., 2011). On the other hand, large AOI margins (i.e. the buffer space around 
an object) increase the likelihood of false positives and overlapping AOIs. Orquin et al. 
(2016) recommend that AOI margins should only be maximal if the distance between objects 
is large. In case the distance is small and fixations even overlap, they argue that AOI margins 
should be smaller to balance the ratio of true and false positive fixations. Relying on the 
auxiliary assumption that what people fixate on is processed in that moment (eye-mind 
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hypothesis; Just & Carpenter, 1976), the position of fixations is used to infer information 
processing in Chapter I, II and III.  
Second, the number of fixations provides a valuable measure for how much attention 
individuals direct to specific stimuli (Meißner & Oll, 2017). Based on the assumption that 
fixation number and decision time indicate the depth of information search (Bettman, 
Johnson, Luce, & Payne, 1993), the number of fixations is used as an indicator for 
information search effort in Chapter I and II. To assess the number of fixations to an AOI in 
relation to the overall number of fixations, the proportion of attention is often computed. The 
proportion of attention is used to quantify the relative importance or weight of the contained 
piece of information as more important pieces of information are fixated more often (e.g., 
Russo & Leclerc, 1994). Therefore, the proportion of attention is used as an indicator for 
information weighting in Chapter I and II.  
Third, eye-tracking devices record the fixation duration. It quantifies how long an 
individual’s eyes are in one position and indicates the duration of a fixation. The sum of 
fixation duration is usually interpreted as an indicator of the processing depth or effort 
(Russo, 2011). Depending on the stimuli that are fixated and their features, fixation duration 
usually ranges from 100 to 500 ms (Rayner, 1998). As it is argued that individuals need to 
fixate information for at least 200 ms in order to process it (Rayner, 1998), fixations shorter 
than 200 ms are generally not subject to data analyses if deliberative processes are studied. 
Further, fixation duration changes depending on how much time has passed in the decision 
process (Glöckner & Herbold, 2011; Krajbich et al., 2012).  
Fourth, temporal dynamics of visual attention offer valuable insights into the decision 
process. Through temporal dynamics of eye gaze researchers gain a deeper understanding of 
what information is relevant to the decision maker at which point in time. In particular, first 
and last fixations offer important insights into the decision process. Information that is 
encoded at the beginning of the decision process is more likely to be remembered (Murdock 
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Jr, 1962) and has a stronger influence on the valuation of goods (Johnson, Haubl, & Keinan, 
2007). In risky choices, options that are fixated first are more likely to be chosen subsequently 
(Manohar & Husain, 2013). Similarly, last fixations are especially relevant as they are a 
stronger predictor of choices than previous fixations (Fiedler & Glöckner, 2012; Krajbich et 
al., 2010). The role of last fixations is further highlighted in theoretical assumptions of the 
aDDM and the gaze-cascade effect. Here, it is argued that subjects generally choose the 
option they looked at last.   
In sum, eye-tracking makes it possible to capture the location, duration and proportion 
of attention, as well as its changes over time. Therein, eye-tracking offers a fine-grained 
measure of attention, which provides a valuable tool to uncover underlying drivers of decision 
making.  
 
 
Top-down and bottom-up shifts of attention 
Traditional models of decision making such as models of rationality and bounded rationality 
(H. A. Simon, 1972) assign a passive role to attention in the decision making process. 
Specifically, the models assume that attention serves the decision makers by passively 
acquiring necessary information (top-down). More recently, frameworks such as drift-
diffusion models and the gaze cascade effect have proposed that attention has a more active 
role in constructing the decision (bottom-up) (Krajbich et al., 2010; Shimojo et al., 2003). The 
distinction assumes that orienting of attention during information search depends on the goal 
an individual has in mind (for an overview see Orquin & Mueller Loose, 2013). It is 
important to note here that the two approaches are not necessarily mutually exclusive and 
both bear significantly on contemporary concepts of visual attention (Duchowski, 2017). 
Rather than adopting a dichotomous view to explain visual attention, this research focuses on 
identifying the respective magnitude of each channel. 
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Top-down control of visual attention is commonly defined as goal-driven. In a seminal 
work on top-down attention by Yarbus (1967), participants viewed photographs with different 
goals in mind and exhibited different patterns of eye movements. This work highlights the 
contingency of task relevance on the demands of a task. The perceived task relevance can be 
affected by a number of factors that were discussed in detail by Orquin and Mueller Loose 
(2013). These factors include task instructions, utility effects (i.e., people tend to gaze at 
information with greater utility), manipulating the use of heuristics (mostly by training 
participants to employ specific heuristics), attention phases (i.e., eye gaze patterns depend on 
the phase of the decision process until a choice is made), and learning effects. Thus, goal-
driven top-down processes have an impact on subsequent choices people make.  
On the other hand, bottom-up processes were defined as stimulus-driven control of 
visual attention. The surrounding context and topographical encoding of stimuli affect 
saliency-driven attention and was incorporated in a computational model of visual attention 
(Itti & Koch, 2001). For instance, results mainly from research on consumer decision making 
indicate that individuals are more likely to choose food items that are visually salient due to 
special fonts (Armel et al., 2008; Milosavljevic, Navalpakkam, Koch, & Rangel, 2012) or 
position (Reutskaja, Nagel, Camerer, & Rangel, 2011).  
Within Chapter III of this dissertation, top-down and bottom-up shifts of attention are 
studied in more detail, especially in the context of (other-regarding) social preference and 
moral choices. Whereas most research discusses social preferences as a stable construct 
(Carlsson, Johansson-Stenman, & Nam, 2014) that strongly influences other-regarding choice 
behavior (Balliet et al., 2009), increasing evidence indicates that choices in the social domain 
can be influenced by subtle manipulations of bottom-up features such as changes in the set of 
options (Knez & Camerer, 1995) and visual cues (Haley & Fessler, 2005). Corroborating 
evidence has also been brought forward in the domain of moral decision making. Here, initial 
judgments of an action being right or wrong are claimed to be formed through bottom-up 
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processes of moral reasoning (Bargh & Chartrand, 1999). Even slight changes in the 
representation such as the presentation order of a set of moral problems appear to influence 
the way decisions are made (Iliev et al., 2009).  
Overall, these findings indicate that choices are driven by a two-channel mechanism 
that includes top-down and bottom-up processes. The studies presented in Chapter III aim to 
disentangle the impact of top-down preferences and characteristics of choice presentation by 
using eye gaze as an indicator of other-regarding and moral choice processes.  
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Social dilemmas in academia: The replication crisis 
 
“In so far as a scientific statement speaks about reality, it must be falsifiable; and 
in so far as it is not falsifiable, it does not speak about reality.“ (Popper, 2005, p. 
316) 
 
Replication is a cornerstone of science. In order to lead a fruitful scientific discourse, 
evidence needs to be falsifiable (Popper, 2005) and researchers should aim for their findings 
to be reproducible, robust and generalizable. Reproducibility describes the extent to which 
consistent results are observed when scientific studies are repeated (Open Science 
Collaboration, 2012). Yet, replications are not (yet) a notable part of scientific practice. While 
researchers gain prestige and reputation for novel research, conducting a replication study 
does not offer any comparable advantages (Nosek, Spies, & Motyl, 2012). Due to such 
incentive structures, replications are underrepresented in published articles and false positive 
results remain unchallenged (Nosek et al., 2012).  
The so-called “replication crisis” describes a recent decrease of confidence in 
scientific findings due to lack of successful replications. In the early 2010s, questionable 
research practices were identified to be common in psychology (John, Loewenstein, & Prelec, 
2012). While questionable research practices (e.g. failing to report all dependent measures) 
are not identical to fraud, they affect the quality of published research substantially. It was 
argued that incentive structures that favor confirming evidence over null results promote such 
fraudulent behaviors (Nosek et al., 2012). The replication crisis has been interpreted as a 
social dilemma, which especially affects early-career researchers (Everett & Earp, 2015). 
While it is in everyone’s interest that studies are replicated to verify their scientific value, it is 
not in the self-interest of an individual researcher to conduct this replication. A possible 
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solution the authors propose to solve the dilemma is to include replications as mandatory 
components of PhD programs.  
Another approach is proposed by the Open Science movement, which distributes the 
cost of conducting a replication across a large number of researchers by promoting large-scale 
collaborations. Aiming to solve the paradox between incentive structures and the importance 
of falsification in science, the Open Science movement set out to change the incentive 
structures in the publication system. The Reproducibility Project is one of the first large-scale 
collaborations that systematically estimated the reproducibility rate of psychological science 
and investigated factors predicting reproducibility (Open Science Collaboration, 2015). In 
total, 270 contributing authors completed 100 replications by closely following a protocol for 
conducting high-quality replications. While 97% of the original studies had statistically 
significant results, only 36% of the replications had statistically significant results.  
Their approach focuses on the overall reproducibility rate rather than individual 
studies’ replicability after multiple replication attempts (Open Science Collaboration, 2012). 
There has been disagreement regarding the interpretation of replications– what does it mean if 
a replication failed and what can we conclude from successful replications (Earp & Trafimow, 
2015)? Not finding the same results as an original study can have more than one reason. Even 
if the replication was conducted as careful as possible using original materials, there is chance 
for a Type II error of 1–β of not finding a true effect. On the other hand, failures to replicate 
include that the original study suffered from a Type I error, finding an effect when there is no 
true effect. Other reasons for failed replications include insufficient power and 
methodological flaws in either the original or the replication. Earp and Trafimow (2015) 
argue that to achieve the most informative value, a series of replications should be conducted 
independently across different labs. Examples for such large-scale replication efforts include 
the Many Labs replications projects (R. A. Klein et al., 2014) and Registered Replication 
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Reports (e.g., Bouwmeester et al., 2017). Here, the influence of time pressure on cooperation 
was replicated across 21 independent, pre-registered studies.  
In order to further improve scientific research methodology, Open Science proposed a 
number of practices for authors as well as editors to ensure the publication of high-quality 
research. These include publication of studies independent of their statistical significance 
(e.g., Nosek & Lakens, 2014), the publication of replication studies (e.g., Koole & Lakens, 
2012), pre-registration of hypotheses and methods, transparent analyses (Bakker, van Dijk, & 
Wicherts, 2012) and free availability of the raw data (Wicherts, Borsboom, Kats, & Molenaar, 
2006). Rather than being a constraint, it was argued by Frankenhuis and Nettle (in press) that 
these practices have a liberating component because they offer the possibility to explore data 
transparently, a reward for quality that can be influenced rather than outcomes which can not 
be influenced, and a reduction of the need to find positive results.  
In sum, psychological science has recently made improvements to the quality of their 
research by identifying unreliable effects, acknowledging the importance of and creating 
incentives for replication studies and formulating recommendations for open and transparent 
research practices. All studies included in this dissertation followed these recommended 
practices by making all materials and data openly available. In addition, the hypotheses for 
studies in Chapter I and III were pre-registered prior to data collection.   
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The present research 
This works aims to provide a bridge between the fields of behavioral economics and 
psychology. It offers insights on cognitive processes underlying decision making from an 
individual differences perspective. The SVO framework offers an excellent theoretical 
framework to address questions raised regarding individual differences– social preferences in 
particular. Going beyond choice behavior, the eye-tracking methodology offers a novel 
perspective on attentional cognitive processes underlying choices in social dilemmas. In this 
thesis, I use both approaches: Chapter I addresses the link between social preferences 
(measured through SVO) and recall of an interaction partner’s cooperation behavior, with 
contributions to the understanding of memory lack as a possible reason for systematic 
deviations from cooperation. Focusing on attention patterns in more detail, Chapter II studies 
how social preferences affect information search effort and weighting in strategic social 
interactions. It contributes to understanding the individual motivations and considerations that 
drive strategic decision making. Chapter III investigates the link between top-down and 
bottom-up processes of attention on other-regarding choices, with contributions to 
understanding how decisions can potentially be influenced by guiding attention or systematic 
interruptions of the decision process.  
 
Chapter I: The cost of imperfect memory in social interactions 
Chapter I builds upon the ability to sustain cooperation between unrelated members of a 
group – one of the hallmarks of human behavior and suggested to be a driving force in the 
evolution of human intelligence (e.g. McNally, Brown, & Jackson, 2012). Reciprocity, 
however, requires keeping track of the interaction partner’s behaviors, which can be a taxing 
task with growing social environments. As a solution, social contract theory has proposed that 
people possess a so-called cheater module, i.e. a heightened ability to remember people that 
cheated on them  – which protects cooperative individuals from being exploited (Cosmides & 
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Tooby, 1989). However, although some studies have found support for a cheater module 
(Chiappe et al., 2004; Mealey et al., 1996; Yamagishi et al., 2003), the ability to remember 
some people better than others does not appear to be specific to cheaters (Barclay & 
Lalumière, 2006; Buchner et al., 2009; Volstorf et al., 2011). From an evolutionary 
perspective, the ability to remember an interaction partner’s behavior and avoid exploitation 
should be particularly important for prosocial individuals. Thus, Chapter I addresses whether 
memory benefits may not only be a function of the interaction partners’ behavior but also 
depend on the prosocial orientation of the individual. Within three pre-registered studies, 
Chapter I investigates whether the ability to remember how a social interaction partner 
behaved is related to an individual’s social preference. A second goal of Chapter I is to 
identify potential drivers of the effect by analyzing information search during encoding of the 
partners’ behavior. 
 
Chapter II: Social Value Orientation predicts information search in strategic settings: 
An eye-tracking analysis 
Chapter II focuses on attention patterns in strategic choices and thereby extends research on 
the underlying cognitive mechanisms in social dilemmas. Previous studies investigating 
beliefs and expectations within strategic interactions provided first indications for a 
heterogeneity that extends from choices to the mental representation of these situations 
(Smeesters, Warlop, Van Avermaet, Corneille, & Yzerbyt, 2003; Van Lange, 1992). Yet, an 
understanding of the underlying motivational mechanisms of strategic social decision making 
is largely lacking. In Chapter II, the goal is to shed light on the cognitive channels linking 
social preferences and cooperation behavior. To pursue this objective, we systematically 
examine whether information search effort and weighting are driven by social preferences 
when people contemplate strategic decisions. Specifically, this work examines the impact of 
SVO on information search in a simple symmetric prisoner’s dilemma. In addition to 
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individual differences, Chapter II aims to uncover whether the relation between attention and 
other-regarding choices goes beyond a correlational link. In order to particularly capture the 
temporal dynamics of strategic decision making, a process measure approach utilizing eye- 
tracking is employed. Particularly, the research examines how contextual variation influences 
people’s choices in a prisoner’s dilemma.  
 
Chapter III: The power of attention: Using eye gaze to predict other-regarding and 
moral choices 
Chapter III of this dissertation builds upon a number of studies that have used gaze recordings 
to understand the processes underlying decision making in different areas (for a review see 
Orquin & Mueller Loose, 2013). So far, they have provided consistent evidence for a 
correlation between eye gaze and subsequent other-regarding (e.g., Fiedler et al., 2013) and 
moral choices (Pärnamets et al., 2015). The current state of the evidence suggests that both 
top-down preferences and characteristics of choice presentation drive information search. 
Inspired by these findings, Chapter III aims to disentangle these two drivers of the correlation 
between eye gaze and choice behavior. In doing so, we critically tested the causality claims 
made in recent publications (Armel et al., 2008; Milosavljevic et al., 2012; Newell & Le 
Pelley, 2018; Pärnamets et al., 2015) in two high-powered, eye-tracking studies using eye 
gaze to predict other-regarding and moral choices. Study 1 focuses on three key points: First, 
we aim to disentangle top-down and bottom-up processes of decision making. Second, we 
will test whether the effect of attention on choices is context-dependent by comparing other-
regarding and moral choices. Due to selection biases that were identified in the data, Study 2 
utilizes a decision paradigm that allows to fully control information intake to test for the 
influence of attention on choice. This design enables us to partial out bottom-up processes of 
attention on choices more clearly and avoids potential selection effects. 
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Abstract 
Memory has been proposed as one of the most crucial cognitive capacities required for 
successful cooperation in social dilemmas. Remembering whether a person cooperated or 
defected in a previous interaction enables decision makers to avoid being exploited by free 
riders. From an evolutionary perspective, the ability to remember an interaction partner’s 
behavior and avoid exploitation should be particularly important for prosocial individuals. 
Following this idea, we investigated whether the ability to remember how a social interaction 
partner behaved is related to an individual’s social preference in three studies. Further, we 
aimed to identify potential drivers of the effect by analyzing information search during 
encoding of the partner’s behavior. Using eye-tracking, we recorded participants’ gaze 
behavior during the observation of other players’ previous choices in decomposed games. 
Subsequently, participants were asked to recall the behavior of each observed player. We then 
used individuals’ social preferences (measured as social value orientation) to predict 
participants’ memory performance. We found that prosocial individuals were more likely to 
recall previous players’ behavior than proself individuals.  Moreover, a mediation analysis 
indicated that those differences were partly driven by the extent of information search during 
encoding. In sum our results suggest that prosocial individuals are better able to identify free 
riders, which could protect them from being exploited in future interactions.  
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Introduction 
The ability to sustain cooperation between unrelated members of a group is one of the 
hallmarks of human behavior and is suggested to be a driving force in the evolution of human 
intelligence (e.g.,  McNally et al., 2012). A cornerstone of the evolution of cooperative 
behavior is reciprocity (Trivers, 1971). Purely cooperative and prosocial behavioral strategies 
fail to succeed, because they pose a disadvantage if they are not reciprocated. In contrast, 
strategies that show reciprocal cooperation such as the famous “tit-for-tat” strategy thrive 
because they enable individuals to profit from the mutual benefits of cooperation while 
protecting them from being exploited by selfish individuals (Axelrod & Hamilton, 1981). 
Reciprocity, however, requires keeping track of the interaction partner’s behaviors, which can 
be a taxing task with growing social environments. As a solution, social contract theory has 
proposed that people possess a so-called cheater module, i.e., a heightened ability to 
remember people that cheated on them  – which protects cooperative individuals from being 
exploited (Cosmides & Tooby, 1989). However, although some studies have found support 
for a cheater module (Chiappe et al., 2004; Mealey et al., 1996; Yamagishi et al., 2003), the 
ability to remember some people better than others does not appear to be specific to cheaters 
(Barclay & Lalumière, 2006; Buchner et al., 2009; Volstorf et al., 2011). Moreover, it is still 
unclear whether the reported memory benefits are sufficient to sustain cooperation (Stevens, 
Volstorf, Schooler, & Rieskamp, 2011). Thus, we suggest that memory benefits may not only 
be a function of the interaction partners’ behavior but also depend on the prosocial orientation 
of the individual. Individuals show stable differences in their social value orientation (SVO), 
a measure that differentiates between individuals who typically cooperate and individuals 
who primarily attempt to maximize their own payoff (Liebrand & McClintock, 1988). 
Cooperative individuals are not only more likely to make prosocial choices, they also show 
more interest in their interaction partner’s payoff (Fiedler, Glöckner, Nicklisch & Dickert, 
2013). This suggests that cooperative individuals will have a better memory for their 
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interaction partner and their behavior, enabling them to protect themselves from being 
exploited.  
In the following, we will first review the literature on memory, cooperation, social 
preferences, and attention to interaction partners and explain our hypotheses in more detail. 
Then, we will report three empirical studies we conducted to test the hypotheses.  
 
Cooperation, reciprocity, and memory 
Cooperation is defined as the process of groups or individuals working together for 
common or mutual benefit. However, cooperation is susceptible to exploitation and free-
riding, making it difficult for purely cooperative strategies to prevail (Fischbacher, Gächter, & 
Fehr, 2001). Cooperative strategies, however, are successful when cooperation is reciprocal – 
that is, cooperation is only maintained when the interaction partner also cooperates. 
Reciprocity, for instance, has been identified as a crucial mechanism for mutual cooperation 
to develop in societies (Trivers, 1971). However, reciprocity is only possible when interaction 
partners can track each other’s behavior (Cosmides & Tooby, 1989). In many interactions, 
reciprocity is delayed rather than simultaneous. This time delay requires memory capacity in 
order to recall an individual’s previous behavior. For example, if there is a lengthy timespan 
between two group projects, one must be able to recall a coworker’s cooperation behavior in 
the first project in order to reciprocate in the next project. Furthermore, memory enables us to 
predict future behavior (Atance & O'Neill, 2001). Thus, knowing that someone returned a 
favor in the past will increase the likelihood of initiating prosocial behavior in a new 
interaction, which represents the first step in building a relationship based on reciprocity.  
According to the social exchange theory, cognitive capacities associated with memory 
for individuals who cheated or hurt us should be favored by natural selection so they can be 
avoided in the future (Cosmides & Tooby, 1989). Several studies have investigated this 
proposition and revealed inconsistent evidence. Although some studies found that faces of 
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defectors were recognized more quickly and remembered better than faces of cooperators 
(Mealey et al., 1996; Verplaetse, Vanneste, & Braeckman, 2007; Yamagishi et al., 2003), a 
number of studies failed to replicate evidence for preferential face recognition of defectors 
(Barclay & Lalumière, 2006; Buchner et al., 2009; Mehl & Buchner, 2008). Based on this 
evidence, Buchner et al. (2009) argued that instead of face recognition, memory for the 
behavior associated with a face is the more relevant aspect. Focusing on memory for behavior 
instead of mere face recognition, they found that recalling whether a person had defected was 
consistently better for faces associated with defection than for faces associated with 
cooperation. However, other studies showed that the observed memory improvements are not 
specific to remembering whether someone defected but are instead driven by more general 
mechanisms that influence memory such as the strength of the emotional reaction and 
expectance incongruity (for an overview, see Bell & Buchner, 2012). Similarly, Bell and 
Buchner (2011) showed that when describing trustworthy behavior with a high valence 
strength and cheating behavior with a low valence strength, the memory advantage for 
cheaters disappeared. Likewise, varying the frequency of how often cheating and cooperative 
partners were encountered suggested that rarely encountered partners are remembered better 
(Volstorf et al., 2011).  
Overall, there is little evidence for a cheater module. However, source memory for 
cheating or defection behaviors can be better than for cooperative behaviors, especially if 
cheating is rare and of high negative valence. Nevertheless, studies attempting to simulate the 
level of memory necessary to sustain cooperation indicated that average levels of memory 
performance typically found in laboratory experiments may not suffice (Stevens et al., 2011), 
suggesting that further mechanisms may be necessary to understand how cooperation can be 
maintained.  
COST OF IMPERFECT MEMORY 42 
Social preferences and cooperation  
While most people are sometimes prosocial and sometimes behave selfishly, there are 
stable individual differences in people’s social preferences. Specifically, it has been suggested 
that individuals differ in terms of the degree to which they only care about resources allocated 
to themselves (self-interest) or also care about resources allocated to others (Fehr & 
Fischbacher, 2002). One construct measuring these individual differences is the concept of 
SVO (Liebrand & McClintock, 1988). SVO refers to how people approach social dilemmas, 
that is, social interactions in which one’s own benefits are weighed against consequences for 
others (Cox et al., 1999; A. J. Stewart & Plotkin, 2016; Van Lange, 1999). Depending on their 
SVO, people vary in terms of the weight they attach to the outcomes they receive themselves 
and the outcomes allocated to other people. In terms of utility, the concept of SVO assumes 
that individuals gain utility not only from their own payoffs (pown) but also from other’s 
payoffs (pother). This assumption is formally expressed in the following utility function 
(Liebrand & McClintock, 1988):  𝑈 = 𝑤! × 𝑢 𝑝!"# +  𝑤! × 𝑢 𝑝!"!!"  
where u indicates a utility transformation function of outcomes and w indicates the weights 
assigned to one’s own outcomes (w1) and other’s outcomes (w2).  An individual’s SVO is 
represented by an SVO angle, which is a continuous measure computed using the weights 
assigned to one’s own and other’s outcomes. An SVO angle is constructed using the radian 
value of the arccosine of the sum of payoffs allocated either to oneself (pown) or the other 
person (pother) and is computed as follows.  
If the sum of the other’s payoffs is positive:  
𝑆𝑉𝑂 𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑙𝑒 = cos!! 𝑝!"#𝑝!"#! + 𝑝!"!!"! !.!  ×  180𝜋   
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If the sum of other’s payoffs is negative:  
𝑆𝑉𝑂 𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑙𝑒 = −cos!! 𝑝!"#𝑝!"#! + 𝑝!"!!"! !.!  ×  180𝜋   
Based on the SVO measure, four types of people are typically differentiated: Altruists, who 
only value the other’s outcome; cooperators, who assign equal weight to their own and the 
other’s outcomes; individualists, only assign weight to their own outcome; and competitors, 
who value their own outcomes as well as comparatively smaller gains for the other (Liebrand 
& McClintock, 1988; McClintock, 1972). However, these four types are frequently grouped 
into two categories: prosocials (altruists and cooperators) and proselfs (individualists and 
competitors). Typically, individuals’ preferences fall between these two extreme types in that 
they weight their own payoffs higher than the other’s payoff but do not ignore the latter 
completely. 
SVO has been shown to be related to individual differences in concepts associated 
with a range of prosocial behaviors such as empathy and perspective-taking (Declerck & 
Bogaert, 2008), beliefs about others (Kelley & Stahelski, 1970), fairness concerns (De Cremer 
et al., 2005), and a sense of social responsibility (De Cremer & Van Lange, 2001). 
Furthermore, studies using social dilemmas, have found that individuals with a more prosocial 
SVO are more likely to cooperate in both, laboratory and field settings (for overviews, see 
Balliet et al., 2009; Bogaert et al., 2008).  
These results suggest that the ability to remember an interaction partner’s behaviors 
may be particularly important for prosocial individuals. Prosocial individuals are more likely 
to cooperate and thus also risk being exploited by selfish interaction partners. However, if 
they are able to remember their interactions partner’s behavior, this would allow them to 
avoid individuals who do not reciprocate, and still maintain cooperation with other prosocial 
individuals. First evidence of this link stems from literature on individual differences in 
prosocial behavior as well as how they relate to processing information about other people. 
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SVO, attention, and memory 
Prosocial and proself individuals differ not only in terms of how much they cooperate 
in social dilemmas but also regarding the cognitive processes underlying their decision 
process (Jiang, Potters, & Funaki, 2016). This suggests that prosocials pay more attention to 
their interaction partners. Prosocials took longer to make a decision in social dilemmas 
(Dehue, McClintock, & Liebrand, 1993) and were more likely to seek information supporting 
cooperative behavior than proself individuals (Camac, 1992). Furthermore, in a money 
allocation task, prosocial individuals inspected more information and directed more attention 
to the other player’s payoff as compared to proself individuals (Fiedler et al., 2013).   
This increase in attention suggests that prosocial individuals should also have a better 
memory of the task structure and their interaction partners’ behavior. Researchers have noted 
that attention and memory appear to be adaptively tuned such that individuals focus on and 
remember key features of the environment that have been closely linked to differential 
reproductive success over evolutionary time (Buss, 1989; S. B. Klein, Cosmides, Tooby, & 
Chance, 2002; Maner, Gailliot, Rouby, & Miller, 2007; McArthur & Baron, 1983; Nairne, 
Pandeirada, Gregory, & Van Arsdall, 2009; Schützwohl, 2006; Schützwohl & Koch, 2004). 
Memory abilities are related to attention during encoding. Attending to a fact or event 
enhances the likelihood of later memory (Chun & Turk-Browne, 2007). For instance, several 
studies have found that the number of fixations directed to a stimulus are predictive of 
subsequent memory performance (Bloom & Mudd, 1991; Kafkas & Montaldi, 2011). 
Exposure time to a face successfully predicts identification accuracy (Bornstein, 
Deffenbacher, Penrod, & McGorty, 2012; Laughery, Alexander, & Lane, 1971). In turn, the 
ability to remember an interaction partner’s behavior should enable prosocial individuals to 
pick interaction partners who will cooperate with a higher likelihood than proself individuals, 
thus reducing the risk of being exploited by selfish interaction partners.  
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An additional factor that is related to the fear of being exploited by selfish individuals 
is risk aversion. A recent study found that risk-averse individuals were more likely to 
cooperate with their partners than risk-seeking individuals in cooperation-friendly 
environments, where the risk of being cheated on was low, but not in cooperation-unfriendly 
environments (Glöckner & Hilbig, 2012). On a process level, more risk-averse individuals 
exhibited more extensive information search in consumer decisions (Conchar, Zinkhan, 
Peters, & Olavarrieta, 2004). This pattern of decision behavior and processes is similar to the 
patterns observed for prosocial individuals in social dilemmas. To avoid confounding risk 
aversion with prosociality when predicting memory performance, risk aversion is included as 
a control variable in the studies.  
To test our hypotheses, we conducted three studies investigating the relationship 
between social preferences and memory by studying recall of an interaction partner’s 
behavior in a social dilemma. Study 1 was an online investigation examining the premise that 
an individual’s social preferences, their SVO in particular, are linked to memory performance 
when recalling an interaction partner’s behavior. Going one step further, in Study 2a we then 
used eye-tracking to assess the underlying processes that potentially drive the effect between 
memory and social preferences. Specifically, we examined how much of the relationship 
between SVO and memory can be attributed to orienting attention during information 
encoding. Exploring boundary conditions of this relationship, Study 2b then investigated the 
link between SVO and long-term memory for interaction partners. Finally, in Study 3 we 
again conducted an online study investigating whether memory for interaction partners’ 
behavior enables prosocial individuals to select interaction partners who are more likely to be 
cooperative than proself individuals. 
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Study 1 
Study 1 is an online study that aimed to assess the relation between SVO and explicit 
memory. Participants repeatedly interacted with others and allocated money between 
themselves and the interaction partner. In each trial, they received feedback on their 
interaction partner’s behavior. After working on a distractor task, participants were asked to 
recall their interaction partner’s behavior. Based on theory and previous findings, we assume 
that individuals who are more prosocial are more likely to correctly recall their interaction 
partner’s behavior than individuals who are less prosocial (H1). Memory is measured by 
explicitly asking participants to recall their interaction partner’s behavior. We are also 
interested in the drivers of this relationship and hypothesize that encoding depth in the initial 
encoding phase will be one of the main factors that influence the recall probability. 
Specifically, we hypothesize that individuals who are more prosocial exhibit longer search 
times when encoding their interaction partners behavior as well as longer response times for 
their own choice (H2). Investigating the role of information search more closely, we assume 
that response time partially mediates the link between SVO and explicit memory (H3). 
 
Method 
Participants. Seventy-nine participants from the Max Planck Decision Lab subject 
pool (students of the University of Bonn) were recruited via Orsee (Greiner, 2015). The 
experiment was conducted online via the platform Unipark and lasted approximately 40 
minutes. Participants were fully incentivized and received a mean payoff of 9.20 Euros (≈ 
11.30 USD), which varied according to their choices. The pre-registered number of 
participants who were scheduled to take part in the study was set to 66 to account for 
dropouts. Due to a technical error (n = 13), an additional 13 participants were scheduled for 
participation. Participants with incomplete data (n = 5) were excluded, resulting in a final 
sample of 61 participants (mean age = 23.1 years, 75.4% female). We determined the target 
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sample size of at least 60 participants by conducting an a priori power analysis (power = .80) 
based on an effect size estimate retrieved from a re-analysis of data collected by Volstorf et 
al. (2011). For a more detailed description of the power analysis as well as the pre-registered 
hypotheses and analyses, see bit.do/Preregistration_Study1. Following the literature, we refer 
to altruists and cooperators as prosocials (SVO angle > 22.5°) and individualists and 
competitors as proselfs (SVO angle < 22.5°).1  
Materials.  
Money allocation task. Participants encountered 10 money allocation problems in the 
main part of the experiment. In each problem, participants are asked to decide between two 
payoff combinations, labeled as option A and B. The two options differed regarding the 
possible payoffs for the participant and their matched interaction partner (see Figure 2). For 
each of the 10 pairs, participants were instructed to choose the outcome distribution they most 
preferred. We constructed the 10 money allocation problems in two steps. First, using data 
from a previous study run at the Max Planck Decision Lab, we identified items of the SVO 
ring measure (Liebrand & McClintock, 1988) that were particularly high in their diagnostic 
value and clearly distinguished between prosocial and proself players. Second, based on these 
items, we constructed new problems that had similar cost-benefit ratios but varied in their 
payoffs.2  
Face stimuli. To represent the interaction partners, participants were shown pictures 
of 5 females and 5 males between 19 and 30 years old displaying a neutral facial expression. 
These pictures were taken from the FACES Database (Ebner & Johnson, 2010; see Figure 2 
for an example). The 10 faces were all rated as moderately attractive (M = 2.09, SD = 0.05, 
range of the rating scale: (1) very unattractive – (4) very attractive).3  
                                                
1 For a graphical representation of the distribution of SVO angles for all studies, please see Figure S1 in the 
supplementary material provided online. 
2 A list of money allocation tasks used for all studies is provided in the online supplementary material (Table 
S1). 
3 We selected the 10 faces by using data from a previous study in which the attractiveness of the same pictures 
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SVO ring measure. Participants completed the SVO ring measure in the fourth part of 
the online study. The instrument is frequently used to determine individual social preferences, 
i.e. weighting of one’s own and others payoffs. Specifically, participants were asked to make 
24 choices between two options representing money allocations that differed in terms of 
payoffs for one’s self and others. Participants could either maximize their own payoff or 
decide to forego money in order to benefit the other. According to their choices, participants 
were classified as prosocial (SVO angle > 22.5°) or proself (SVO angle < 22.5°). The mean 
SVO angle was 22.54° (SD = 20.37°). 29 participants were classified as prosocials; and 32 as 
proselfs. Participants’ choices were fully incentivized such that one of the money allocations 
was randomly selected and paid out at the end of the study.   
Risk aversion. As a control variable, participants completed a test for risk aversion 
(Holt & Laury, 2002). The test consists of 10 choices between two options with varying 
probabilities of receiving a certain payoff. One of the options is always safe and the other 
always risky to varying degrees. The probability of the high-payoff risky outcome gradually 
increases with the riskier option becoming progressively less risky from item 1 to item 10. 
The point at which participants switch to the risky option is used as an indicator for their risk 
aversion, where later switches indicate greater risk aversion. A relative risk aversion 
parameter was calculated for every participant based on the procedure described by Holt and 
Laury (2002).   
A complete overview of the items, face stimuli, original instructions, and a print 
version of the experiment can be found here bit.do/Materials_Study1. 
Procedure. 
Encoding phase. In the first part of the experiment, participants repeatedly engaged in 
a money allocation problem with 10 different interaction partners. 
                                                                                                                                                   
was rated on the same scale (Hayn-Leichsenring, Kloth, Schweinberger, & Redies, 2013). 	
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 In each interaction, participants first observed the decision their interaction partner 
had made in the respective money allocation problem (partner’s decision). After observing 
the interaction partners’ choice, the participant made a choice regarding the same money 
allocation task and the same partner (own decision). In each interaction, participants viewed a 
face representing the interaction partner, the money allocation problem, and the partner’s 
choice. The interaction partner’s choice was either individualistic (i.e. maximizing the payoff 
of the interaction partner) or prosocial (i.e. maximizing the payoff of the participant). Each 
partner was represented by the same face picture in all interactions. However, participants 
were informed that the presented face did not display the actual participant but rather was 
used as a place holder representing the respective person. The option that was chosen by their 
partner in the money allocation problem was visually highlighted using a dark grey rectangle 
as a background (see Figure 2). To avoid confounding faces and type of players 
(individualistic vs. prosocial) each face had the same likelihood of being presented with a 
prosocial or an individualistic player (between subjects). Further, we counterbalanced all 
tasks concerning the position of the prosocial option in the matrix (left or right).  
 Participants interacted with each of the 10 partners 7 times, resulting in a total of 70 
choices (i.e., 7 blocks). The presentation order was randomly determined within a block. 
Participants responded to five players who had chosen the prosocial option and five players 
who had chosen the individualistic option. Each partner was always shown together with the 
same money allocation problem; participants were informed that because the other player 
received no feedback, the option chosen by the partner would be constant across the seven 
blocks.  
To incentivize choices, participants were informed that one of the rounds would be 
selected at random and paid out at the end of the experiment. The payout was determined 
after all participants had completed the task. Participants were matched in pairs, depending on 
the behavior they had observed in the selected round, as well as on their own choice, such that 
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the matched partner’s choice corresponded to the observed behavior. After completing the 
seven blocks, a short distractor task followed, asking participants to memorize the order of 
symbols and then sort them correctly.  
Explicit memory phase. In the subsequent explicit memory phase, participants were 
asked to recall how their interaction partners behaved during the encoding phase. Again, the 
interaction partners and the respective money allocation problems were presented in random 
order. Participants could indicate whether the player had chosen option A or option B by 
pressing on the corresponding button. This task was fully incentivized in that participants 
could earn an extra 10 cents for each correct answer. After completing the task, participants 
received feedback regarding their number of correct answers.  
After the experiment ended, participants were asked to complete the SVO ring 
measure and, finally, the risk aversion measure.4 
Data analysis. To test whether social preferences have an impact on memory for 
interaction partners’ behavior, we used a repeated measurement logistic regression predicting 
memory accuracy by SVO angle. Analyzing the influence of SVO angle on response time, we 
used a repeated measures linear regression. Prior to analyses, we tested the assumption of a 
normal distribution of response time using the Shapiro-Wilk test. The results indicate a 
skewed distribution (W = 0.63, z = 12.15, p < .001). We corrected for this by log-transforming 
response time. Using a mediation analysis, we then tested whether the effect of SVO angle on 
memory accuracy is mediated by response times. When entering interaction effects, we 
centered all involved predictor variables. For all regression analyses, we calculated robust 
standard errors. Throughout the article, we report two-sided test statistics. We use a 
significance level of α = .05 when testing undirected hypotheses and a significance level of α 
= .10 when testing directed (and preregistered) hypotheses for interpretation purposes. In 
order to test the stability of the result, we controlled for participant gender, the interaction 
                                                
4 Participants additionally rated the attractiveness of the presented faces for another unrelated project after 
completing this study. 
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partner gender, risk aversion, the cost-benefit ratio of the item, the pre-rated attractiveness of 
the face, as well as the observed behavior (prosocial vs. individualistic choice) to predict 
memory accuracy and information search. These factors have been identified in the literature 
as potential drivers of memorability. The raw data are available here bit.do/Data_Study1; and 
a detailed description of all analyses here bit.do/Analysis_Study1.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2. Experimental procedure of Study 1. (a) Partner’s decision: Observation of 
interaction partner’s choice. In this example, the partner chose option A. (b) Own decision: 
The participant could choose how to distribute money between himself and the displayed 
partner by choosing either option A or B. (c) Distractor: Presentation of distractor task. (d) 
Explicit memory phase: Recalling the displayed person’s behavior. 
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Results 
Predicting explicit memory performance. Overall, participants recalled their 
interaction partner’s behavior in 74.26% of trials. The correct explicit memory rate was 80% 
for prosocial participants and 69.06% for proself participants. To test our first pre-registered 
hypothesis, namely that more prosocial individuals are more likely to correctly recall their 
interaction partner’s behavior than less prosocial individuals (H1), we predicted the correct 
recall of an interaction partner’s behavior using SVO angle. The results show that individuals 
with a higher SVO angle (more prosocial) exhibit better recall of their interaction partners’ 
behavior in a social dilemma (β = .31, z = 2.43, p = .015, see Figure 3a). Descriptively, the 
proportion of correctly recalled types of behavior was 10.94 percentage points higher for 
participants classified as prosocial than for those classified as proselfs (Cohen’s h = .25).5 
Controlling for the variables identified above, the results indicate that the effect of SVO on 
explicit memory performance persists (see Table S3). The results reveal no significant effect 
of interaction partner’s type on explicit memory (β = -.11, z = -0.86, p = .389). In line with 
previous findings, SVO angle successfully predicted the proportion of prosocial choices in 
money allocation tasks while controlling for the same factors as above (see Table S4).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
5 ℎ =  2sin!! 𝑃! − 2sin!! 𝑃! =  2sin!! 0.8 − 2sin!! 0.69 = .25  
P is the proportion of correctly recalled behaviors for prosocials (P1) and proselfs (P2; Cohen, 1988, p .181).  
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Predicting information search. In order to obtain an initial understanding of the 
underlying cognitive processes driving the effect of memory, we additionally analyzed 
response times in the encoding phase. To do so, we aggregated and log-transformed response 
times across items such that the sum of response times is computed for every item and 
subsequently log transformed. We were interested in both stages: (1) the feedback regarding 
the partner’s behavior in the first stage of the encoding phase (partner’s decision); and (2) the 
participant’s own decision (own decision). In line with our pre-registered H2, SVO angle 
significantly predicts response time during encoding (β = .41, z = 3.25, p = .001). Specifically, 
more prosocial participants spend more time inspecting partners’ decisions than more proself 
participants. The main effect of SVO on response times while receiving feedback about the 
partners’ decision holds when controlling for the set of pre-specified control variables (Table 
1). In contrast to H2, we do not find an effect of SVO angle on response time when 
Figure 3. Proportion of correctly recalled behavior of the interaction partner, depending on 
SVO angle for all studies. SVO angle is displayed in 5° bins. Areas shaded in grey are 95% 
confidence intervals. 
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SVO and explicit memory
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participants were asked to make their own choice (β = .12, z = 1.49, p = .137). This result 
does not change when controlling for the pre-specified control variables (Table 1). 
 
Table 1 
Response time during encoding predicted by SVO angle 
 
 Response time (log-transformed) 
 Partner’s decision Own decision 
SVO angle  0.39** (2.93) 0.10 (1.23) 
Prosocial partner 0.03 (1.18) 0.01 (0.37) 
Female participant -0.16 (-1.41) -0.10+ (-1.72) 
Female partner 0.09** (3.12) 0.03 (1.61) 
Risk aversion -0.01 (-0.08) 0.01 (0.23) 
Attractiveness -0.01 (-0.26) -0.01 (-0.73) 
Cost-benefit ratio 0.00 (0.05) -0.02 (-0.92) 
Constant 0.06 (0.52) -0.06 (-0.87) 
Observations 610 
Note. Standardized coefficients are reported; z statistics in parentheses, + p < .10, ** p < .01.  
 
Mediation of the link between SVO and explicit memory. We used a mediation 
analysis to test our directed hypothesis that the effect of SVO angle on explicit memory is 
mediated by increased response times (H3) (see Figure 4).6 As a first step, we included 
response time during encoding (partner’s decision) in the logistic regression model predicting 
explicit memory performance. In doing so, we found that when including response time as an 
additional predictor, the influence of SVO angle on memory decreases (β = .20, z = 1.49, p = 
                                                
6 SVO angle does not significantly predict response time during participants’ own decisions. Therefore, we only 
report the results using response time while receiving feedback about the partner’s decision as a mediator here. 
For a mediation analysis including response time during participants’ own decisions, see Table S5.   
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.137); and response time significantly predicts explicit memory performance (β = .25, z = 
2.14, p = .032). For the mediation analysis, we cannot use the standard procedure proposed by 
Sobel (1982) as our model includes continuous and binary variables. Instead, we followed the 
analytical approach suggested by Karlson, Holm, and Breen (2010) using the KHB method, 
which estimates an indirect effect that is not distorted by differences in scales by rescaling the 
residuals’ standard deviation.  
We found a total effect of SVO on explicit memory in that SVO angle significantly 
predicts memory for an interaction partner’s behavior. This effect is reduced for the direct 
effect when response time is added to the model. Overall, the total effect of SVO angle on 
explicit memory is 1.4 times larger than the direct effect. The indirect effect of SVO angle on 
explicit memory via response time indicates that the effect of SVO on memory is partially 
mediated by response time. Specifically, 28.59% of the total effect of SVO angle on explicit 
memory is due to response time.  
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Discussion Study 1 
Study 1 investigated whether an individual’s social preferences are linked to memory 
performance in social interactions. Based on prior evidence that not only choice behavior but 
also underlying cognitive processes differ depending on individual social preferences, we 
postulated that more prosocial individuals would be more likely to recall their interaction 
partner’s behavior (H1) than less prosocial individuals. Lending support to this hypothesis, 
our findings provide first evidence that an individual’s social preference is indeed related to 
memory in social dilemmas. Thus, the notion that memory may be adaptively tuned to the 
specific challenges an individual faces receives initial support (Nairne et al., 2009). For 
Figure 4. Illustration of mediation design with one mediating variable. The figure shows 
the effect of SVO angle on response time (a), the effect of response time on explicit 
memory (b), the total effect of SVO on memory (c), the direct effect of SVO on explicit 
memory mediated by response time (c’), and the indirect effect of SVO angle on explicit 
memory via response time (a × b). Control variables are included and standardized 
coefficients are reported. For the indirect effect, standard errors are bootstrapped with 1000 
repetitions. + p < .10, * p < .05, ** p < .01. 
 SVO angle 
 Response time (log) 
 Explicit memory 
c’ = .20 
a = .31** b = .25* 
c = .27* 
a × b = .08+ 
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prosocial individuals, remembering their partner’s behavior is highly relevant in order to 
reciprocate and avoid exploitation. This is less important in the case of proself individuals. 
The results also show that the link between SVO and memory is partially mediated by 
response times. Prosocial individuals took longer when processing feedback about their 
partner’s behavior and were subsequently better at recalling that behavior in a test of their 
explicit memory. This finding indicates that the link between SVO and memory is driven by 
differences in information search, which is in line with research suggesting that individuals 
exhibit different cognitive processes, depending on their SVO (Camac, 1992; Dehue et al., 
1993; Fiedler et al., 2013). Regarding cheater detection (e.g.,  Buchner et al., 2009), we did 
not find evidence of a cheater-specific memory advantage. This finding is in line with current 
research suggesting that memory advantages for cheating behavior disappear when cheating is 
common and of low negative valence (Bell & Buchner, 2011; Bell, Koranyi, Buchner, & 
Rothermund, 2017; Volstorf et al., 2011). 
 More generally, the findings of Study 1 corroborate the idea that social preferences 
affect memory in social interactions and that this effect is partially driven by the extent of 
information search. Yet, it is still unclear which elements of the information search influence 
explicit memory. Going beyond response time predictions, Study 2 aimed to explore in 
greater detail the impact of visual attention as part of information search. 
 
CHAPTER I: COST OF IMPERFECT MEMORY 
 
58 
Study 2a & b  
Building on the findings from Study 1, Study 2a extends the investigation by taking 
the role of visual attention into account. Utilizing eye-tracking to investigate the role of 
processing effort, we aimed at investigating individuals’ information search in more detail. 
Eye movements were frequently recorded in previous studies to capture attention patterns in 
social, (e.g.,  Halevy & Chou, 2014), simultaneous (Lejarraga, Schulte-Mecklenbeck, & 
Smedema, 2017) and strategic interactions (N. Stewart et al., 2016). Eye-tracking makes it 
possible to unobtrusively assess how differences in attention allocation during encoding affect 
subsequent memory performance. Furthermore, Study 2a extends Study 1 by analyzing not 
only the link between SVO and explicit memory but also between SVO and implicit memory 
(described in detail below). 
The aim of Study 2a was to replicate and extend the effect of SVO on explicit memory 
presented in Study 1. Specifically, we assume that individuals who are more prosocial are 
more likely to correctly recall the observed behavior of an interaction partner than less 
prosocial individuals (explicit memory, H1). Linked to this hypothesis, we assume that more 
prosocial individuals more often select a prosocial partner to interact with than less prosocial 
individuals (implicit memory, H2). Third, we hypothesize that more prosocial individuals 
exhibit a higher number of fixations when processing feedback about their partner’s decision 
in the encoding phase (H3a) and direct a larger proportion of attention towards the interaction 
partner’s payoffs than less prosocial individuals (H3b). Extending the mediating role of 
response time to attention, we assume that fixation number partially mediates the link 
between SVO and explicit memory (H4). 
To test for long-term memory effects, we additionally conducted a follow-up study 
(Study 2b) after a period of three weeks. The aim of Study 2b was twofold: (1) to test how 
stable memory of interaction partners’ behavior are across time and (2) whether individual 
differences in SVO extend to predict long-term memory performance. 
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Method 
Participants. One hundred twenty-two participants from the Max Planck Decision 
Lab subject pool (students of the University of Bonn) were recruited via Orsee (Greiner, 
2015). The experiment consisted of an online part and a part that was conducted at the 
Decision Lab. Together, both parts lasted a total of approximately one hour. Participants were 
fully incentivized, receiving a mean payoff of 12.40 Euros that varied according to their 
choices. The number of participants that were scheduled to take part in the study was set to 
138 to account for dropouts. After excluding participants with incomplete data (n = 12), the 
final sample consisted of 110 participants (mean age = 23.14 years, 54.55% female). For all 
analyses including measures of fixation number, we excluded participants without eye-
tracking data (n = 9), resulting in a sample of 101 participants (mean age = 23.15 years, 
54.46% female). The mean SVO angle was 20.48° (SD = 21.69°). Fifty-one participants 
classified as prosocials; and 59 as proselfs. 
 Using data from the first study, we conducted an a priori simulation based power 
analysis aiming at a power of .8. This resulted in a target sample size of 100 complete data 
sets. For a more detailed description of the power analysis and sampling plan as well as the 
pre-registered hypotheses and analyses, see bit.do/Preregistration_Study2.  
Materials. 
Money allocation task. Participants encountered 8 different money allocation 
problems that constituted a subset of the 10 problems used in Study 1. Each problem 
consisted of option A and B, which differed with regard to the possible payoffs for the 
participant and the interaction partner. 
Face stimuli. We used the same set of pictures as in Study 1, with an additional 6 
faces to construct a complete set of 16 faces. The 16 faces were all rated as being moderately 
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attractive (M = 2.15, SD = 0.12, range of the rating scale: (1) very unattractive – (4) very 
attractive).7 
Memory ability. To control for individual differences in memory ability, participants 
completed the Verbal Paired Associates Memory (VPAM) subtest from the Wechsler 
Memory Scale-III, which measures verbal episodic memory. To complete the scale, 
participants first study specific word pairs and are then asked to indicate which words were 
presented together after a short delay. We used an adapted version that allows the test to be 
completed online (Germine et al., 2012; Wilmer et al., 2010). During the memorization phase, 
participants were presented with 25 word pairs, which were presented on screen one at a time 
for 6 s per word pair. In the test, participants were shown one of the words in each pair and 
asked to choose the second word from a list of four words.8 The three distractor words were 
part of other word pairs. Memory ability was measured as the number of correctly recalled 
word pairs, which is referred to as the recall index and ranges from 0 (no word pair recalled) 
to 25 (all word pairs recalled).  
The SVO ring measure, risk aversion measure, and attractiveness ratings of the faces 
were employed the same way as described in Study 1. A complete overview of the items, face 
stimuli, original instructions, and the PsychoPy program used in the experiment can be found 
here bit.do/Materials_Study2. 
Procedure. 
Online phase. At least 12 hours before taking part in the experiment, participants 
completed an online questionnaire. First, they completed the SVO ring measure (Liebrand & 
McClintock, 1988). Next, participants were informed that one of their choices in the 
subsequent phase would be presented to other participants in the laboratory. A battery of 
different choices including filler questions followed this instruction. As part of this battery, 
                                                
7 The additional faces were again selected based on previous attractiveness ratings (Hayn-Leichsenring et al., 
2013) 
8 To construct an appropriate German version of the test, we used words that are frequently used in German and 
have a medium word length, measured in number of words (M = 5.94, SD = 0.84). 
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participants completed eight money allocation problems, one of which would later be 
presented to other participants in the laboratory, and the risk aversion measure (Holt & Laury, 
2002). Each measure of the online questionnaire was fully incentivized in that one money 
allocation or lottery was randomly selected to be payoff-relevant.  
Encoding phase. Upon arriving at the laboratory, participants were seated in front of a 
laptop (12.2'' × 6.7'' screen, color monitor with a native resolution of 1600 × 900). Viewed 
from a distance of 55 cm, the screen subtended a visual angle of 34° horizontally and 23° 
vertically. After reading the instructions, participants were calibrated to an EyeTribe eye-
tracking device (9-point calibration, 30 Hz sampling rate, accuracy ~ 0.5°). In the first part of 
the experiment, participants observed their interaction partner’s choice in the money 
allocation problem, which were taken from participants’ responses in the online 
questionnaire. The procedure was the same as in Study 1 with a few adaptations. Rather than 
10 interaction partners, participants encountered 16 interactions partners; and rather than 10 
money allocation problems, participants were presented with 8 allocation problems. Each 
problem was presented twice but with a different partner. In addition, choices in the encoding 
phase were not incentivized but rather hypothetical. Finally, rather than 7 blocks, participants 
completed 10 blocks such that every interaction partner was presented 10 times. We adapted 
the number of interaction partners to increase the number of trials and thereby reduce noise. 
We assumed that participants’ attention span would be higher in the laboratory than in an 
online study, remembering more partners with a higher number of repetitions is a more 
feasible task when in a controlled environment. After completing all blocks, a short distractor 
task was conducted that asked participants to count specific symbols and then enter the 
correct number.  
Implicit memory phase. In the implicit memory phase, participants were presented 
with two potential interaction partners and the respective money allocation problem. Both 
interaction partners were presented with the same money allocation problem that they had 
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been presented with during the encoding phase. They were instructed to select the partner 
they preferred to interact with as a means to determine their payoff. Participants were 
informed that the position of the presented partners was not related to the option they had 
previously chosen. Choices were fully incentivized in that one interaction was randomly 
selected and paid out at the end of the experiment.  
Unfortunately, a substantial proportion of participants misunderstood the implicit 
memory task. The interaction partners were presented on the left or right side of the screen, 
with the money allocation payoff matrix presented in the middle. Instead of choosing the 
partner who had made a prosocial decision during the encoding phase to maximize their 
payoff, participants’ choices were driven by the position of the prosocial option in the payoff 
matrix, with a majority choosing the partner who was presented next to the prosocial option. 
Considering these findings, we refrained from conducting the planned analysis for the implicit 
memory task.9  
Explicit memory phase. In the subsequent explicit memory phase, participants were 
asked to recall their interaction partners’ behavior during the encoding phase. Again, the 
procedure in this phase was identical to Study 1.  
Data Preparation.  
Areas of interest. Overall, 5 non-overlapping areas of interest (AOIs) were defined: 2 
AOIs containing the participant’s own payoffs (310 × 250 pixels with a margin of 140.5 × 
117.5 pixels); 2 AOIs containing the interaction partner’s payoffs (310 × 250 pixels with a 
margin of 140.5 × 117.5 pixels); and 1 AOI containing the face used as the profile picture 
(375 × 450 pixels with a margin of 68.5 × 75 pixels). Other AOIs included text labels for the 
payoff matrix, which were not included in the analysis. We constructed the stimuli such that 
the distance between objects and the AOI margin was maximized, following suggestions by 
                                                
9 See the supplementary material for a more detailed explanation and a screenshot of the decision situation 
(Figure S2). 
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Orquin et al. (2016).10 Fixations were defined as relative stable gaze (raw data points are 
located with a radius of 30 pixel) lasting at least 50 ms (Salvucci & Goldberg, 2000). 
Data analysis. To test whether social preferences have an impact on memory for 
interaction partner’s behavior, we again used a repeated measures logistic regression 
predicting memory accuracy by SVO angle and calculated robust standard errors. Using a 
mediation analysis, we then tested whether the extent of information processing, measured by 
the number of fixations, mediates the effect of SVO angle on memory accuracy. For fixation 
number, we used the total number of fixations for each item. To test for a normal distribution 
of fixation number, we used the Shapiro-Wilk test. The results indicated that the distribution 
is skewed (W = 0.95, z = 9.96, p < .001); consequently, we log-transformed fixation number. 
When including an interaction effect in a model, we centered all involved predictor variables. 
When predicting explicit memory performance, we controlled for a set of pre-specified 
variables, namely participant’s gender, interaction partner’s gender, cost-benefit ratio of the 
item, attractiveness of the faces, memory ability, and the observed behavior (prosocial vs. 
individualistic choice). The position of the partner’s payoffs in the on-screen matrix (top row 
vs. bottom row) was found to have an influence on an individual’s attention allocation. Thus, 
when predicting attention to other’s payoffs, we additionally controlled for the position at 
which other’s payoffs were presented. For the analysis script and data, see 
bit.do/Analysis_Study2. For a pre-processing script as well as the raw data, see 
bit.do/Data_Study2. 
 
Results  
Predicting explicit memory performance with SVO. Overall, participants correctly 
recalled the behavior of 68.81% of their interaction partners. The correct explicit memory rate 
was 75.12% for prosocial and 63.35% for proself participants (Cohen’s h = .26). To test our 
                                                
10 For a visual presentation of the AOIs position on the screen, see Figure S3. 
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first directed hypothesis, namely that more prosocial individuals are more likely to correctly 
recall their interaction partner’s behavior than less prosocial individuals (H1), we predicted 
the correct recall of an interaction partner’s behavior using SVO angle. The results show that 
individuals with a higher SVO angle (more prosocial) recall their interaction partners’ 
behavior in the encoding phase better (β = .26, z = 2.11, p = .035, see Figure 3b).11 More 
specifically, using marginal predictions we find that the probability for recalling the partner’s 
behavior correctly was 9.70% higher for ideal prosocials than for ideal proselfs. Testing for 
the influence of interaction partner’s type on explicit memory, the results again reveal no 
significant effect (β = .03, z = 0.33, p = .742). 
Predicting information search with SVO. Taking a closer look at the underlying 
drivers of the effect of SVO on explicit memory, we additionally analyzed attention processes 
in the encoding phase. Specifically, we were interested in whether the number of fixations 
individuals exhibit while observing the interaction partner’s decision, as well as the 
proportion of attention directed towards the interaction partner’s payoffs, depends on a 
person’s SVO. In line with our directed Hypothesis H3a yet non-significant, the results 
suggest that prosocial individuals may exhibit a higher number of fixations while receiving 
feedback about the partner’s decision than individuals who are less prosocial (see Table 2a).12  
However, SVO significantly predicts the proportion of attention that is directed towards the 
partner’s payoffs while receiving feedback about the partner’s decision, which is in line with 
the pre-registered Hypothesis H3b (Table 2b).  
 
 
 
 
                                                
11 This effect also holds for the simple effect of SVO on explicit memory without controls (see Table S6). 
12 This effect is significant in the simple regression without controls (β = .14, z = 1.65, p = .099; see Table S7). 
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Table 2 
Information search predicted by SVO angle while receiving feedback about the partner’s 
decision 
 
(a) Fixation number (log) (b) Proportion of attention to 
partner’s payoffs 
SVO angle 0.12 (1.23) 0.16** (2.95) 
Control factors YES  YES  
Constant -0.00 (0.00) 0.00 (0.00) 
Observations 1616 
Note. Standardized coefficients, z statistics in parentheses. Fixation number is log-transformed. Control factors 
include the partner’s attractiveness, the cost-benefit ratios, risk aversion, memory ability, and the position of the 
partner’s payoff. ** p < .01. 
 
Predicting memory performance with information search. In a next step, we 
examined whether information search (measured through fixation number) while receiving 
feedback about the partner’s decision during the encoding phase influenced memory. 
Predicting explicit memory performance with fixation number indicated that, as the number 
of fixations increased, correctly recalling an interaction partner’s behavior became 
significantly more likely (β = .40, z = 5.02, p < .001; see also Figure 5a).  
In exploratory analyses, we also used the proportion of attention directed towards the 
partner’s payoffs and the proportion of attention directed towards the interaction partner’s 
face to predict explicit memory. Our findings show that individuals were more likely to 
correctly recall their partner’s behavior if they directed more attention to their partner’s 
payoffs while receiving feedback about the partner’s decision during the encoding phase (β = 
.24, z = 2.78, p = .005, see also Figure 5b). Likewise, an increase in the proportion of 
attention directed towards the partner’s face (log-transformed) was associated with a higher 
likelihood of correctly recalling the partner’s behavior (β = .17, z = 2.04, p = .041, see also 
Figure 5c).  
CHAPTER I: COST OF IMPERFECT MEMORY 
 
66 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Mediation of the link between SVO and explicit memory with information 
search.  To investigate whether attention processes drive the effect of SVO on explicit 
memory accuracy, we again used a mediation approach (H4). Following our pre-registered 
hypothesis, we used fixation number as a mediating variable of the link between SVO and 
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Figure 5. The probability of recalling the observed player’s behavior correctly depending 
on (a) mean fixation number, (b) proportion of attention towards the partner’s payoffs, and 
(c) proportion of attention to the partner’s face. Dotted lines indicate 95% confidence 
intervals. The histograms in the bottom column indicate the relative frequency of 
observations on the corresponding x-axis variable separately for prosocial and proself 
participants. For further details on the statistical analysis, see Table S8. 
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explicit memory, rather than attention directed to the other’s payoff or face. As a first step, we 
included fixation number during encoding in the logistic regression model predicting explicit 
memory performance. We found that when including fixation number as an additional 
predictor, the influence of SVO angle on explicit memory decreases (β = .15, z = 1.47, p = 
.142) and fixation number significantly predicts memory performance (β = .40, z = 5.03, p < 
.001). For the mediation analysis, we followed the analytical approach described in Study 1 – 
that is, we rescaled and bootstrapped the indirect effect. The results indicate that, in terms of 
the total effect when fixation number is not included in the model, SVO angle significantly 
predicts explicit memory for the interaction partner’s behavior. This effect decreases for the 
direct effect when fixation number is added to the model. Overall, the total effect of SVO 
angle on explicit memory is 1.31 times larger than the direct effect. In support of H4, the 
indirect effect of SVO angle on explicit memory via response time indicates that fixation 
number partially mediates this effect. Specifically, 23.55% of the total effect of SVO angle on 
explicit memory is driven by fixation number (see Figure 6).13 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
13 For a replication of the analysis using response time as a mediator of the effect of SVO on memory, see Table 
S9.  
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Figure 6. Illustration of mediation design with one mediating variable. The figure shows 
the effect of SVO angle on fixation number (a), the effect of fixation number on explicit 
memory (b), the total effect of SVO on memory (c), the direct effect of SVO on explicit 
memory mediated by fixation number (c’), and the indirect effect of SVO angle on explicit 
memory via fixation number (a × b). Control variables are included; and standardized 
coefficients are reported. For the indirect effect, standard errors are bootstrapped with 1000 
repetitions. * p < .05, *** p < .001. 
 SVO angle 
 Fixation number (log) 
 Explicit memory 
c’ = .15 
a = .12 b = .40*** 
c = .20* 
a × b = .05* 
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Study 2b (long-term effects) 
To explore the link between SVO and long-term implicit and explicit memory, we 
contacted all 101 participants again after three weeks. Due to the aforementioned 
misunderstanding of the original implicit memory task, we adapted the presentation screen so 
that, for the implicit decision only, the interaction partners’ faces were on the screen, omitting 
the payoff matrix (see Figure S4, implicit memory phase).  
 
Method 
Participants. All participants had the chance to win a fixed payoff of 46 Euros and an 
additional, variable payoff. The variable payoff was determined by realizing one of the 
choices in the implicit memory phase and an additional 10 cents for each correctly 
remembered behavior. Out of the 101 participants, 90 took part in the follow-up study (mean 
age = 23.92 years, 54.44% female). To test for selection effects due to attrition, we compared 
the distribution of participants’ SVO angles in both waves. The distribution of SVO angles in 
Study 2b is not significantly different from the distribution in the overall sample, t(198) = 
.886, p = .930. See bit.do/Longterm_Study2 for materials, raw data, and the complete analysis 
of the follow-up study.  
Procedure. In the follow-up study, participants again completed six trials in which 
they were asked to choose one of two presented partners that they had interacted with three 
weeks earlier to allocate money for them (implicit memory). Afterwards, participants were 
again asked to remember the behavior of each partner (explicit memory) as well as the 
attractiveness ratings of the faces for an unrelated study. 
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Results 
Predicting memory performance. 
Implicit Memory. Overall, in 63.75% of the trials, a prosocial partner was selected to 
allocate the money. Including the pre-specified control variables, the results show no link 
between SVO and implicit long-term memory (β = .005, z = 0.04, p = .970).  
Explicit Memory. Testing also explicit memory performance, the results show that 
participants correctly recalled the interaction partners’ behavior in 60.97% of the trials. 
Therefore, the rate of correctly recalling interaction partner’s behavior decreased by 13.52% 
across the time span of three weeks. The correct explicit memory rate was 63.81% for 
prosocial and 58.38% for proself participants. The results indicate that the link between SVO 
and explicit memory does not prevail over time (β = .10, z = 1.21, p = .227). Testing for the 
cheater-memory hypothesis, the results again show no evidence of an influence of the 
partner’s type on explicit long-term memory (β = .14, z = 1.43, p = .152). 
 
Discussion Study 2 
 The findings of Study 2 provide additional evidence for a link between an individual’s 
SVO and their short-term memory for behavior in social interactions. Successfully replicating 
the results of Study 1, more prosocial individuals were more likely to correctly recall their 
interaction partner’s behavior. Analyzing in more detail the role and elements of information 
search in this relationship, we measured the extent of information search in a more detailed 
manner using eye-tracking. In contrast to Study 1, the collected measures included number of 
fixations and attention distribution. The results show that more prosocial individuals exhibit 
higher numbers of fixations and direct more attention to the partner’s payoffs while receiving 
feedback about the partner’s decision. Paying more attention to an interaction partner’s face 
or payoff is related to better memory. Furthermore, as predicted the number of fixations when 
encoding information about the partner’s decision partially mediates the effect of SVO on 
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memory performance. These results are in line with previous findings suggesting that memory 
abilities are related to attention processes during encoding, where attended information is 
more likely to be recalled (Chun & Turk-Browne, 2007). More specifically, these findings 
corroborate the important role fixations have in predicting subsequent memory that was 
suggested by previous research (Bloom & Mudd, 1991; Kafkas & Montaldi, 2011). To test for 
boundary conditions of this effect, Study 2b additionally tested long-term effects of SVO on 
memory. The results no longer show a significant relationship between SVO and explicit 
long-term memory as well as no link to implicit memory.  
 The lack of an effect on long-term memory is in line with the results of Volstorf et al. 
(2011), who also found a decrease in memory accuracy for social interaction partners after a 
retention interval of one week. The fact that memory performance declines with longer 
retention intervals is one of the earliest laws discovered in psychology (Brown, 1958; Rubin 
& Wenzel, 1996). Given that the average memory rate was only approximately 69% after a 
brief delay of several minutes, we possibly faced floor effects for an interval of three weeks. 
After this fairly long retention interval, the average memory rate decreased to approximately 
61%, making it difficult to detect differences driven by social preferences. 
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Study 3 
The evidence of Studies 1 and 2a connects explicit short-term memory performance to 
individual SVO. We conducted Study 3 in order to replicate the findings concerning the link 
between explicit memory and SVO and, in particular, test whether this effect extends to 
implicit short-term memory. As empathy was found to be related to prosociality as well as the 
ability to recognize facial expressions (Declerck & Bogaert, 2008), the study material from 
the first two studies was extended to include this pre-test measure, which was then used as a 
control variable. Following a procedure similar to Study 1 and 2, participants chose one of 
two players to determine their own payoff in a money allocation task after observing their 
previous choices. Assuming that prosocial individuals are more likely to correctly recall their 
interaction partner’s previous behavior, we hypothesized that more prosocial individuals 
would be more likely to select the prosocial rather than individualistic player.14  
 
Method 
Participants. One hundred thirty-seven participants from the Max Planck Decision 
Lab subject pool (students of the University of Bonn) were recruited via Orsee (Greiner, 
2015). The experiment was conducted online via the platform Unipark and lasted 
approximately 45 minutes. Participants were fully incentivized and received a mean payoff of 
9.50 Euros that varied according to their choices. Using data from the first study, an a priori, 
simulation based power analysis aiming at .85 revealed a target sample size of 130 complete 
data sets. The pre-registered number of participants who were scheduled to take part in the 
study was set to 143 to account for dropouts. Six participants did not take part in the study. In 
addition, we excluded 3 participants who did not complete the experiment. This resulted in a 
final sample of 134 participants (mean age = 21.5 years, 50% female). The mean SVO angle 
was 28.58° (SD = 24.26°), with 79 participants classified as prosocials and 55 as proselfs. 
                                                
14 To ensure that there would be no misunderstandings in the adapted task, we pre-tested the stimulus material in 
Study 2b. The results revealed that there were no difficulties understanding the adapted task. 
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Materials. 
Money allocation task. Participants encountered 6 different money allocation 
problems that constitute a subset of the 10 tasks used in Study 1. Each problem consisted of 
option A and B, which differed in terms of the possible payoffs for the participant and the 
interaction partner (see Figure 2). 
Face stimuli. The stimulus set consisted of 12 faces to include an equal number of 
male and female faces for the implicit memory task. In order to test for any stimulus 
dependencies, we compiled two distinct face sets of 12 faces each, resulting in an overall 
number of 24 faces. All stimuli were rated15 as being moderately attractive (16 were also used 
in Study 1 and 2). Faces were randomly distributed across two sets (Set 1: M = 2.21, SD = 
0.17, Set 2: M = 2.25, SD = 0.17, range of the rating scale: (1) very unattractive – (4) very 
attractive). We randomized between-subjects with which behavior (prosocial or 
individualistic) a face was presented. 
Interpersonal Reactivity Index. The Interpersonal Reactivity Index (Davis, 1980) uses 
a multidimensional approach to capture individual differences in empathy. It defines empathy 
as the “reactions of one individual to the observed experiences of another”. It consists of 28 
items on a 5-point Likert scale ranging from “Does not describe me well” to “Describes me 
very well”. The measure has 4 subscales, namely perspective taking (i.e., “I try to look at 
everybody’s side of a disagreement before I make a decision.”), fantasy (i.e., “I really get 
involved with the feelings of the characters in a novel.”), empathic concern (i.e., “I often care 
about people less fortunate than me.”), and personal distress (i.e., “In emergency situations, I 
feel apprehensive and ill-at-ease.”).  
The SVO ring measure, risk aversion measure, and attractiveness ratings of the faces 
were employed as described in Study 1. A complete overview of the items, original 
                                                
15 The additional faces were again selected based on previous attractiveness ratings (Hayn-Leichsenring et al., 
2013). 
CHAPTER I: COST OF IMPERFECT MEMORY 
 
74 
instructions, and the Unipark program of the experiment can be found here: 
bit.do/Material_Study3. 
Procedure. 
Encoding phase. The encoding phase was identical to Study 1 but participants 
interacted with 12 rather than 10 partners. We increased the number of interaction partners 
from 10 to 12 to ensure that we presented the same number of female and male face pairs.  
Implicit memory phase. In the implicit memory phase, participants were presented 
with two interaction partners. Similar to Study 2a, participants had observed the behavior of 
two interaction partners for each money allocation problem during the encoding phase. In 
contrast to Study 2a, we presented the two interaction partners without the money allocation 
problem on the screen to avoid misunderstandings. Pictures of the interaction partners were 
presented on the far left and far right side of the screen (See Figure S4). Participants then 
selected the partner they wished to allocate the money between themselves and their partner. 
To minimize differences in attractiveness within the 6 pairs of potential partners, we matched 
the two faces again according to gender and previous attractiveness ratings (Hayn-
Leichsenring et al., 2013). Each of the pairs consisted of a prosocial and an individualistic 
partner (location of each partner was randomized within participant). Choices were fully 
incentivized, in that one interaction was selected at random and paid out at the end of the 
experiment.  
Explicit memory phase. In the subsequent explicit memory phase, participants were 
asked to recall their interaction partners’ behavior during the encoding phase. Again, the 
procedure in this phase was the same as in Study 1. See Figure S4 for the adapted procedure.  
Data analysis. Following the same approach as in Study 1 and 2, we used a repeated 
measurement logistic regression predicting memory accuracy by SVO angle and calculated 
robust standard errors. Analyzing the influence of SVO angle on response time, we used a 
repeated measures linear regression. The Shapiro-Wilk test again indicated a skewed 
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distribution of response times (W = 0.63, z = 12.15, p < .001). Consequently, we log-
transformed response time. Using a mediation analysis, we tested whether the effect of SVO 
angle on memory accuracy is mediated by response times. When predicting implicit memory 
performance, pre-specified control variables included the participant’s gender, the interaction 
partner’s gender, the cost-benefit ratio of the item, the attractiveness of the faces, and 
empathy. For analyses on explicit memory performance, observed behavior (prosocial vs. 
individualistic choice) was added as an additional control variable. Raw data can be found 
here bit.do/Data_Study3, whereas a detailed description of all analyses can be found here 
bit.do/Analysis_Study3.  
 
Results 
Predicting memory performance.  
Implicit memory. Overall, participants chose a prosocial interaction partner to allocate 
the money in 67.41% of the trials. A prosocial interaction partner was selected in 67.93% of 
the trials by prosocial participants and 66.67% of the trials by proself participants. To test our 
pre-registered hypothesis that more prosocial individuals are more likely to select a prosocial 
partner to interact with than less prosocial individuals (H1), we predicted the choice of a 
prosocial interaction partner using SVO angle. The findings indicate that individuals with a 
higher SVO angle (more prosocial) do not significantly differ from less prosocial individuals 
in terms of their choice of interaction partner (β = -.02, z = -0.17, p = .861). 
Explicit memory. In terms of explicit memory performance, the results reveal that 
participants correctly recalled their interaction partner’s behavior in 61.50% of the trials. The 
correct explicit memory rate was 62.24% for prosocial and 60.45%for proself participants. 
Testing the link between SVO and explicit memory established in Study 1 and 2a (H2) 
showed that, in Study 3, SVO did not significantly predict explicit memory (β = .04, z = 0.60, 
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p = .552, see Figure 3c). Testing the cheater-memory hypothesis, the analyses again reveal no 
significant effect (β = .10, z = 1.29, p = .198). 
Predicting information search. In contrast to H3, which assumes that more prosocial 
individuals are more likely to exhibit longer information search, the results showed no 
statistically significant link between SVO and response times when receiving feedback about 
the partner’s choice (β = .11, z = 1.59, p = .113).  
 
Discussion Study 3 
In Study 3, we did not replicate the effect of SVO on explicit memory established in 
Study 1 and 2a. There are two potential reasons for this. First, the overall explicit memory 
rate decreased from 74.26% (Study 1) to 61.50%, possibly due to changes in the difficulty of 
the memory task (84 trials during encoding rather than 70 trials). The baseline memory rate is 
potentially too low to detect differences in explicit memory due to SVO. Second, based on the 
power analysis, the chance of not finding an effect with the given sample size is 15%. 
Highlighting the problem of Type II errors, Schimmack (2012) argued that multiple-study 
articles do not provide more credible evidence by replicating results repeatedly given the 
modest power of individual studies. To maintain credibility, he suggests that, rather than 
increase the number of studies, the total power should be maximized. Thus, in order to obtain 
a more comprehensive understanding of the link between SVO and memory and to increase 
total power, we used a meta-study approach to examine the effect of SVO on explicit memory 
across all three studies.  
 
CHAPTER I: COST OF IMPERFECT MEMORY 
 
77 
Meta-study 
In order to test for the overall effect of SVO on memory, we pooled the data across 
Study 1 to 3. The resulting increase in sample size and heterogeneity of the stimulus material 
of this joint analysis thus provides a robust estimation of systematic differences in explicit 
memory due to SVO. 
 Predicting memory performance. We conducted a mixed-effects, repeated measures 
logistic regression including the previously pre-registered control factors, a dummy for study 
1-3, and a dummy for study type (online vs. lab). The results confirm a positive relation 
between prosociality and memory performance (β = .17, z = 2.80, p = .005, see Figure 7). 
More specifically, marginal predictions show that the probability of correctly recalling the 
partner’s behavior was 6.45% higher for ideal prosocials than for ideal proselfs. In addition, 
when testing the cheater-detection hypothesis overall, the results show no link between the 
interaction partner’s past behavior and explicit memory of their behavior (β = .04, z = 0.71, p 
= .479). 
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 To test the role of the information search channel, we analyzed response times while 
receiving information about the others choice across all studies. The results of a mixed-effects 
regression including control factors as well as study and study type dummies show that SVO 
angle significantly predicts response time during encoding (β = .08, z = 3.36, p < .001). 
Specifically, more prosocial participants spend more time inspecting the partner’s decision 
than proself participants. To test whether response time mediates the effect of SVO on 
explicit memory, a mediation analysis – following the same method described in Study 1 and 
2a (and additionally controlling for study and study type) – was conducted. The results of the 
mediation analysis revealed that the total effect of SVO angle on explicit memory is 1.21 
times larger than the direct effect. The indirect effect of SVO angle on explicit memory via 
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Figure 7. Proportion of correctly recalled behavior of interaction partner, depending on 
SVO angle. SVO angle is displayed in 5° bins, whereas proportion of correct recall is 
displayed in 0.1 bins. Areas shaded in grey are 95% confidence intervals. N = 305. 
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response time indicates that the effect of SVO on memory is partially mediated by response 
time (see Figure 8). Specifically, 17.64% of the total effect of SVO angle on explicit memory 
is due to response time.  
 
 
 
 SVO angle 
 Response time (log) 
 Explicit memory 
c’ = .12* 
a = .08*** b = .30* 
c = .15* 
a × b = .02* 
Figure 8. Illustration of mediation design with one mediating variable. The figure shows the 
effect of SVO angle on response time (a), the effect of response time on explicit memory (b), 
the total effect of SVO on memory (c), the direct effect of SVO on explicit memory mediated 
by response time (c’), and the indirect effect of SVO angle on explicit memory via response 
time (a × b). Control variables are included; and standardized coefficients are reported; * p < 
.05, *** p < .001. 
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General Discussion 
 In three preregistered studies (N = 305, two online studies and one eye-tracking study), 
we investigate the link between social preferences (measured through SVO) and recall of an 
interaction partner’s cooperation behavior. The results show that prosocial individuals are 
more likely to recall interaction partner’s past behavior than proself individuals. Going 
beyond this simple observation of choice behavior, process analyses indicate that the link 
between SVO and explicit memory is partly driven by the extent of information search during 
the first interactions. More prosocial individuals take longer to encode information regarding 
their partner’s behavior and exhibit more thorough information search (i.e., higher number of 
fixations). Testing for boundary conditions of the effect of SVO on memory, we additionally 
investigated the link between SVO and long-term memory for social interaction partners 
(Study 2b). The results indicate that the influence of SVO on memory did not persist over a 
retention interval of three weeks.  
 These results are noteworthy in several respects. First, this research is, to our 
knowledge, the first to adopt an individual differences approach to examine the role of 
memory in social interactions. Second, the findings shed light on one crucial channel through 
which social preferences affect memory performance. By providing converging evidence that 
the extent of information search contributes to the memory advantage of prosocials, this work 
highlights the importance of cognitive processes in the emergence of cooperation. Third, the 
studies exhibit high external validity, as participants passed through fully incentivized 
interactions and formed their own impressions via repeated contact.  
 
Drivers of the link between social preferences and memory  
 The present results successfully replicate previous research (Fiedler et al., 2013) by 
showing that more prosocial individuals are more likely to take longer and exhibit a higher 
number of fixations when searching for information in social dilemmas. These findings go 
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even further by showing support for a mediating role of information search. Notably, this 
provides first evidence that differences in cognitive processes not only explain immediate 
choice behavior but also are linked to memory performance in people facing a social 
dilemma.  
 Investigating the differences in information search in more detail, Study 2 revealed 
that more prosocial individuals not only took longer for each interaction but also directed a 
higher proportion of attention to the interaction partner’s payoffs. With more extensive 
encoding of the decision problem, prosocial individuals have a more accurate memory 
representation of previous interactions. Additionally, when participants direct more attention 
to their partner’s face, subsequent memory of the partner’s behavior is improved. Similarly, 
previous research found that exposure time to a face successfully predicts identification 
accuracy (Bornstein et al., 2012; Laughery et al., 1971). Beyond facial identification, the 
present findings suggest that more elaborate encoding of the partner’s face might serve as an 
additional cue for the behavior associated with that face.  
 By utilizing process data to study these driving factors on a more fine-grained level, 
we contribute to a more detailed understanding of memory processes in social interactions. 
An interesting explanation for the observed link between social preferences and memory can 
be found in work on social networks. Whereas previous evidence suggests that network size is 
determined by individual differences in prosocial behavior (Layous, Nelson, Oberle, 
Schonert-Reichl, & Lyubomirsky, 2012), Wink and Stevens (2017) show that memory 
accuracy for an interaction partner’s behavior increases with the decision makers’ social 
network size. Assuming that prosociality is associated with larger social networks, our results 
suggest that the link between prosociality and memory capacity could be driven by 
differences in the environments that prosocials create for themselves. 
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Memory in the emergence of cooperation 
 The presented evidence is strongly in line with propositions of the social exchange 
theory highlighting memory as one of the essential cognitive capacities required for social 
interactions (Cosmides & Tooby, 1989). Following this account, memory is a necessary 
prerequisite in order to keep track of an individual’s behavior and ultimately resembles a key 
feature in the emergence of reciprocal strategies. This is particularly important for individuals 
who have a preference for cooperation. By being able to remember their interaction partner’s 
behavior, they are able to maintain cooperation across time and avoid being exploited by 
defectors (Feyer, Leopold-Wildburger, & Pickl, 2007). Explaining prosocials’ memory 
advantage from an evolutionary perspective, it could be argued that the additional effort 
invested in information search and processing is a natural consequence of their underlying 
preference for cooperation.  
 Going beyond general requirements for social interactions, the social exchange theory 
claims that individuals have a specific module for detecting cheaters in adaptation to 
evolutionary challenges (Cosmides & Tooby, 1989). There is first evidence in favor of a 
cheater-specific memory effect was presented (e.g., Mealey et al., 1996); however, other 
studies have failed to replicate that effect (e.g., Barclay & Lalumière, 2006). Our results 
replicate those null findings and show no evidence for preferential memory of individualistic 
behavior within simple decomposed dictator games. One alternative explanation that was put 
forward is a general strategy to remember rare interaction partners (Volstorf et al., 2011). 
However, in the current studies, all partners were encountered equally often. Consequently, 
the results provide no answer concerning a rarity advantage. 
 
Future Directions and Implications 
 The current studies offer a number of interesting directions for future research. First, 
the results of Study 2b suggest that the effect of social preferences on memory performance is 
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sensitive to the time between initial interaction and recall. These changes in memory 
performance call for a systematic investigation of the development of the postulated memory 
advantages of prosocial participants.  
 Second, in the present studies, participants were not explicitly instructed to remember 
their interaction partners’ behavior. An interesting avenue for future research would be to 
investigate whether memory performance could be influenced by such an instruction. For 
example, when lending money to someone, the incentive to remember a person’s behavior is 
high and could crowd out any differences in memory driven by SVO.  
 Considering the number of social interactions we experience in everyday life, the 
present findings have important practical implications. Presumably, prosocial individuals are 
better equipped to engage in cooperative social interactions, as they form more accurate 
expectations of their partner’s future behavior. For example, when working on a joint project 
with a coworker, paying attention to the consequences of working together not only for 
oneself but also for the coworker can facilitate recalling that coworker’s behavior later. When 
deciding whether to engage in a joint project again in the future, this information can be 
recalled and expectations regarding the coworker’s future behavior adjusted accordingly. 
Importantly, remembering previous behavior can sustain cooperative actions between prosocial 
coworkers. Engaging in bilateral cooperation across long periods of time is beneficial not only 
to coworkers but also to the company for which they work. Given the crucial economic and 
societal benefits of engaging in cooperative social interactions, it is important to note that a 
lack of memory is a possible reason for systematic deviations from cooperation. From an 
evolutionary perspective, memory for interaction partners is crucial to avoid exploitation, 
which is especially costly for prosocials. In conclusion, the overall results of the three studies 
indicate that individual’s social preferences predict their explicit short-term memory 
performance in social interactions. The presented evidence supports the notion that memory is 
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adaptively tuned to the specific challenges that individuals face, depending on their social 
preferences.
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Abstract 
Understanding cooperation in strategic interactions is essential for the well being of 
individuals and societies. Using eye-tracking, the current study investigates the influence of 
other-regarding preferences on cognitive processes in a strategic environment (N = 73). 
Specifically, this work examines the impact of Social Value Orientation (SVO) on 
information search in a simple symmetric prisoner’s dilemma. Reporting gaze behavior and 
participants’ subsequent choices, our findings reveal that prosocial individuals are more likely 
to attend to the cooperative strategy and their partner’s payoff than individualists. 
Interestingly, these differences extend to the magnitude of the gaze cascade effect, reflecting 
higher levels of motivated information search for prosocials. Cooperative choices were 
associated with shorter information search and more attention to the cooperative strategy than 
defective choices. Overall, the findings indicate that during strategic considerations in social 
dilemmas, eye movements reflect differences in other-regarding preferences.  
 
 
Keywords: information search, prisoner’s dilemma, eye-tracking, social value orientation, 
process tracing 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER II: SVO PREDICTS STRATEGIC INFORMATION SEARCH 
 
87 
Introduction 
In many societal problems, individuals exhibit a conflict between keeping resources (e.g., 
money, time or attention) to themselves and sharing them with another individual or group. 
Such a conflict is the defining feature of a social dilemma. For example, company employees 
who compete with each other are often subject to such a dilemma. They can either support 
their colleague and potentially receive support in return or focus on getting ahead without 
losing any time. The company benefits most if employees support each other in their tasks, 
but any single employee would be best off by receiving support from their colleague without 
returning the favor. How individuals behave in such situations is of central interest to social 
scientists, because creating institutional frameworks that foster the evolution of cooperation, 
are crucial for well-functioning organizations as well as society. One widely-used paradigm to 
study behavior in strategic social situations is the prisoner’s dilemma with imperfect 
information (e.g., Rapoport & Chammah, 1965). This particular game is a theoretical 
representation of strategic decision making, where two players simultaneously have to choose 
either to cooperate or defect. Both players are completely informed about the consequences of 
each outcome as well as the incentives of the other player. Fueled by narrow self-interest the 
dominant decision within this game structure is to defect, even though mutual cooperation 
would be better for both players. 
Deviating from predictions of standard economic theory, the empirical literature 
provides evidence that there is substantial behavioral heterogeneity within this economic 
paradigm (e.g., Axelrod & Hamilton, 1981; Dawes & Thaler, 1988). One of the most 
prominent approaches to explain these inter-individual differences in strategic cooperation are 
social preferences. Social preferences are exhibited when people are not solely motivated by 
their material self-interest, but also care positively or negatively for the outcomes of others 
(Fehr & Schmidt, 1999). Evidence for a link between choice behavior and social preferences 
has been repeatedly shown (for overviews see Balliet et al., 2009; Bogaert et al., 2008), and 
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studies investigating beliefs and expectations within strategic interactions provide first 
indications for a heterogeneity also within the mental representation of these decision 
situations (Smeesters, Warlop, Van Avermaet, Corneille, & Yzerbyt, 2003; Van Lange, 
1992). Yet, an understanding of the underlying motivational mechanisms of strategic social 
decision making is largely lacking.  
In this study, we aim to shed light on the cognitive channels linking social preferences 
and cooperation behavior. To pursue this objective, we systematically examine whether 
information search effort and weighting are driven by social preferences when people 
contemplate strategic decisions. In order to particularly capture the temporal dynamics of 
strategic decision making, we will employ a process measure approach utilizing eye-tracking.  
 
Social preferences in strategic interactions 
When observing decision makers in strategic interactions, we often see a wide range of 
responses. It has been shown that these inter-individual decision making differences are 
linked to different motives and stable sets of personal preferences (e.g., Messick & 
McClintock, 1968). One construct that is particularly relevant within the context of strategic 
cooperation, is social preferences (e.g., Fehr & Schmidt, 1999). Depending on individual 
social preferences, people vary in the weight they attach to the outcomes they receive 
themselves and the outcomes allocated to other people (Liebrand & McClintock, 1988). Since 
outcomes are not decided single-handedly, but instead conditional on the decisions of others, 
the importance and weights of particular outcomes are determined by social preferences, as 
well as the resulting beliefs about the behavior of others. Depending on what a person expects 
their counterpart to choose, the subjective importance assigned to the different payoff 
outcomes varies (Polonio, Di Guida, & Coricelli, 2015). 
  Aiming to study the emergence and maintenance of human cooperation in strategic 
settings, game theory provides a unifying theoretical framework – the prisoner’s dilemma 
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game. The combined choices within this game determine the payoffs for each player. Here, 
defection is a dominant individual strategy, but mutual cooperation is preferred over mutual 
defection. The tension becomes apparent when the preferred choices of each player lead to 
individual actions resulting in mutual defection, despite the fact that mutual cooperation is 
more beneficial. With regard to economic decision-making, social preferences have been a 
reliable predictor of behavior in experimental games (for a review see Balliet et al., 2009). In 
strategic settings, prosocial individuals were found to be more likely to cooperate with their 
partner than individualistic or competitive individuals (Van Lange, 1999). In addition, when 
receiving information about the partner’s behavior before their own decision, prosocials acted 
contingent on their partner’s behavior, while less prosocial individuals were not affected by 
this information (De Cremer & Van Lange, 2001). Further, a recent meta-analysis revealed 
that prosocials expected more cooperation from others than individualists and claim that 
expectations partially mediate the relation between SVO and cooperation behavior (Pletzer et 
al., 2018). It is still unclear, however, what processes underlie the interplay between SVO and 
the related expectations in driving strategic decisions. 
 
Social preferences and strategic information search  
Even though the link between social preferences and strategic decision making has been 
shown repeatedly, we know little about the underlying processes in these decisions. 
Investigating the depth of information processing and weighting as well as the importance of 
particular strategies and outcomes is especially important in order to understand the different 
motivations driving strategic decisions. Based on previous studies exploring information 
search in strategic decision paradigms, we know that process measures during information 
acquisition reflect the participants’ level of strategic sophistication (Chen, Huang, & Wang, 
2009; Costa‐Gomes, Crawford, & Broseta, 2001; Polonio et al., 2015; N. Stewart et al., 
2016). For instance, Wang, Spezio, and Camerer (2010) utilized eye movements to explore 
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underpinnings of strategic considerations in sender-receiver games. Here, attention patterns 
(i.e., eye movements) indicated beliefs about the choices of others (i.e., their strategy). 
Additional studies present evidence that people are boundedly rational when searching for 
information in strategic decision situations. Instead of attending to all payoffs equally, they 
showed that individuals are mainly interested in their own payoffs for unilateral defection 
(i.e., temptation) and payoffs for mutual cooperation (Devetag, Di Guida, & Polonio, 2016; 
Hristova & Grinberg, 2005). This work reveals that information is systematically weighted 
within the decision process, but fails to investigate the inter-individual differences in social 
preferences, which are crucial for the respective importance of particular outcomes as well as 
strategies. 
First studies provided evidence that social preferences not only predict decisions, but 
also the related decision processes (Camerer, Johnson, Rymon, & Sen, 1993; Fiedler et al., 
2013; Jiang et al., 2016; Kieslich & Hilbig, 2014). More evidence comes from the fMRI 
literature, which showed different neural activations in strategic settings that are driven by 
SVO (Emonds, Declerck, Boone, Vandervliet, & Parizel, 2011). By focusing, for example, on 
the effort people exert during information search, Fiedler et al. (2013) have offered important 
insights into the motivational drivers underlying social preference choices. Analyzing 
information search in the context of a public-goods game, they show that individualists invest 
considerably less effort in understanding the decision situation and make often quick 
decisions to free ride on the cooperation of others. Their results are in line with other research 
showing similar effects in decomposed dictator games (Dehue et al., 1993; Liebrand & 
McClintock, 1988). These speak to the functional form of the underlying utility function 
within such decisions. Specifically, they indicate that individualists take less time to make 
their decision because they predominantly focus on own payoffs, while prosocials weight and 
integrate their own as well as the others’ payoffs within their decisions. Based on these 
findings, we assume to observe similar differences in information search effort driven by 
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social preferences in strategic settings. Yet, it should be noted here that under strategic 
considerations, understanding the payoff structure of the counterpart is also relevant for one’s 
own payoffs, since they are conditional on each other (N. Stewart et al., 2016). 
Using gaze patterns to study the weighting of one’s own and the other’s payoffs in 
more detail, previous findings show that depending on their SVO, attention directed to other’s 
payoffs differs. Specifically, prosocial individuals were more likely to attend to other’s 
payoffs than individualists in simple money allocation tasks (Fiedler et al., 2013). From this 
literature, we expect prosocial individuals also to direct more attention towards the other’s 
payoffs when facing a prisoner’s dilemma. Again, we point to the strategic decision structure 
as a caveat, which increases the importance of understanding the other’s payoffs in addition to 
one’s own payoffs. Considering that prosocials are more likely to expect their matched 
partners to cooperate, this belief should reflect in an increase of attention to the cooperative 
strategy.  
Therefore, we hypothesize that prosocial individuals are more likely to invest more 
effort in their search for information (H1), direct their attention to the other player’s payoffs 
(H2), and direct their attention to payoffs related to the cooperative strategy (H3).  
 
Gaze bias in strategic decisions  
Going beyond correlational evidence, various studies have shown that the link between 
preferences and cognitive processes, in particular attention, is not unidirectional. Instead 
preferences arguably guide attention, and in turn, attention guides the final decision. This 
bidirectional link between attention and preference is referred to as the gaze cascade effect 
(Shimojo et al., 2003). Several studies have demonstrated a gaze bias towards the eventually 
chosen option (Atalay et al., 2012; Bird et al., 2012; Fiedler & Glöckner, 2012; Glaholt & 
Reingold, 2009; Nittono & Wada, 2009; Schotter, Berry, McKenzie, & Rayner, 2010). Since 
N. Stewart et al. (2016) showed evidence for this phenomenon in strategic choices also, we 
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hypothesize that prosocials will increasingly fixate the cooperative strategy, while 
individualists will increasingly fixate the defective strategy (H4). 
Taking a closer look at the attentional feedback on choice, few studies have suggested 
that the order in which information is attended and integrated is influential on the final 
decision (e.g., Iliev et al., 2009). In particular, research on primacy effects found that 
information encoded at the beginning of the decision process was more likely to be 
remembered (Murdock Jr, 1962) and had a stronger influence on the valuation of goods 
(Johnson et al., 2007). Additionally, in risky choices, options that were fixated first were more 
likely to be chosen subsequently (Manohar & Husain, 2013). Formalizing these findings, 
Johnson et al. (2007) proposed the conceptual framework of the query theory. This theory 
argues that the first query results in a richer and more heavily weighted representation than 
the second. We respectively hypothesize that choices will be influenced by the starting point 
of information search (H5).  
 
The present study 
The current study takes a fully incentivized process measure and economic game 
approach to identify the cognitive channels linking social preferences and cooperation 
behavior. With the present investigation, we contribute to the literature by systematically 
testing whether information search effort and information weighting (i.e., attention directed to 
other’s payoffs) are driven by social preferences during strategic contemplations. Testing 
information search effort during individuals’ strategic considerations by measuring the 
number of fixations and decision time, we gain insights into the individual differences in the 
depth of processing necessary to make the decision (Bettman et al., 1993). In addition, our 
aim is to enhance existing knowledge on whether decision differences are purely driven by 
the level of strategic contemplation or whether they are potentially linked to a qualitative shift 
in beliefs. To do so, we investigate the proportion of attention towards specific decision 
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strategies and payoffs, since this measure has been shown to quantify the relative importance 
or weight of a piece of information (e.g., Russo & Leclerc, 1994). Studying these underlying 
processes offers a deeper understanding of the individual motivations and considerations that 
drive strategic decision making. 
In addition to individual differences, we aim to uncover whether the relation between 
attention and other-regarding choices goes beyond a correlational link. Particularly, we 
estimate a gaze bias to eventually chosen options and test how the order in which information 
is attended to influences strategic choices. By manipulating where people start to search for 
payoff-related information, this study contributes to understanding how contextual variation 
influences people’s choices in a prisoner’s dilemma.  
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Method 
Participants  
Participants (all normal or corrected to normal vision, signed informed consent) from 
the Max Planck Decision Lab subject pool (mostly students of the University of Bonn) were 
recruited via Orsee (Greiner, 2015). The experiment was the second in a two-study 
experimental battery lasting about 45 minutes.16 Both experiments were independent and 
choices within the presented experiment were fully incentivized (average payoff: 9.30 €). We 
had the financial means to collect data from 100 participants. Hence, 100 participants were 
scheduled for participation. Due to no-shows and cancellations, 78 participants eventually 
took part in the study. We excluded trials where more than 40% of the fixations were not 
directed at any of the predefined AOIs (16.58%, n = 4), outliers regarding decision time 
(4.97%) and participants with a competitive SVO (n = 1) from any analyses, resulting in a 
final sample of 73 participants (mean age = 23.44 years, 63.01% female). The mean SVO 
angle of the final sample was 19.24° (SD = 17.46°). 
  
Materials 
SVO ring measure. Participants completed the SVO ring measure online at least 12 
hours before coming to the Decision Lab. The instrument is frequently used to determine 
individual social preferences, i.e., weighting of one’s own payoffs and those of others. 
Specifically, participants were asked to make 24 choices between two options representing 
money allocations that differed in terms of payoffs for oneself and others. Participants could 
either maximize their own payoff or decide to forego money in order to benefit the other. The 
work in this area typically differentiates between people seeking to enhance the outcomes of 
others (altruists), those seeking to enhance joint outcomes and equality in outcome 
(cooperators), those seeking to enhance their own outcomes (individualists), and those 
                                                
16 The other independent study investigated in a within-design the influence of time pressure and cognitive load 
on social preferences. 
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seeking to enhance their own outcome compared to their partners (competitors). Following 
the literature, individuals with an angle above 22.5° are referred to as prosocial types (n = 31) 
and individuals with an angle below 22.5° are referred to as individualistic types (n = 42).17 
Participants’ choices were fully incentivized such that one of the money allocations was 
randomly selected and paid out at the end of the study.  
 Prisoner’s dilemma. In a prisoner’s dilemma, two players decide between a 
cooperative and a defective strategy. Mutual cooperation leads to reward R, whereas mutual 
defection leads to punishment P. The other two possibilities occur when one player 
cooperates and the other defects, for which the associated game payoffs are S (sucker’s 
payoff) and T (temptation) for the cooperator and the defector, respectively (Rapoport & 
Chammah, 1965). Table 3 shows the general form of a symmetric two-person prisoner’s 
dilemma. If the following inequalities are satisfied, a situation can be defined as a prisoner’s 
dilemma: T > R > P > S and 2R > T + S > 2P. As R, P, T and S vary the situational change is 
likely to affect the player’s behavior (cooperation index): 
𝐶𝑜𝑜𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥 =  𝑅 − 𝑃𝑇 − 𝑆  
Keeping other payoffs constant, cooperation becomes more likely if R and S increase and 
becomes less likely if T and P increase (Rapoport & Chammah, 1965). The cooperation 
indices of the prisoner’s dilemmas varied between .09 and .5.18  
Within the experiment, participants were randomly assigned to complete the prisoner’s 
dilemma as the row player (see “Person 1” in Table 3), choosing between top and bottom or 
the column player (see “Person 2” in Table 3), choosing between left and right. Further, the 
position of the different strategy combinations was varied between subjects such that pressing 
A on the keyboard sometimes indicated a cooperative choice and at other times indicated a 
                                                
17 See Figure S5 in the supplement for the distribution of participants’ SVO angles. 
18 For a list of the games used and their respective cooperation index, see Table S10. 
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defective choice. This variation allowed for a counterbalanced presentation of the different 
strategy combinations and subsequent eye-tracking analyses.  
 
Table 3 
General form of a 2-person symmetric Prisoner’s Dilemma 
 Person 2 
Person 1 Cooperation Defection 
Cooperation R, R S, T 
Defection T, S P, P 
Note. The payoff to the left of the comma in each cell is Person 1’s outcome; Person 2’s outcome is to the right 
of the comma. R indicates reward for mutual cooperation, S indicates sucker’s payoff, T is temptation to defect, 
and P is punishment for mutual defection.  
 
 
Procedure 
At least 12 hours before taking part in the experiment, participants completed an 
online version of the SVO questionnaire (Liebrand & McClintock, 1988), determining their 
social preferences. Upon arriving at the lab they were seated in front of a computer screen 
(17'' color monitor with a native resolution of 1280×1024 pixels), received written 
instructions of the prisoner’s dilemma and the search task used for location cueing and were 
calibrated to an Eyegaze remote binocular system (LC Technologies) with a sampling rate of 
120 Hz and an accuracy of about 0.45°. Viewed from a distance of 60 cm, the screen 
subtended a visual angle of 39° horizontally and 28° vertically. A chin rest was used to ensure 
data quality by reducing head movement during the experiment. Following a 9-point 
calibration procedure on a grey background, participants were instructed in a simple search 
task used to cue particular locations and the respective strategies that were presented at the 
same coordinate in the next step. The search task manipulation was used in order to direct 
participants’ attention to a specific area of the screen (location cueing; Wright & Ward, 2008) 
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and set a cooperative or defective reference point at the start of the decision making process. 
Within the task, participants had to identify a picture that did not match the presented set of 9 
pictures by pressing A on the keyboard when the mismatch was presented on the left side of 
the screen, and by pressing B when it was presented on the right side. For example, if there 
are 8 pictures of rodents and 1 picture of a bird on the left side of the screen, the picture of the 
bird does not match the others and the correct response would be to indicate the left side by 
pressing A. After participants had logged their answer, the payoff matrix of a prisoner’s 
dilemma appeared and they were asked to choose to cooperate or defect. The two decision 
options of the prisoner’s dilemma were labeled as A and B, and participants were asked to 
indicate their choice of strategy by pressing A or B on the keyboard. Participants did not 
receive any feedback regarding the other player’s choice.  
Overall, participants completed 10 trials consisting of the presentation of a central 
fixation cross (500 ms), followed by a search task and a prisoner’s dilemma (see Figure 9). 
After they had completed all trials, they received a payoff determined by a randomly drawn 
choice in the prisoner’s dilemma and a debriefing. All stimuli were presented via NBS 
Presentation®. For all materials, original instructions and the experimental program, see 
bit.do/Strategic_Material.  
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Data Preparation and Pre-processing 
The eye-tracking and choice analyses were performed using custom STATA 14 scripts 
(find the raw data and complete data pre-processing script here bit.do/Strategic_Data). The 
raw data were pre-processed in order to determine saccades and fixations as well delete 
artefacts in the data. Therefore, the following pre-processing steps were applied (adaptation 
from Salvucci and Goldberg (2000)): (1) fixations were defined as relative stable gaze (raw 
data points are located with a radius of 30 pixel) which lasted at least 50 ms, (2) blinks were 
removed and (3) trials were excluded in which 40% or more of the fixations were located 
outside of the predefined AOIs (16.58%) and (4) to account for outliers, trials that were very 
short (< 200 ms) or very long (> 3 standard deviations of the mean) were excluded from the 
analysis (4.97%). 
Overall, eight non-overlapping areas of interest (AOIs) were defined, containing the 
payoffs connected with the different choices of the participant and her matched partner 
(100×100 pixels, mean margin of 25×20 pixels). Other AOIs included text labels for the 
payoff matrix, which were not included in the analysis. We constructed the stimuli such that 
Figure 9. Example of a prisoner’s dilemma. Participants have the choice to cooperate or defect, 
which determines their payoff, depending on the other player’s choice.  
RR = Mutual cooperation, TS = Temptation, ST = Sucker, PP = Mutual defection. 
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the distance between objects and the AOI margin was maximized, following suggestions by 
Orquin et al. (2016).  
SVO, type of choice (cooperation vs. defection) and location cue were used as 
predictors in repeated measures logistic regressions with a random effects model and robust 
standard errors. Controlling for any learning effects across time, trial number was included as 
a control variable in all models. Another factor influencing strategic choices is the relation 
between possible payoffs for mutual cooperation relative to possible gains from defecting 
(cooperation index; Terhune, 1968). To account for characteristics of the task, cooperation 
index was also included as a control variable in all models.19 In case an interaction effect was 
included in the model, all variables were centered. The results of the Shapiro-Wilk test 
showed support for a skewed distribution of response time (W = 0.73, z = 11.39, p < .001) and 
fixation number (W = 0.73, z = 11.45, p < .001). Consequently, both variables were log-
transformed for all analyses. For the final data set and the complete analysis script, see 
bit.do/Strategic_Analysis.  
 
 
                                                
19 Including control variables has no substantial influence on the main analyses. For analyses without control 
variables, see the supplementary material. 
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Results 
Strategic choice behavior 
Overall, 56.61% of the choices individuals made in the prisoner’s dilemma were 
cooperative. Replicating previous findings, prosocial participants made 19.36% more 
cooperative choices than individualists. Specifically, as participants’ SVO angle increased the 
likelihood of making a cooperative choice significantly increased (OR = 1.06, z = 3.41, p = 
.001). Additionally, in line with previous findings, making a cooperative choice became more 
likely as the cooperation index of a game increased (OR = 68.84, z = 5.87, p < .001) and 
hence was used as a crucial control within the process analyses.  
 
SVO and information search  
Information search effort. To analyze the underlying processes of strategic choices, 
specific measures were selected to provide insights into the depth of information search, 
namely decision time and the number of fixations. On average, prosocial individuals took 7.3 
seconds to make their choices, while individualists took slightly longer at 7.5 seconds. 
Contrary to H1 and findings in non-strategic decision environments, SVO did not have a 
significant effect on decision time or the number of fixations (Table S12).  
Information weighting. For a more detailed understanding of participants’ weighting 
process, the influence of SVO on relative attention directed to participants’ own payoffs as 
compared to the other players’ payoffs was examined. Overall, participants were less likely to 
look at their own payoffs than the other player’s payoffs (43.45%). While prosocials directed 
45.08% of their attention to the others’ payoffs, individualists directed 42.22% to them. In 
line with H2, more prosocial participants were significantly more likely to attend the other 
players’ payoffs than individualists (β = .21, z = 2.56, p = .011).  
Adding further to the understanding of underlying processes, the proportion of 
attention directed to specific strategies was examined (H3). The results show that, on average, 
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prosocials directed 52.45% of their attention to outcomes associated with cooperation (mutual 
cooperation and sucker’s payoff), while individualists directed 48.47% of their attention to 
these outcomes. This difference is statistically significant, with prosocials being more likely 
to direct their attention towards cooperative strategies than individualists (β = .20, z = 2.94, p 
= .003). Investigating attention to the specific outcomes in more detail, Figure 10a illustrates 
that as SVO increases, the proportion of attention to the potential payoffs of mutual 
cooperation (RR) increased, while attention towards the other payoff combinations slightly 
decreased. This effect is driven by prosocial individuals who decide in line with their 
prosocial preference and cooperate. No such attentional focus to a specific outcome 
combination can be observed for prosocial individuals who go against their original 
inclination to cooperate. Using SVO to predict attention directed to mutual cooperation in 
cooperative choices, we do not find a significant link (OR = 1.003, z = 0.50, p = .615); and 
neither for a relation between SVO and attention directed to temptation payoffs in defective 
choices (OR = 1.01, z = 0.69, p = .490).  
Temporal dynamics. Taking a closer look at the allocation of attention, we examined 
the temporal dynamics of attention during the complete decision making process.  The results 
reveal an increase of proportion of attention towards the chosen option over time (i.e., gaze 
cascade effect). Particularly, we tested whether individual social preferences affect the 
magnitude of a gaze cascade effect by taking SVO into account (H4). The results indicate a 
successful replication of the established gaze cascade effect with an increase of attention 
towards the eventually chosen strategy across time (β = 0.08, z = 4.94, p < .001).20 This effect 
tends to be stronger for prosocials than for individualists  (β = 0.05, z = 2.64, p = .008). 
In a next step, we included only last fixations in the analysis to gain a deeper 
understanding of the temporal dynamics in strategic decisions. Last fixations are especially 
relevant as they are a stronger predictor of choices than previous fixations (Krajbich et al., 
                                                
20 For all temporal analyses, we excluded first fixations to eliminate the exogenously directed fixations due to 
location cueing. 
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2010). Taking into account only last fixations before making a choice, attention patterns 
become more pronounced (see Figure 10b). Prosocial individuals who decided to defect 
mostly directed their attention towards the temptation payoff (39.46%) just before making 
their choice. For individualists the attention pattern is less clear, with temptation and mutual 
defection receiving similar proportions of attention.  
CHAPTER II: SVO PREDICTS STRATEGIC INFORMATION SEARCH 
 
103 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
0 10 20 30 40 50 0 10 20 30 40 50
Defective choice Cooperative choice
Mutual cooperation (RR) Temptation (TS) Sucker (ST) Mutual defection (PP)
Pr
op
or
tio
n 
of
 fix
at
ion
s t
o 
th
e 
str
at
eg
ies
 (i
n 
%
)
SVO angle
(a) Overall attention
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
0 10 20 30 40 50 0 10 20 30 40 50
Defective choice Cooperative choice
Mutual cooperation (RR) Temptation (TS) Sucker (ST) Mutual defection (PP)
Pr
op
or
tio
n 
of
 fix
at
ion
s t
o 
th
e 
str
at
eg
ies
 (i
n 
%
)
SVO angle
(b) Last fixation
Figure 10. Differences in attention allocation directed to the payoff combinations driven 
by SVO angle and separately for defective and cooperative choices (error bars indicate 
95% confidence intervals and circle size reflects the number of observations). 
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Type of choice and information search 
Information search effort. Investigating the mechanisms driving choices in further 
detail, we examined in an exploratory set of analyses the way in which cooperative choices 
differ from defective choices with regard to the depth of information search and attention 
allocation. Cooperative choices were on average 1.67 seconds faster than defective decisions 
and presented with 7.22 less fixations during the decision process. To test for differences, the 
type of decision was used to predict response time and fixation number. The results indicate 
that cooperative choices are associated with shorter response times (β = -.12, z = -2.89, p = 
.004) and a smaller number of fixations (β = -.12, z = -2.83, p = .005). The link between type 
of choice and information search effort differs depending on SVO angle. Specifically, for 
individualists, the type of choice is a stronger predictor of response times (β = -.12, z = -3.28, 
p = .001) and number of fixations (β = -.10, z = -2.71, p = .007) than for prosocials. 
Information weighting. Next, differences in attention allocation to the varying 
strategy combinations for cooperative and defective choices were tested for. During 
cooperative decisions, participants directed on average 52.51% of their attention to 
cooperative payoff combinations (mutual cooperation and sucker’s payoff) while during 
defective decisions the average was at 46.94%. Using a regression analysis, cooperative 
choices significantly predict the proportion of attention directed to the cooperative strategy 
combinations (β = .24, z = 4.92, p < .001).  
Temporal dynamics. Analyzing the temporal dynamics, the results indicate that 
differences in information search prior defective and cooperative choices were mostly driven 
by attention allocation during the last part of the trial. Specifically, for cooperative choices 
there was a pronounced increase in attention towards mutual cooperation, decreasing attention 
to the other strategy combinations (see Figure 11). For defective choices, a similar proportion 
of attention was directed towards temptation and mutual defection payoffs. Following up on 
the temporal dynamics analysis, we tested whether the type of choice participants make 
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affects the established gaze cascade effect. The findings reveal that the gaze bias to eventually 
chosen options does not differ depending on whether a choice was cooperative or defective (β 
= .001, z = 0.03, p = .976). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Influence of attentional reference points 
Investigating the role of attentional reference points, we first tested the effectiveness 
of the location cueing manipulation, by calculating the likelihood of the first fixation being on 
the cued strategy. The manipulation check shows that the first fixation is significantly more 
likely to be directed towards the cued strategy (OR = 4.76, z = 5.36, p < .001). Overall, we 
observed an average increase of 7.59% in attention directed towards payoffs presented in 
previously activated locations (see Figure S2). Yet in contrast to H5, there is no evidence that 
location cueing influenced the subsequent decision (OR = 0.96, z = -0.20, p = .840). 
Figure 11. Proportion of attention towards the strategy combinations as a function of relative 
time passed in the decision making process and the final decision made (defection vs. 
cooperation). Error bars indicate 95% confidence intervals.  
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Discussion 
The present study investigates attention patterns in strategic choices using eye-tracking 
thereby extending the existing research on the underlying cognitive mechanisms in social 
dilemmas. Overall, the findings suggest that social preferences are an important driver of 
strategic considerations and reflect in eye movements. Uncovering differences in information 
weighting, we show that prosocial individuals were more likely to direct their attention to the 
other player’s payoff and the cooperative strategy than individualists. In contrast to findings 
in simple games, information search effort was not affected by individuals’ SVO. Using the 
type of choice to predict information search, cooperative choices were associated with shorter 
information search and increased attention to the cooperative strategy than defective choices. 
Taking temporal gaze patterns into account, our results successfully replicate the gaze cascade 
effect in strategic decisions with an increase of attention to the chosen strategy across time 
and additionally show that this effect tends to be stronger for prosocial individuals.  
 
Information search effort in strategic environments 
Exploring the underlying drivers of cooperation in more detail, the present study 
utilized eye movements to uncover individuals’ strategic considerations. Notably, a 
comprehensive analysis is offered by using a number of dependent variables such as decision 
time, fixation number and proportion of attention. In contrast to the current study, previous 
research found that a prosocial value orientation was associated with longer decision times 
when compared to individualists (Dehue et al., 1993; Fiedler et al., 2013; Liebrand & 
McClintock, 1988). Arguably, the strategic component of the situation diminishes differences 
in the extent of information search between prosocials and individualists. Due to the 
additional complexity and dependency of own outcomes on others choices, more extensive 
computations are required in strategic environments (Rapoport & Chammah, 1965). For 
individualists, the amount of information that is relevant for their decision increases, because 
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in interdependent situation it is necessary to assess both, own and other’s outcomes, in order 
to choose the strategy resulting in the best outcome for themselves. Thus, by taking other’s 
outcomes into account as well, individualists’ information search process is more similar to 
prosocials’ search for information. The similarity in information search effort between 
prosocials and individualists suggests that, rather than avoiding search effort in general, 
individualists search rationally for information that is important for their decisions. It also 
suggests that besides individual differences, the decision structure of the social dilemma has 
an important influence on information search effort. Building upon this finding, one 
interesting avenue for future research would be to compare the extent of information searches 
in strategic vs. non-strategic environments in order to systematically investigate the influence 
of the decision structure on information search effort.  
Additionally, the results revealed systematic differences in information processing 
between cooperative and defective choices. In line with previous research on cooperation and 
decision time defective choices were associated with more extensive information search than 
cooperative choices (e.g., Rand, Greene, & Nowak, 2012; but see e.g., Tinghög et al., 2013). 
Other findings indicate that this only holds for individuals who decide in line with their initial 
social preference (Mischkowski & Glöckner, 2016). The current findings revealed that social 
preferences affect the strength of the link between cooperative/defective choices and 
information search effort. These results suggest that cooperative and defective choices are 
related to different evaluation processes that are linked to individual social preferences and 
reflect in decision time. 
 
Attention patterns reflect strategic considerations 
Going beyond the extent of information search, our results are in line with results on 
information weighting in money allocation tasks where prosociality was related to more 
fixations to the outcome of others (Fiedler et al., 2013). A similar notion was supported by 
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Kurzban and DeScioli (2008) who assume that participants seek the information that is most 
relevant to their contribution strategy. Their findings indicate that information search differed 
depending on whether participants’ decided to reciprocate or free ride. The present results 
show that prosocials direct more attention to the other player’s payoffs and thereby suggest 
that prosocials weight outcomes for others more strongly than individualists when making 
strategic decisions. Even though they invest similar effort in their information search, the 
systematic differences in weighting suggest that social preferences are associated with 
different decision strategies. Such strategies are supposedly similar across decision contexts 
as we find that prosocials overweight other’s payoffs in both, strategic and non-strategic 
situations. 
These findings have relevant theoretical implications. The bounded rationality 
framework proposed that decision processes are limited by individual information processing. 
The results reported here support this notion by showing that attention allocation is driven by 
individual preferences and corresponds to the motives each individual pursues. This is 
consistent with evidence showing that players selectively attended to information that is 
relevant to them (Hristova & Grinberg, 2005), in particular their own payoffs (Devetag et al., 
2016). Further, the current findings suggest that models formalizing strategic thinking (e.g. 
level-k) could predict strategic considerations more accurately by taking individual social 
preferences into account.  
 
Temporal dynamics 
The results on temporal dynamics successfully replicate evidence for the previously 
established gaze cascade effect (Armel et al., 2008; Fiedler & Glöckner, 2012; Krajbich et al., 
2010; Shimojo et al., 2003; N. Stewart et al., 2016). We contribute to the respective literature 
by taking an individual differences perspective to understand the temporal and motivational 
dynamics of strategic decision making and present evidence that the gaze bias is stronger for 
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prosocials than for individualists. These differences suggest that depending on their social 
preferences, individuals’ decision process is qualitatively different, with more prosocial 
individuals showing higher levels of motivated information search, which has been linked to 
experiencing less uncertainty during the decision process (De Dreu, Nijstad, & van 
Knippenberg, 2008). Further investigations of this link between social preferences and 
decision uncertainty would be valuable for understanding the extent to which choices in social 
situations can be influenced by exogenously interrupting the decision process.    
 
Strategic choice behavior 
In addition, the results presented here succesfully replicate strategic cooperation 
behavior on two accounts successfully. First, SVO has been found to be a reliable predictor of 
cooperation behavior with more prosocial individuals cooperating more than less prosocial 
individuals. This finding is in line with the results of a meta-analysis by Balliet et al. (2009), 
which established a robust link between SVO and cooperation in social dilemmas (see also 
Bogaert et al., 2008). Second, as the cooperation index of a game increased cooperation 
became more likely, which is consistent with previously reported evidence (Goehring & 
Kahan, 1976; Rapoport & Chammah, 1965; Terhune, 1968). This fortifies the suggestion that 
an increase of the reward for joint cooperation and of the punishment for joint defection in 
relation to a decrease in the temptation to defect and the sucker’s payoff leads to higher rates 
of cooperation.  
 
Evaluation of attentional reference points 
The failed influence of location cueing on choice behavior stands in contrast to 
research on query theory highlighting the weight of first queries (Johnson et al., 2007) and 
findings in risky choices, showing that first fixated options are more likely to be chosen 
(Manohar & Husain, 2013). To carve out the specific differences between simple and 
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strategic decisions, it will be necessary to understand the impact of information order within 
decision making. Developing a search task, which was used prior to the choice task in order to 
avoid obviousness and resulting demand effects, we provide a new tool to systematically 
investigate these order effects. As other studies mostly integrated the manipulation of 
attention into the choice task, the separation of the two possibly leads to an attenuation of the 
location cue. To understand strategic contemplations, studying decision processes in 
prisoner’s dilemmas is an important step. Information search requires more resources in these 
situations than in simple non-strategic choices (Rapoport & Chammah, 1965). The strategic 
structure of the environment supposedly prevents a spillover of manipulating attention to 
subsequent choices. Investigating the extent to which attention can influence choices in social 
dilemmas, it is important to understand how dynamic individual social preferences are. With 
previous research showing that social preferences are a stable over time (Carlsson et al., 
2014), it is questionable whether such preferences can be influenced via attention. These 
limitations call for a critical test of previous causality claims regarding eye gaze and choice 
behavior.  
 
Conclusion 
In conclusion, social preferences are able to explain systematic differences in strategic 
information search. Attention patterns reflect weighting processes associated with individuals’ 
SVO angle and individuals’ final choice. Uncovering some of the strategic contemplations 
people are facing in social dilemmas, temporal dynamics show that attention allocation 
unfolds differently for cooperative and defective choices. These findings contribute to 
research on social dilemmas as they shed light on the impact of social preferences on strategic 
information search and develop a preliminary understanding of the underlying drivers of 
cooperation and defection.
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Abstract 
According to research studying the processes underlying decisions, a two-channel mechanism 
connects attention and choices: top-down and bottom-up processes. To identify the magnitude 
of each channel, we exogenously varied information intake by systematically interrupting 
participants’ decision process in Study 1 (N = 116). Results show that participants were more 
likely to choose the pre-determined target option. Since selection effects limited the 
interpretation of the results, we used a sequential presentation paradigm in Study 2 (pre-
registered, N = 100). To partial out bottom-up effects of attention on choices, in particular, we 
presented alternatives by mirroring the gaze patterns of autonomous decision makers. Results 
revealed that final fixations successfully predicted choices when experimentally manipulated 
(bottom-up). Specifically, up to 11.32% of the link between attention and choices is driven by 
exogenously guided attention (= 1.19% change in choices overall), while the remaining 
variance is explained by top-down preference formation.  
 
 
Keywords: bottom-up, top-down, eye-tracking, social preferences, moral decision making 
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Introduction 
Walking down the street, a stranger struggles with her grocery bags. When considering 
whether to help her, the cost of your time and physical effort are weighed against the benefit 
for the stranger. Thus, personal self-interest is in conflict with what is best for someone else. 
Does the timing of asking what you want to do about this situation alter your subsequent 
choice? Recently, a number of studies have used gaze recordings to understand the processes 
underlying decision making in different areas (for a review see Orquin & Mueller Loose, 
2013). So far, they have provided consistent evidence for a correlation between eye gaze and 
subsequent other-regarding (e.g., Fiedler, Glöckner, Nicklisch, & Dickert, 2013), moral 
choices (Pärnamets et al., 2015), consumer choices (e.g., Ashby, Walasek, & Glöckner, 2015; 
for a review see Krajbich & Smith, 2015), attractiveness ratings (e.g., Shimojo, Simion, 
Shimojo, & Scheier, 2003; Störmer & Alvarez, 2016), and risky choices (e.g., Fiedler & 
Glöckner, 2012). The current state of the evidence suggests that both top-down preferences 
and characteristics of choice presentation drive information search. Inspired by these findings, 
the current studies aimed to disentangle these two drivers of the correlation between eye gaze 
and choice behavior. In doing so, we critically tested the causality claims made in recent 
publications (Armel, Beaumel, & Rangel, 2008; Milosavljevic, Navalpakkam, Koch, & 
Rangel, 2012; Pärnamets et al., 2015; but see Newell & Le Pelley, 2018) in two high-
powered, eye-tracking studies using eye gaze to predict other-regarding and moral choices.  
 
Choice behavior and visual attention 
Many of the assumptions concerning the link between eye gaze and choice behavior 
are based on the attentional drift-diffusion model (aDDM; Krajbich, Armel, & Rangel, 2010). 
The aDDM is an evidence accumulation model that assumes that directing eye gaze towards a 
specific option resembles the process of collecting evidence in favor of that option. 
Considering the initial example of helping a stranger carry grocery bags, evidence 
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accumulation models would predict that the decision to help is made by accumulating 
stochastic information over time until the net evidence in favor of one alternative exceeds a 
pre-specified threshold and a decision is made. Another key idea of the aDDM is that 
fixations affect the value comparison process by introducing a temporary drift bias towards 
the fixated item in the positive domain. More precisely, fixations supposedly have a causal 
effect on the value comparison process.  
The theoretical assumptions of the aDDM highlight the importance of the two relevant 
factors when studying the link between attention and choice behavior: (1) proportion of 
attention directed towards stimuli and (2) the direction of the last fixation. Pärnamets et al. 
(2015) aimed to understand this interplay and subsequently developed a gaze-contingent 
paradigm. In doing so, they showed a significant correlation between the direction of the last 
fixation as well as a positive (but not significant) effect of the relative overall fixation time of 
an option (i.e., relative time advantage) on moral choices. The authors subsequently 
concluded that there is a causal link between last fixation and moral choices. However, only 
the relative time advantage was manipulated experimentally, whereas the direction of the last 
fixation was simply observed in the data.  
Across two studies, we tackled the remaining question of causality by developing the 
experimental paradigm further so that the causal link between the last fixation and subsequent 
choices could be tested directly. To do so, we systematically interrupted decision makers’ 
decision process based on their gaze behavior to assess the impact of attention on choices.  
 
Construction of other-regarding and moral choices 
Within this investigation, we focused on two domains: other-regarding and moral 
choices. Studying the link between attention and choices in these contexts is particularly 
interesting because it allowed us to explore the similarities and differences between decisions 
involving social vs. moral concerns. While social (other-regarding) dilemmas involve 
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strategies that differ in terms of social desirability (e.g., common gain vs. self-interest), moral 
dilemmas involve situations in which all possible solutions are associated with undesirable 
outcomes. In both domains, at least two possible options stand in conflict with each other. 
While classic economic theories for example suggest that people try to maximize their own 
welfare in other-regarding problems, research has shown that a substantial proportion of 
people are willing to sacrifice their own benefits because they weight also the benefits of 
others in their decision process (Fehr & Schmidt, 1999). The necessary weighting process and 
its link to heterogeneous underlying preferences make other-regarding and moral problems 
especially interesting for the study of decision making. 
Even though the motives for both decisions often overlap, both decision environments 
are also distinct. While other-regarding choices are a fairly regular element of day-to-day life, 
moral decisions are less frequent and often discussed more abstractly. Consequently, it is 
important to include both domains when studying underlying attentional processes.  
Most research discusses social and moral preferences as stable constructs (Alger & 
Weibull, 2013; Carlsson, Johansson-Stenman, & Nam, 2014) that strongly influence behavior 
(Balliet, Parks, & Joireman, 2009). Yet, findings showing that even slight changes in the 
representation of moral and social problems such as the presentation order or format altered 
decisions (Haley & Fessler, 2005; Iliev et al., 2009; Knez & Camerer, 1995) indicate that 
people’s preferences are not completely stable and instead are partly constructed during the 
decision making process through bottom-up processes (Sharot, Velasquez, & Dolan, 2010; 
Simon & Spiller, 2016).  
Overall, these findings indicate that choices are driven by a two-channel mechanism 
that includes top-down and bottom-up processes. Going beyond previous studies, the current 
design enabled us to disentangle the relative contribution of these two channels on other-
regarding and moral choices by using eye gaze as an indicator of choices processes. Study 2 
extended this first investigation by utilizing a decision paradigm that allowed to fully control 
CHAPTER III: THE POWER OF ATTENTION 
 
 
116 
information intake though exogenously provided real-time viewing patterns. It coalesced 
Study 1 as it disentangled bottom-up processes from top-down processes and avoided 
potential selection effects. 
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Study 1 
Study 1 focuses on three key points: First, we aim to disentangle top-down and 
bottom-up processes of decision making. Second, we will test whether the effect of attention 
on choices is context-dependent by comparing other-regarding and moral choices. In order to 
ensure that effects can be attributed correctly to one or the other channel, we will 
systematically examine the data concerning potential selection biases. 
 
Method 
Participants. One hundred and twenty participants (mean age = 22.9 years, 55.6 % 
female, all normal or corrected to normal vision) from the Max Planck DecisionLab subject 
pool (students of the University of Bonn) were recruited via Orsee (Greiner, 2015). The 
experiment, which required approximately 30 minutes to complete, was the first in a two-
study experimental battery lasting a total of approximately 60 minutes (the second unrelated 
study was designed by a different experimenter). Participants received a fixed payoff of 6 € 
for the present study. All participants signed a consent form for taking part in experimental 
studies and were debriefed after the experiment. Based on the effect size reported by 
Pärnamets et al. (2015), we estimated a minimum sample size for this study of approximately 
80 participants. Due to joint data collection for multiple experiments, we had the opportunity 
to collect data from 120 participants. Hence, this sample size was set as the stopping point for 
data collection. We excluded four participants who either reported difficulties hearing the 
recordings or did not understand the control questions. 
Materials and Procedure. Participants completed the Social Value Orientation 
(SVO) Ring Measure online at least 12 hours prior to taking part in the experiment (Liebrand 
& McClintock, 1988). The instrument is frequently used to determine individual social 
preferences – i.e., the weights they attribute to their own and others’ payoffs. Specifically, 
participants were asked to make 24 choices between two options representing money 
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allocations that differed in terms of payoffs to themselves and others. Participants could either 
maximize their own payoff or sacrifice their personal gain in order to benefit others. While 
typically individuals attributed greater weight to their own payoffs they did not ignore others’ 
payoffs completely (Liebrand & McClintock, 1988). According to their choices, participants 
were classified as either cooperative (SVO angle < 67.5° and > 22.5°) or individualistic (SVO 
angle < 22.5° and > -22.5°). Their choices were fully incentivized in that one of the money 
allocations was selected at random and paid out with real money. We deliberately did not pay 
out all 24 choices in order to prevent hedging behavior. 
Upon arriving at the lab, participants were seated in front of a computer screen (17'' 
and 14'' color monitors with a native resolution of 1280 × 1024) and were calibrated to an 
Eyegaze system (LC Technologies) with a remote binocular sampling rate of 120 Hz and an 
accuracy of about 0.45˚. Viewed from a distance of 60 cm, the screen subtended a visual 
angle of 28° horizontally and 21° vertically. A chin rest was used to ensure data quality by 
reducing head movement during the experiment. Following a 9-point calibration procedure on 
a grey background, participants read the instructions on the screen. Participants were 
presented with 90 statements via headphones. These recordings included descriptions of 
situations in which personal interests stood in conflict with other’s interests (other-regarding) 
and moral issues as well as general knowledge questions (factual). The set of other-regarding 
recordings included statements such as “If I saw a stranger on the street struggling with her 
grocery bags, I would help her carry them”. In response to this statement, two alternative 
choice options appeared on the screen (“Only if I have time” and “I would usually help”). 
Participants were instructed to listen carefully to the recording and then choose the alternative 
they considered to be most in line with their preferences. Following their choice, they were 
asked whether they had been able to see the two alternatives (yes vs. no), how confident they 
were regarding their answer (7-point Likert scale), and how important the related topic was to 
them (7-point Likert scale). The trial then continued with the next recording.  
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Eye-tracking paradigm. To test whether the direction of the last fixation has a causal 
influence on choices, we developed a novel paradigm based on the method used in Pärnamets 
et al. (2015). We adapted the gaze-contingent paradigm such that the decision prompt was 
sent conditional on the fixation location and absolute time spent on each of the options (see 
Figure 12). Specifically, participants were prompted to choose when their last fixation was 
directed at the randomly allocated target option and both options had been attended to. Within 
our experimental program, three decision prompt criteria were implemented. First, to ensure 
that participants knew both choice alternatives: (1) the target alternative had to be attended to 
for at least 750 ms and (2) the nontarget had to be attended to for at least 250 ms. When both 
of these criteria were fulfilled, the decision prompt was sent as soon as (3) the target option 
was fixated again. In case the process exceeded 3000 ms, the decision prompt was 
automatically sent to avoid lengthy decision trials. The essential feature that differentiates this 
paradigm from the one used in Pärnamets et al. (2015) is the addition of criterion (3). 
Participants were informed that the screen showing the alternatives would be presented for a 
short and variable amount of time. To ensure that participants were able to make an informed 
choice even when the presentation time was very short, we asked if they had been able to see 
the two alternatives after the presentation.  
For this study, it was especially important to predefine areas of interest (AOIs) in 
order to determine the attention towards a specific option and accurately apply the gaze-
contingent manipulation. We thus defined two non-overlapping AOIs containing the two 
different options from which participants could choose (each 320 × 140 pixels with a mean 
margin of 75 × 30 pixels). The AOIs were vertically centered and horizontally positioned on 
the far left and far right, respectively. 
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Stimuli. A total of 90 questions were presented via headphones – 30 other-regarding 
items, 30 moral items, and 30 factual items. The recordings were all read by the same female 
voice using the Audacity software and had a mean duration of 6.5 s (SD = 1.7 s). While 
listening to the recording, participants viewed a fixation cross at the center of the screen. The 
order of the questions as well as the screen side on which each answer option appeared was 
determined randomly. All answer alternatives were matched in terms of visual features 
including background color of the screen (grey), font type (Arial), font color (white), and font 
Figure 12. Participants first listened to the recording while a central fixation cross was 
presented on screen. Following the recording, two options appeared on the screen that were 
randomly assigned to the right or left side. Participants viewed the alternatives until their 
choice was prompted, either by fulfilling the decision criteria or after 3000 ms, whichever 
came first. Participants then made a choice by clicking the right or left mouse button, 
respectively. After answering questions regarding their perception of the alternatives, 
confidence, and importance of the topic (omitted from this figure), the next recording was 
played via the headphones. For presentation purposes, we modified the background color and 
font color of the stimuli for this figure. 
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size (17). The presented moral and factual items constituted a subset of the items that were 
used in Pärnamets et al. (2015). Thirty of the original moral items were selected. Items were 
excluded if they did not fit to the German student population (e.g., “Acting according to 
God’s will is key to being moral”). Other-regarding items were constructed using items from 
the prosocial personality battery (Penner, Fritzsche, Craiger, & Freifeld, 1995), self-reported 
altruism scale (Rushton, Chrisjohn, & Fekken, 1981), altruistic personality scale, (Rushton et 
al., 1981), honesty-humility scale of the HEXACO (Ashton & Lee, 2009), and self- and other-
interest inventory (Gerbasi & Prentice, 2013). Factual items were used as filler tasks and were 
therefore excluded from all analyses, following the procedure in Pärnamets et al. (2015). All 
stimuli were presented via NBS Presentation®. As indicated by their responses to the 
question “Do you have an assumption what we investigated in this study?”, all participants 
were unaware of the gaze contingent interruption of their decision making process. For a 
complete list of items, original instructions, recordings, and the experimental program, see 
bit.do/osf-Material. 
Data preparation. Participants were able to choose an option before the decision 
prompt was activated (= self-determined trials, 37.78% of decisions). Providing the option for 
self-determined trials enabled us to distinguish between top-down and bottom-up processes 
by comparing them to trials in which the last fixation was experimentally manipulated (= 
interrupted trials, 43.31% of decisions). Trials were excluded from the analysis if either there 
was a timeout after 3000 ms (18.92% of decisions) or participants were not able to see both 
alternatives (0.75% of interrupted choices and 0.20% of self-determined choices). Including 
these trials in the analyses did not change our findings. To check whether participants 
followed the instruction of choosing as soon as they were prompted, we analyzed response 
times after viewing the options (M = 1.58 s, SD = 2.71 s). As this indicates a fairly short 
response time, we can assume that participants generally followed the instruction to decide 
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right after the decision prompt was presented. The raw data of the study and a script for the 
pre-processing procedure can be found here bit.do/osf-Data.    
 
Results 
All of the following analyses used a repeated measurement logistic regression 
predicting the final choice by the location of the target (or last fixation) and controlled for 
relative time advantage, time effects (trial number), and participants’ perceived confidence in 
their answer. Relative time advantage refers to the amount of time in which a participant’s 
gaze focused on the option on the right side minus the amount of time in which his or her gaze 
focused on the option on the left side (i.e. negative values are possible). We predicted choice 
of right option rather than target choice. Using last fixation to predict target choice would not 
be meaningful in this case, because the last fixation is per definition by the program always 
directed towards the target. Consequently, there is no variation in the predictor variable; and 
we have perfect collinearity with the constant in our model. By using “option on the right” as 
the dependent variable and “last fixation to the right” as a predictor, we have the opportunity 
to test the relationship in which we are interested. When making a large number of sequential 
choices, familiarity or learning effects often influence the decision process and subsequently 
choice behavior. Adding time effects allowed us to control for any such influence of time 
trends on the link between attention and choices. Another factor that has been shown to have 
an influence on subsequent choices was the relative time advantage towards one of the sides. 
Thus, we included this variable as an additional control variable. Examining the distribution 
of attention for interrupted trials showed that in the current adaptation, attention is equally 
distributed across both target and nontarget options, whereas in the original paradigm 
participants directed more attention towards the target option (Pärnamets et al., 2015). Due to 
our interest in the top-down and bottom-up processes involved, we will present separate 
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analyses for interrupted and self-determined trials. For the final data set, the complete analysis 
script, and additional analyses, see bit.do/osf-Analysis. 
Magnitude of top-down and bottom-up mechanisms. Overall, we found a strong 
correlational link between attention and self-determined other-regarding and moral choices. 
Specifically, 72.83% of all last fixated alternatives were subsequently chosen (Table 4A). To 
determine the role of bottom-up processes in the link between the last fixation and subsequent 
choice, we analyzed trials in which the gaze-contingent paradigm successfully interrupted the 
decision making process. The results showed that in these trials the last fixated (pre-
determined target) option was chosen in 62.02% of decisions (Table 4B). Hence, the 
attention-choice relationship might be driven by up to 36.40%21 by the influence of attention 
on choice. In contrast, the remaining variance cannot be attributed to this bottom-up 
connection but rather to the fact that attention allocation is a natural byproduct of the arising 
choice preferences of the decision maker. When including all trials in the analysis, target 
options remained more likely to be chosen than nontarget options (OR = 1.17, 95% CI = 
[1.05, 1.30], z = 2.83, p = .005). However, when analyzing only self-determined choices, the 
target option was chosen in only 37.56% of the trials (OR = 0.45, 95% CI = [0.36, 0.57], z = -
6.68, p < .001). This reversal of the effect is a first indication for possible selection effects (a 
more detailed analysis is described below). 
Comparing self-determined to interrupted choices, the results showed that the link 
between last fixation and the subsequent choice is stronger for self-determined than for 
interrupted trials (OR = 0.46, 95% CI = [0.33, 0.66], z = -4.24, p < .001, Table 4C). These 
findings indicate that even though the link between the last fixation and the subsequent choice 
was systematically stronger in an uninterrupted preference formation process (top-down), we 
also observed an effect when the process was exogenously interrupted (bottom-up). 
 
                                                
21 100 / ORself-determined × ORinterrupted = 100 / 9.45 × 3.44 = 36.40 
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Table 4 
Choice of right option predicted by last fixation for interrupted (A) and self-determined trials 
(B) and both trials combined (C). 
 (A) Self-determined 
OR (right option) 
(B) Interrupted 
OR (right option) 
(C) Pooled 
OR (right option) 
Last fixation right 9.45***  [6.48, 13.78] 3.44***  [2.76, 4.29] 5.46*** [4.41, 6.77] 
Relative time 
advantage right 
4.85*** [3.45, 6.81] 2.33*** [1.90, 2.86] 3.48*** [2.85, 4.25] 
Confidence 0.96 [0.88, 1.04] 0.95* [0.90, 0.99] 0.95* [0.91, 1.00] 
Trial number 1.00* [0.99, 1.00] 1.00 [0.999, 1.00] 1.00 [1.00, 1.00] 
Interrupted trial -  -  0.76*** [0.65, 0.89] 
Last fixation right 
× interrupted trial 
-  -  0.46*** [0.33, 0.66] 
Constant 0.62 [0.34, 1.14] 0.58** [0.42, 0.81] 0.93+ [0.85, 1.01] 
Observations 2540 2912 5452 
Note. Odds Ratios; 95% confidence intervals in brackets. For C all variables were centered, * p < .05, ** p < .01, 
*** p < .001.  
 
Comparing attention-choice relationship across domains. To further understand the 
decision process and the role of attention within it, we tested for potential differences between 
other-regarding and moral decisions. We replicated the well-established correlation between 
attention and choices, in that the alternative attended to last was chosen in 71.68% of other-
regarding (OR = 7.73, 95% CI = [4.88, 12.24], z = 8.71, p < .001) and 73.89% of moral 
choices (OR = 12.58, 95% CI = [8.20, 19.28], z = 11.60, p < .001). In contrast, in the 
interrupted sample, the lastly attended alternative was chosen in 59.49% of trials (OR = 2.85, 
95% CI = [2.17, 3.74], z = 7.53, p < .001). For moral choices, participants chose the last 
fixated alternative in 64.57% of trials (OR = 4.03, 95% CI = [3.06, 5.31], z = 9.93, p < .001). 
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Comparing trials with self-determined last fixations to trials with experimentally manipulated 
last fixations, the results showed, in both domains, that the link between the last fixation and 
the subsequent choice is weaker for interrupted in contrast to self-determined trials (other-
regarding: OR = 0.50, 95% CI = [0.32, 0.78], z = -3.05, p = .002; moral choices: OR = 0.41, 
95% CI = [0.27, 0.64], z = -3.98, p < .001). Figure 13 shows a comparison of the bottom-up 
link between attention and subsequent choices (interrupted) and the top-down influence (self-
determined) for other-regarding and moral trials. To test the context dependency directly, we 
compared other-regarding to moral trials. The results indicated that the top-down influence of 
the last fixation on choice behavior was stronger for moral than for other-regarding trials (OR 
= 1.61, 95% CI = [1.07, 2.42], z = 2.29, p = .022). However, for the bottom-up effect of 
attention on choices, there is a reduced difference between other-regarding and moral trials 
(OR = 1.28, 95% CI = [0.94, 1.74], z = 1.54, p = .123; for more details, see the supplement). 
To explore the context dependency of the bottom-up effect of last fixation on choices 
in more detail, we analyzed the overall sample. When including only other-regarding trials in 
the analysis, the bottom-up effect of last fixation on choices did not hold (OR = 1.08, 95% CI 
= [0.93, 1.26], z = 1.06, p = .289). In contrast, for moral trials, the link between the pre-
determined target option and subsequent choices prevailed (OR = 1.26, 95% CI = [1.09, 1.45], 
z = 3.21, p = .001; see Figure 13 Overall). These results indicate that, for other-regarding 
trials, the bottom-up effect of the last fixation on choices might be the result of a selection 
bias. Overall, when including all trials, target options were still 4% more likely to be chosen 
than nontarget options but this difference is only driven by moral choices. 
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Note. The Overall estimation displays the likelihood of choosing the right vs. left option predicted by the 
location of the target (right / left), whereas in all other estimations choices are predicted using last fixation (right 
/ left) instead of target location.  
 
Considering selection effects. Choosing the pre-determined target option varied 
strongly between interrupted and self-determined trials. Whereas the randomly allocated 
Figure 13. Regression coefficients for the effect of last fixation on choice behavior for (a) 
Study 1 and (b) Study 2. For Study 1, the effect is displayed for all trials, self-determined 
trials, and interrupted trials (N = 116). For Study 2, the effect is displayed for the autonomous 
(n = 50) and exogenous groups (n = 50). At coefficient = 0 (dashed line), the last fixated and 
non-fixated option are equally likely to be chosen. Error bars indicate 95% confidence 
intervals.  
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target alternative was more likely to be chosen in interrupted trials (OR = 3.44, 95% CI = 
[2.76, 4.29], z = 10.96, p < .001), the effect reversed in self-determined trials (OR = 0.45, 
95% CI = [0.36, 0.57], z = -6.68, p < .001). This systematic reversion of the effect indicates 
that the trials in which the decision prompt criteria were not fulfilled were not a random 
selection. Target choices were not influenced by confidence (OR = 1.02, 95% CI = [0.99, 
1.06], z = 1.28, p = .202) and perceived importance of the topic (OR = 1.01, 95% CI = [0.98, 
1.05], z = 0.86, p = .387). 
In order to better understand the underlying processes and the potential selection bias 
present in our data, we analyzed the factors that influence the likelihood to fulfill all three 
decision prompt criteria. Particularly, we identified three factors increasing the likelihood of a 
self-determined trial. Self-determined trials were more likely if the nontarget option was 
selected (OR = 0.25, 95% CI = [0.21, 0.30], z = -14.11, p < .001) and participants were 
confident in their decision (OR = 1.44, 95% CI = [1.35, 1.55], z = 10.27, p < .001) as well as 
the later the trial appeared in the course of the experiment (OR = 1.01, 95% CI = [1.00, 1.01], 
z = 4.45, p < .001). We also examined how a preference for the left or right alternative 
affected the likelihood of making a choice before the decision trigger was sent (self-
determined trial). Due to the natural left bias in reading, trials were more likely to be self-
determined if the alternative on the right was chosen (OR = 1.36, 95% CI = [1.14, 1.62], z = 
3.47, p = .001). To further investigate potential selection effects, we analyzed which factors 
influenced the likelihood of a timeout to occur. Timeouts were more likely to occur when 
participants chose the nontarget option (OR = 0.43, 95% CI = [0.36, 0.52], z = -8.92, p < .001) 
and when they were less confident of their answer (OR = 0.90, 95% CI = [0.86, 0.95], z = -
4.31, p < .001). These results indicate that using the gaze-contingent paradigm led to 
systematic differences between target and nontarget choices.  
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Study 2 
While informative, the revealed selection effects do not allow to draw conclusive 
inferences from the findings presented in Study 1 (for a discussion of the same problem, see 
also Newell & Le Pelley, 2018). Hence, pre-registered Study 2 utilized a decision paradigm 
that allowed to fully control information intake to test for the influence of attention on choice. 
As in Study 1, we hypothesized that last fixations would be predictive for choice behavior 
even when information presentation was exogenously determined by the information search 
of another person (H1). We assumed that this effect would be stronger if information search 
was autonomous (H2). Following up on the findings of Study 1, we also hypothesized that the 
relationship between attention and choices would be stronger for moral than for other-
regarding choices (H3).  
 
Method 
Participants. One hundred five participants (mean age = 22.82 years, 68% female) 
from the Max Planck DecisionLab subject pool (students of the University of Bonn) were 
recruited via Orsee (Greiner, 2015). The experiment, which took approximately 30 minutes to 
complete, was the first in a two-study experimental battery lasting a total of approximately 60 
minutes (the second unrelated study was designed by a different experimenter). Participants 
received an average payoff of 11.50 €. All participants signed a consent form for taking part 
in experimental studies and were debriefed after the experiment. Using data from the first 
study, we conducted an a priori simulation based power analysis. Aiming at a power of .8 
revealed a target sample size of 66 complete data sets. Assuming that the effect of the last 
fixation on subsequent choices would be overestimated in this power analysis due to the 
selection effects discussed above, we aimed to collect data from at least 100 participants. 
Following the procedure in Study 1, trials in which participants indicated that they had not 
been able to see both alternatives (2.64%) were excluded. Participants who correctly guessed 
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the goal of the study (n = 5) were also excluded, resulting in a final sample of 100 
participants. 
Materials and Procedure. Following the same procedure as in Study 1, participants 
completed the fully incentivized SVO Ring Measure (Liebrand & McClintock, 1988) online 
at least 12 hours prior to participating in the experiment. Upon arriving at the laboratory all 
participants were presented with the same 90 statements as in Study 1 via headphones. After 
completing the experiment, participants were asked about their assumptions regarding the 
goal of the study. See bit.do/osf-Material for a complete list of items, original instructions, 
recordings and the experimental program. 
Using a between-subjects design, participants were assigned to either the autonomous 
(n = 50) or the exogenous condition (n = 50). Participants of the autonomous condition were 
seated in front of a laptop (12.2'' × 6.7'' screen, color monitor with a native resolution of 1600 
× 900). After reading the instructions, (all normal or corrected to normal vision) were 
calibrated to an EyeTribe eye-tracking device (30 Hz sampling rate, accuracy ~ 0.5°) and 
completed a 9-point calibration procedure on a grey background. During the experiment both 
alternatives appeared simultaneously on the screen after the audio recording was played. Two 
non-overlapping AOIs were defined with the same properties as in Study 1 containing the two 
alternatives. Participants were asked to make their choice within a given time frame ranging 
between 1 and 4 seconds for the first five trials and 1 and 3.5 seconds for all following trials. 
These are the mean decision times identified in a pre-test in which participants made the same 
choices without time constraint. By reducing the time frame after five trials, we adjust for 
learning effects. The time frame is set to reduce variance in the decision times and 
participants received feedback accordingly. During each trial, participants could inspect the 
information freely.  
To test whether the link between last fixation and subsequent choices holds even when 
information search is exogenously determined, we adapted the paradigm used in Study 1. In 
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the exogenous condition, alternatives were presented in a timely sequence based on viewing 
patterns of autonomous decision makers (see Figure 14). By presenting the information search 
of decision maker A to decision maker B, we hypothesized that their subsequent choices 
could be aligned. While individuals followed their natural gaze pattern in the autonomous 
choice condition, participants’ information intake in the exogenous condition was determined 
by a matched presentation pattern. We sampled four versions of viewing patterns, two where 
the original decision maker chose option A and another two where the decision maker 
eventually chose option B (while option A was presented on the left or right side). It was 
randomly determined, which of the four versions participants completed. Note that this makes 
it equally likely that the last presented option would be on the left or the right option. By 
using gaze patterns of autonomous decision makers, we determined 1) the order in which 
alternatives were presented, 2) the presentation length, and 3) the frequency with which an 
alternative was presented. The set of presentation patterns was systematically constructed to 
reflect a decision process in which the last fixated alternative was selected in an autonomous 
choice. Fixation durations in autonomous choices determined the presentation length in the 
sequential presentation paradigm. When presenting information simultaneously, transitions 
from one alternative to the other are unobstructed. However, transitions are slightly delayed 
when information is presented sequentially, as attention can only be oriented towards the 
alternative after it is displayed. To account for such differences in transition time due to the 
change in presentation format, we conducted a pre-test. In doing so, we measured the delay in 
transitions that individuals experienced when alternatives were presented sequentially rather 
than simultaneously (M = 344 ms). This time delay was added to each presentation of 
individual alternatives to ensure that fixation durations were as similar as possible in the two 
conditions. 
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Results 
As in Study 1, and as defined in the study pre-registration, all of the following tests 
used a repeated measurement logistic regression predicting the final choice by the last fixation 
Figure 14. Autonomous group (1): Participants viewed the alternatives until they made their 
decision. The graph represents a stereotypical viewing pattern of an uninterrupted decision 
maker. The left alternative was fixated first for 500 ms, followed by the right alternative for 750 
ms. Finally, the left alternative was then fixated again for 750 ms before making a choice. 
Exogenous group (2): The naturalistic gaze pattern in autonomous choices was exploited to 
define the sequential presentation of alternatives. Participants were prompted to choose after the 
alternatives were presented. For presentation purposes, the background color and font color of 
the stimuli were adapted for this figure. 
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(left, right) and again controlled for relative time advantage, time effects (trial number), and 
participants’ perceived confidence in their answer. In all regression analyses, we calculated 
robust standard errors. The raw data and pre-processing script can be found here bit.do/osf-
Data; the complete analysis script can be found here: bit.do/osf-Analysis. All hypotheses and 
analyses have been pre-registered (bit.do/osf_Pre-Registration).  
Magnitude of top-down and bottom-up mechanisms. Replicating the results found 
in Study 1, the analysis shows a strong correlational link between attention and autonomous 
other-regarding and moral choices. Specifically, 76.87% of all last fixated alternatives were 
subsequently chosen (Table 5A). To determine whether and to what extent this link is driven 
by the influence of attention on the subsequent choice, we analyzed the exogenous group in 
which information intake was determined by another person’s viewing pattern. The results 
lend support to H1, showing that even completely exogenously determined last fixations were 
predictive of subsequent choices (Table 5B). Hence, the actual influence of attention on 
choices is only 11.32%22, in contrast to 36.40% in the overestimated effect for interrupted 
trials in Study 1. The remaining variance can most likely be attributed to attention being the 
natural byproduct of the top-down decision making process. As participants in the exogenous 
condition chose the target option 51.19% of the trials, this equates to a 1.19% change in 
choices overall. Comparing the coefficients to Study 1 indicates how the bottom-up effect of 
last fixation on choices was overestimated within the gaze-contingent paradigm (see Figure 
13).  
Testing the assumption of H2, we analyzed the magnitude of top-down to bottom-up 
mechanisms for the link between attention and choices. To do so, autonomous last fixations 
were compared to exogenous last fixations in order to disentangle top-down from bottom-up 
processes. In line with H2 and the results of Study 1, the link between last fixation and 
subsequent choices is weaker for the exogenous as compared to the autonomous group (OR = 
                                                
22 100 / 10.87 × 1.23 = 11.32 
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0.07, 95% CI = [0.06, 0.09], z = -20.67, p < .001, Table 5C).  
 
Table 5 
Choice of right option predicted by last fixation for the autonomous (A), exogenous group (B), 
and both groups combined (C). 
 (A) Autonomous 
OR (right option) 
(B) Exogenous 
OR (right option) 
(C) Pooled 
OR (right option) 
Last fixation right 10.87*** [8.78, 13.45] 1.23* [1.04, 1.44] 3.15*** [2.77, 3.59] 
Relative time 
advantage right 
4.26*** [3.53, 5.14] 0.84** [0.75, 0.94] 1.42*** [1.29, 1.56] 
Confidence 0.96 [0.90, 1.03] 1.00 [0.94, 1.05] 0.98 [0.94, 1.02] 
Trial number 1.00 [1.00, 1.00] 1.00 [1.00, 1.00] 1.00 [1.00, 1.00] 
Exogenous group -  -  1.29*** [1.11, 1.49] 
Last fixation right 
× exogenous 
group 
-  -  0.07*** [0.06, 0.09] 
Constant 0.34*** [0.21, 0.54] 0.85 [0.59,1.23] 0.88*** [0.82, 0.95] 
Observations 2754 2932 5686 
Note. Odds Ratios; 95% confidence intervals in brackets. For C all variables are centered, * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** 
p < .001.  
 
Comparing attention-choice relationship across domains. Disentangling the overall 
effect of last fixation on choices, the findings indicate that the last attended alternative was 
chosen in 78.71% of autonomous moral choices (OR = 12.77, 95% CI = [9.45, 17.25], z = 
16.60, p < .001) and 75.02% of autonomous other-regarding choices (OR = 8.46, 95% CI = 
[6.27, 11.41], z = 13.97, p < .001). Testing the exogenous group, we found, as predicted, a 
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substantially reduced influence of attention on choice for moral choices with a likelihood of 
choosing the target option of 52.79% (OR = 1.32, 95% CI = [1.07, 1.64], z = 2.55, p = .011). 
Testing the same relationship for other-regarding decisions, we found no support for the 
causal link, as participants chose the target option in 49.59% of the trials (OR = 1.13, 95% CI 
= [0.88, 1.45], z = 0.95, p = .342). When analyzing whether the attention-choice relationship 
is more pronounced for moral as opposed to other-regarding choices (H3), results replicate the 
pattern in Study 1, in that the top-down influence of last fixation on choice behavior is 
stronger for moral choices than other-regarding choices ((OR = 1.48, 95% CI = [1.01, 2.17], z 
= 1.99, p = .047, see Figure 13). As expected, there is again no difference between other-
regarding and moral choices for exogenously guided attention on choices (OR = 1.22, 95% CI 
= [0.91, 1.64], z = 1.31, p = .190). 
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Discussion 
The current studies provide a systematic and critical test of the interplay of top-down 
and bottom-up processes between attention and choice preference. Additionally, we 
demonstrate how previous work systematically overestimated the influence of attention on 
choice using the gaze-contingent paradigm within simple, two-alternative decisions. For 
moral choices, though not for other-regarding ones, we present evidence for the influence of 
attention on choice. As expected, last fixations were more strongly linked to subsequent 
choices when they occurred as a byproduct of the preference formation process (top-down) 
than when experimentally manipulated (bottom-up).   
Previous research supports the notion of a two-channel mechanism. On the one hand, 
personal preferences and motivations were identified as drivers of observable attentional 
mechanisms during the choice process (e.g., Fiedler et al., 2013). Our findings fit into this line 
of research by showing that last fixations were especially predictive of choices as part of the 
top-down preference formation. On the other hand, past studies repeatedly illustrated the 
influence of bottom-up features of the presentation, such as salience (Shen & Urminsky, 
2013) and serial position on final choice outcomes (Mantonakis, Rodero, Lesschaeve, & 
Hastie, 2009). Hence, the presented evidence lends support to the ideas of the aDDM – in 
particular, its prediction that the last fixated option is more likely to be chosen. This notion of 
people’s preferences being actively constructed during the decision making process was put 
forward as one explanation for the dynamic nature of our decisions (Simon & Spiller, 2016). 
An alternative explanation for the bottom-up link between attention and choices is the recency 
effect (Baddeley & Hitch, 1993). Since the alternatives are no longer visible at the time of the 
decision the likelihood of choosing the last fixated option could be driven by its availability in 
participants’ memory.  
In order to investigate the level of universality of this proposed attention-choice 
relationship, we tested for its context dependency. The respective results showed that the link 
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between attention and choice was systematically stronger for moral than for other-regarding 
choices in both studies. There are several aspects that distinguish other-regarding from moral 
choices that may offer an explanation for these differences. First, other-regarding choices 
relate to issues that people encounter often in their everyday lives (e.g., helping someone 
carry grocery bags), whereas most of the moral issues relate to more abstract and novel 
situations (e.g., whether murder is sometimes justified). In novel situations, underlying 
preferences supposedly have not yet been formed. Attention, therefore, reflects the preference 
formation process more strongly. Second, it has been argued that, in moral choices, decision 
makers take the perspective of an “impartial spectator” when making a judgment (Smith, 
1976). In contrast, decisions in other-regarding situations are made from a first-person 
account (Harsanyi, 1977). 
From a methodological perspective, our results point to some shortcomings of the 
gaze-contingent paradigm. While, at first glance, it appeared to be an unobtrusive tool to 
manipulate last fixations within the decision making process, our analysis showed it is met 
with limitations. At the cost of extensive selection effects, the causal influence of attention 
was overestimated by 25.08% in moral choices. When critically tested in the sequential 
sampling paradigm, it was even eliminated in other-regarding decisions. One strength but also 
limitation of our sampling paradigm using natural viewing patterns is that they are not 
randomly matched to stimuli. On the one hand, this ensures that participants have a chance to 
read all the information available while still being under time pressure. But on the other hand, 
it reduces the level of randomization and might subsequently create stimuli dependency. We 
went to great length to maximize the suitability of the design under the constraints mentioned 
above, but encourage future replications of the results in particular with different items. 
 
Conclusion 
The evidence highlights the function of attention as a driver and byproduct of decision 
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making. This work shows the context dependency of the observed links between attention and 
choice, in particular, and thus informs policies designed to support decision makers. Since 
many everyday decisions are based on complex and dynamic processes, they can potentially 
be influenced by guiding attention or systematic interruptions of the decision process. Taking 
a closer look at the underlying attentional mechanisms offered a novel perspective on the 
complex interplay between top-down and bottom-up processes as well as the limited influence 
that bottom-up processes have within moral and especially other-regarding decisions.  
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General Discussion 
In the current dissertation, two questions were studied in more detail regarding decisions in 
social dilemmas: (1) To what extent do individual differences affect cognitive capacities and 
processes in social dilemmas? (2) How stable are decisions in these situations and does 
attention have the power to influence them? The present research addresses these questions by 
measuring eye movements in a range of social preference choices. Within Chapter I and II, 
the role of individual differences in cognitive capacities (i.e., memory) and information search 
is investigated in the context of simple money allocation tasks and strategic social dilemmas. 
Exploring the relation between attention and other-regarding decisions in more detail, Chapter 
III examines how stable social preference choices are and how exogenously manipulating the 
decision situation can affect choices.  
The findings presented in Chapter I and II indicate that individual differences, in 
particular people’s social preferences, are reflected in cognitive capacities and information 
search. Specifically, prosocial individuals were more likely to correctly recall their interaction 
partners’ behavior in social dilemmas. This memory advantage is mediated by more extensive 
information search during encoding. Further, differences in information search are also 
observed in strategic settings, where own payoffs are dependent on other’s choices. The 
results presented in Chapter III reveal that social preference choices can be affected by 
manipulating information presentation and decision time. These findings contribute to the 
debate on the causal relationship between attention and choices and estimate the respective 
magnitude of top-down and bottom-up processes linking attention to choices. While the top-
down channel has a stronger influence on choices, some variance can also be explained 
through bottom-up effects. Additionally, the chapter critically discusses potential selection 
effects associated with paradigms.  
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In the following, methodological limitations that apply to all chapters are discussed 
and suggestions for future research are provided. Finally, implications of the findings reported 
in this dissertation are proposed.  
  
Methodological limitations and future directions 
In the following, some of the methodological limitations associated with the presented studies 
are discussed. First, using economic games to study behavior has received criticism due to the 
artificially constructed decision situation. While the highly simplified and controlled settings 
offer a number of advantages, they are limited by the decontextualized nature of the situation. 
Particularly psychologists argue that real-word interactions rarely have the same features as 
economic games. In real life, counterparts are usually not anonymous and consequences of 
actions are not presented in matrices displaying monetary payoffs, which questions the 
generalizability of behavior in economic games (e.g., Pruitt & Kimmel, 1977). At the same 
time, behavior in economic games was found to be closely related to the real world (Gintis, 
Bowles, Boyd, & Fehr, 2003) and their abstractness allows them to be used to study a wide 
range of phenomena in a standardized way (Osborne & Rubinstein, 1994). Nonetheless, 
future research should aim to study cognitive processes in situations that are more similar to 
situations people encounter in their everyday lives. For example, Dietze and Knowles (2016) 
took a first step in this direction by recording eye movements with a mobile eye-tracking 
device in naturalistic environments.  
Second, the studies reported in this dissertation are conducted using student samples. 
Students usually differ in their demographic characteristics from the general population, 
especially regarding age, socio-economic background and education, which limits the 
generalization of research findings (Hanel & Vione, 2016). The samples used in the present 
studies have previously been described as WEIRD (Western, educated, industrialized, rich 
and democratic), highlighting the cultural characteristics that distinguish these individuals 
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from the general population. These differences were argued to be problematic in the 
generalization of psychological findings from WEIRD individuals to the general population 
(Henrich, Heine, & Norenzayan, 2010). In a similar vein, students were found to 
systematically behave differently in economic games than non-students (Belot, Duch, & 
Miller, 2015). Regarding basic research phenomena, however, a number of factors were not 
affected by participants’ characteristics. For example, cognitive processes underlying social 
relationships revealed similar patterns across distinct populations (Fiske, 1993). Further, self-
selected student participants were found to be an appropriate subject pool for the study of 
social behavior and conclusions about the representative population (Exadaktylos, Espin, & 
Branas-Garza, 2013). To systematically estimate whether the present findings generalize to 
the general population, future research should aim to use non-student and culturally more 
diverse samples when studying decision processes in social dilemmas.  
Third, the studies reported in this dissertation include online as well as laboratory 
studies. Both types of studies bring advantages as well as limitations with them. Conducting 
online studies have become more popular with the rise of digitalization. They constitute a 
very cost and time efficient way of collecting data (for an extensive overview see Reips, 
2002). Less time is required as the number of participants is not restricted by space in the 
laboratory, participants do not have to be paid a show-up fee and no personnel is required. 
This efficiency allows for an increased sample size as compared to laboratory studies, which 
makes findings more robust. The advantages of efficiency and robustness in online studies 
come at the cost of control. In online studies, researchers do not have any control over the 
setting in which participants complete their study and the potential distractions they are 
confronted with (Reips, 2002). Here, laboratory studies have the advantage of offering a 
highly controlled research environment (Falk & Heckman, 2009). Using standardized 
procedures during data collection, it can be ensured that participants complete studies under 
very similar conditions. Laboratory studies, however, put participants in a very artificial 
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decision environment that is likely to differ from the real world. Thus, high internal validity 
of laboratory studies comes at the cost of external validity. Future research should aim to use 
a combination of both types of studies in order to have a robust estimation of the effect under 
consideration and identify potential boundaries. Design choices should be carefully adapted to 
the setting the experiment is conducted in. For instance, in Chapter I of this dissertation, both 
types of studies were combined in order to robustly estimate the effect of social preferences 
on memory performance in social interactions.  
 
 
Implications 
The findings presented in this dissertation offer a number of relevant theoretical and practical 
implications. In the following, some of these implications are discussed with regard to their 
merit.  
Several of the here presented, but also previous studies have examined the influence of 
individual differences on information processes. These findings have relevant theoretical 
implications. For instance, the bounded rationality framework proposed that decision 
processes are limited by individual information processing. The results reported here, support 
this notion by showing that attention allocation is driven by individual preferences and 
corresponds to the motives each individual pursues. This is consistent with evidence showing 
that players selectively attended to information that is relevant to them (Hristova & Grinberg, 
2005), in particular their own payoffs (Devetag et al., 2016). Further, the current findings 
suggest that models formalizing strategic thinking (e.g., level-k) could predict strategic 
considerations more accurately by taking individual social preferences into account. 
Similarly, simulations modeling behavior in repeated interactions could be improved by 
taking into account that reciprocal strategies are supposedly more feasible for prosocial than 
for proself individuals.  
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Considering the number of social interactions we experience in everyday life, findings 
on the link between social preferences and cognitive capacities have also important practical 
implications. Presumably, prosocial individuals are better equipped to engage in cooperative 
social interactions, as they form more accurate expectations of their partner’s future behavior. 
For example, when working on a joint project with a coworker, paying attention to the 
consequences of working together not only for oneself but also for the coworker can facilitate 
recalling that coworker’s behavior later. Importantly, remembering previous behavior can sustain 
cooperative actions between prosocial coworkers. Engaging in bilateral cooperation across 
long periods of time is beneficial not only to coworkers, but also to the company for which 
they work. Given the crucial economic and societal benefits of engaging in cooperative social 
interactions, it is important to note that a lack of memory is a possible reason for systematic 
deviations from cooperation. 
Further, this work shows the context dependency of the observed links between 
attention and choice, in particular, and thus informs policies designed to support decision 
makers. Since many everyday decisions are based on complex and dynamic processes, they 
can potentially be influenced by guiding attention or systematic interruptions of the decision 
process. Taking a closer look at the underlying attentional mechanisms offered a novel 
perspective on the complex interplay between top-down and bottom-up processes as well as 
the limited influence that bottom-up processes have within moral and especially other-
regarding decisions.  
 
Conclusion 
Since the beginning of the cognitive revolution, researchers’ understanding of the cognitive 
processes underlying choices has made considerable progress. Here, we enhance existing 
knowledge by particularly studying decision processes in social dilemmas. In sum, the results 
of this dissertation indicate that individual’s social preferences predict systematic differences 
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in cognitive capacities (i.e., memory performance) and information search processes within 
social interactions. Within these processes, attention patterns reflect weighting processes 
associated with individual social preferences and the final choice. Uncovering some of the 
strategic contemplations people are facing in social dilemmas, temporal dynamics show that 
attention allocation unfolds differently for cooperative and defective choices. Studying the 
link between attention and choice behavior in more detail, the results reveal that while other-
regarding choices can be influenced by exogenously guiding attention, they are mostly driven 
by a top-down influence of individual preferences on choices. The findings of this dissertation 
contribute to the research on social dilemmas as they shed light on the impact of social 
preferences on cognitive capacities and processes and develop a preliminary understanding of 
the underlying drivers of other-regarding decisions.  
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Study 2a 
Method 
Procedure.  
Implicit memory phase. Unfortunately, results in Study 2a suggested that a substantial 
proportion of participants misunderstood the implicit memory task (see Figure S2). A first 
indication for this lack of understanding was a difference in the number of choices of the partner 
that had behaved prosocial during encoding depending on the counterbalance condition participants 
had randomly been assigned to. We counterbalanced whether the prosocial or individualistic 
interaction partner was presented on the left or right side with the money allocation problem 
presented in the middle. This resulted in two groups of participants, one for which the prosocial 
partner was always on the same side as the prosocial option in the money allocation problem (i.e. 
the option that would maximize the participants’ payoff) and one for which the individualistic 
partner was presented on the same side as the more prosocial option. The group for which the 
prosocial partner was presented at the same side as the prosocial option chose the prosocial partner 
in 81.65% of the trials while the other group did so in only 43.49% if the trials. This difference 
between the groups can be explained if at least some participants misunderstood the task and 
thought that they will receive the option that is at the same side as the interaction partner they 
choose, because for the first group it would maximize their payoff if they chose the prosocial 
partner while for the second group it would maximize payoff to choose the individualistic partner. 
In Study 2b, we adapted the design of the task to accurately measure implicit memory performance.  
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Figure S2. Presentation of the implicit memory phase in Study 2. 
 
 
Data analysis. Studying the attentional processes of participants, the different pieces of 
information were separated into Areas of Interest (AOI). For a graphical presentation of the AOIs’ 
positions, please see Figure S3. Further, Table S2 includes descriptive statistics on the direction of 
participants’ first fixations to these different AOIs.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure S3. Numbering of Areas of Interest. Numbers 1- 4 refer to presented payoffs and number 5 
refers to presented picture of face. 
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Table S2 
Direction of first fixations depending on AOIs content.  
 
Content of AOI 
Percent of first fixations directed towards AOI 
Own payoffs top row Other’s payoffs top row 
AOI 1  Payoff 42.27 % 34.95 % 
AOI 2 Payoff 21.92 % 21.34 % 
AOI 3 Payoff 10.85 % 15.89 % 
AOI 4 Payoff 9.79 % 13.71 % 
AOI 5 Face  15.17 % 14.11 % 
Note. AOI = Areas of Interest. See Figure S3 for the respective position of the AOI. 
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Study 2b & 3 
Method 
Procedure. The procedure of the implicit memory phase was adapted for Study 2b and 3. 
Please see Figure S4 for the adapted procedure.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure S4. Experimental procedure of Study 2b and 3. (a) Partner’s decision: Observation of 
interaction partner’s choice. In this example the partner chose option A. (b) Own decision: 
Participant could choose how to distribute money between himself and the displayed partner by 
either choosing option A or B. (c) Distractor: Presentation of distractor task. (d) Implicit memory 
phase: Participant could choose one partner to allocate the money for them. (e) Explicit memory 
phase: Recall of the displayed person’s behavior. 
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Table S4 
Prosocial choices predicted by SVO angle  
  β (prosocial choice) 
  Study 1  Study 2a  Study 3 
SVO angle   1.88*** (5.14)  2.57*** (6.53)  1.63*** (4.13) 
Constant  0.29 (1.01)  0.46 (1.63)  0.33 (1.40) 
Observations  4270  17600  11256 
Note. Standardized coefficients are reported; z statistics in parentheses, ** p < .01, *** p < .001.  
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Table S5 
Decomposition of total effect of SVO angle on explicit memory performance into direct and indirect 
effect via response time (while participants makes own decision) 
 Study 1 
 β (correct explicit memory) 
Total effect (c) 
SVO angle 
0.28* (2.06) 
Direct effect (c’) 
SVO angle 
(controlling for response time) 
0.29* (2.05) 
Indirect effect (a × b) 
SVO angle  
(via response time) 
-0.00 (-0.13) 
Observations 610 
Note. Standardized coefficients are reported,  z statistics in parentheses. Control variables are included. For the indirect 
effect, standard errors are bootstrapped with 1000 repetitions. * p < .05, ** p < .01. 
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Table S8 
Study 2a: Explicit memory performance predicted by fixation number / attention to other’s 
payoffs / attention to other’s face  
  β (correct explicit memory) 
  Model 1  Model 2  Model 3 
Fixation number 
(log) 
 0.40*** (5.03) 
 
-   - 
 
Attention to 
other’s payoffs 
 -  
 0.24** 
 
(2.78) 
 
 - 
 
Attention to 
other’s face (log) 
 -  
 
-   0.17* (2.04) 
SVO angle   0.15 (1.47)  0.17 (1.37)  0.21 (1.62) 
Prosocial partner   0.01 (0.07)  0.001 (0.01)  -0.02 (-0.15) 
Female 
participant 
 0.05 (0.48) 
 
0.06 (0.55)  0.04 (0.35) 
Female partner  0.18*** (3.51)  0.18** (3.44)  0.20** (3.46) 
Risk aversion  -0.09 (-0.94)  -0.0004 (-0.00)  0.01 (0.12) 
Attractiveness  0.06 (1.18)  0.05 (1.03)  0.06 (1.05) 
Cost-benefit ratio  0.14* (2.43)  0.13* (2.27)  0.11+ (1.86) 
Memory ability  0.15 (1.59)  0.25* (2.52)  0.24* (2.31) 
Constant  1.00*** (8.38)  1.01*** (7.67)  1.05 (7.84) 
Observations  1616  1616  1537 
Note. Standardized coefficients are reported; z statistics in parentheses, + p  <.10, * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001. 
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 Supplement: Chapter II  
Table S10 
Payoffs and cooperation index for all items  
Version 1 
Item # Reward Punishment Temptation Sucker 
Cooperation Index  
(R-P) / (T-S) 
1 31 25 61 1 0.1 
2 36 18 62 2 0.3 
3 42 12 63 3 0.5 
4 48 6 64 4 0.7 
5 57 3 65 5 0.9 
6 25 13 61 1 0.2 
7 36 18 51 6 0.4 
8 46 12 59 3 0.6 
9 54 8 63 5 0.8 
10 68 4 72 8 1 
 
Version 2 
Item # Reward Punishment Temptation Sucker 
Cooperation Index 
(R-P) / (T-S) 
1 31 25 61 1 0.1 
2 34 27 76 1 0 
3 25 13 61 1 0.2 
4 28 17 57 2 0.2 
5 36 18 62 2 0.3 
6 29 11 62 3 0.3 
7 35 19 51 6 0.35 
8 43 12 81 4 0.4 
9 49 13 82 10 0.5 
10 42 12 63 3 0.5 
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Figure S5. Graphical representation of participants’ SVO angles. The weight assigned 
to own outcomes (w1) and other’s outcomes (w2) determine the degree of the angle.  
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Table S11 
Cooperative choice predicted by SVO angle and Cooperation Bias 
 Cooperative choice (OR) 
 Without controls  Without controls  With controls 
SVO angle  1.06** (3.29)  -   1.06*** (3.41) 
Cooperation index -   -   68.84*** (5.87) 
Cooperation Bias -   1.04 (0.19)  0.96 (-0.20) 
Trial -   -   0.95 (-1.27) 
Constant 0.55 (-1.36)  1.55 (1.32)  0.17** (-3.11) 
Observations 620 
Note. Odds ratios are reported; z statistics in parentheses, ** p < .01, *** p < .001. 
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Table S15 
Attention to cooperative strategy predicted by type of choice  
 Attention to cooperative strategy 
 Without controls  With controls 
Cooperative choice 0.24*** (4.90)  0.24*** (4.92) 
Cooperation index -   -0.01 (-0.15) 
Trial number -   -0.01 (-0.14) 
Constant -0.004 (-0.06)  -0.004 (-0.06) 
Observations 620 
Note. Standardized coefficients are reported, z statistics in parentheses, * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001 
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Figure S6. Proportion of attention directed to the different payoff combinations depending on 
location bias. Error bars indicate 95% confidence intervals.  
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Supplement: Chapter III 
Table S16 
Study 1: Choice of right option predicted by last fixation for self-determined (A), interrupted (B) 
and all trials (C). Separate analysis for other-regarding and moral choices. 
  (A) Self-determined 
OR (right option) 
 (B) Interrupted 
OR (right option) 
 (C) All trials 
OR (right option) 
  Social  Moral  Social Moral  Social Moral 
Last fixation 
right 
 7.45*** 
(8.55) 
12.58*** 
(11.60) 
 2.89*** 
(7.70) 
4.03*** 
(9.93) 
 3.79*** 
(11.75) 
5.06*** 
(15.11) 
Relative time 
advantage right 
 4.44*** 
(7.43) 
5.72*** 
(10.65) 
 2.02*** 
(5.67) 
2.84*** 
(7.05) 
 2.22*** 
(8.91) 
2.82*** 
(10.72) 
SVO Angle  1.00  
(-0.22) 
-  1.00 
(1.00) 
-  1.00 
(1.10) 
- 
SVO Angle × 
Last fixation 
 1.00 
(0.26) 
-  1.00 
(-0.55) 
-  1.00 
(-1.01) 
- 
Confidence  0.97  
(-0.53) 
0.96 
(-0.76) 
 0.93* 
(-2.05) 
0.98  
(-0.63) 
 0.93* 
(-2.44) 
0.97 
(-1.00) 
Trial number  0.99* 
(-2.03) 
1.00 
(-0.38) 
 1.00 
(1.46) 
1.00 
(0.60) 
 1.00 
(0.85) 
1.00 
(1.06) 
Constant  1.15 
(1.21) 
1.05 
(0.47) 
 0.82** 
(-3.11) 
0.83** 
(-2.91) 
 0.92 
(-1.76) 
0.92 
(-1.61) 
Observations  1179 1329  1404 1448  3243 3368 
Note. Odds Ratios; z statistics in parentheses, * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001. All variables are centered.  
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Table S17 
Study 1: Choice of right option predicted by last fixation and interrupted trial for other-
regarding choices (A), moral choices (B) and all trials (C). 
  (A) Other-regarding 
OR (right option)  
 (B) Moral 
OR (right option) 
 (C) All trials 
OR (right option) 
Last fixation 
right 
 
4.48*** (11.19) 
 
6.63*** (15.63) 
 
4.51*** (16.41) 
Interrupted  0.77* (-2.26)  0.78* (-2.40)  0.76*** (-4.00) 
Last fixation × 
Interrupted 
 
0.50** (-3.05) 
 
0.41*** (-3.98) 
 
0.63** (-3.15) 
Relative time 
advantage right 
 
3.02*** (8.95) 
 
4.13*** (14.36) 
 
2.39*** (10.36) 
Confidence  0.94+ (-1.88)  0.97 (-0.86)  0.94** (-3.08) 
Trial number  1.00 (-0.12)  1.00 (0.35)  1.00 (0.65) 
Constant  0.93 (-1.24)  0.91 (-1.62)  0.94 (-1.66) 
Observations  2675  2777  6724 
Note. Odds Ratios; z statistics in parentheses, * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001. All variables are centered.  
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Table S18 
Study 1: Comparison of other-regarding and moral choices. Choice of right option predicted by 
last fixation for self-determined (A), interrupted (B) and all trials (C). 
  (A) Self-determined 
OR (right option) 
(B) Interrupted 
OR (right option) 
(C) All trials 
OR (right option) 
Last fixation right  9.43*** (11.66) 3.44*** (10.83) 4.37*** (15.89) 
Moral item   0.96 (-0.35) 1.00 (-0.05) 1.00 (0.04) 
Moral item × 
Last fixation 
 
1.61* (2.29) 1.28 (1.54) 1.26* (2.02) 
Relative time 
advantage right 
 
4.87*** (9.14) 2.31*** (8.04) 2.39*** (10.52) 
Confidence  0.96 (-0.96) 0.95* (-2.12) 0.95** (-2.58) 
Trial number  1.00* (-2.27) 1.00 (1.54) 1.00 (0.93) 
Constant  1.11 (1.28) 0.84*** (-3.76) 0.93* (-2.02) 
Observations  2540 2912 6724 
Note. Odds Ratios; z statistics in parentheses, * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001. All variables are centered. 
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Influence of SVO  
To put the observed effect of the last fixation on the likelihood to decide for the more prosocial 
option into context of another well studied effect, we used SVO as an additional behavioral 
predictor in the primary regression model. The results showed that, as in other studies, 
participants with a high SVO angle were more likely to make prosocial choices (OR = 1.01, z = 
2.51, p = .012). In particular, that means that the pure individualist (SVO angle = 0°) made on 
average 8.25% fewer prosocial choices than an ideally prosocial (SVO angle = 45°) participant. 
Testing the effect of the last fixation on the subsequent choice in the interrupted (self-
determined) trials, the analysis revealed that in case the prosocial option was attended to last, the 
odds ratio of choosing the prosocial option was 2.12 (z = 6.07, p < .001, self-determined: OR = 
6.52, z = 9.20, p < .001). Specifically, attending the prosocial option last increased the 
probability of choosing it by 15.19% (self-determined: 36.35%). Investigating the influence of 
SVO angle further, we found that it did not have an impact on the size of the attention-choice 
relationship (OR = 1.01, z = 0.55, p = .583), and neither on the strength of the bottom-up effect 
of attention on choices (OR = 1.00, z = -0.46, p = .649) in the interrupted trials. Additionally, the 
results showed that SVO angle did not have an impact on whether a participant made a self-
determined choice (OR = 1.00, z = -0.34, p = .737) or was timed out (OR = 1.00, z = 0.20, p = 
.839). See Table S19 for the complete analysis.  
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Figure S7. Participant’s Social Value Orientation (SVO) in Study 1 according to the SVO Ring 
Measure. SVO angle is measured in degrees. 
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Table S19 
Study 1: Choice of prosocial option predicted by SVO Angle for self-determined (A), interrupted 
(B) and all trials (C). 
  (A) Self-determined 
OR (prosocial)  
 (B) Interrupted 
OR (prosocial) 
 (C) All trials 
OR (prosocial) 
Last fixation 
prosocial 
 6.52*** (9.20)  2.12*** (6.07)  3.16*** (10.38) 
SVO Angle  1.01* (2.51)  1.01 (1.53)  1.01* (2.51) 
Trial number  1.00 (-1.40)  1.00 (0.91)  1.00 (0.43) 
Constant  0.99 (-0.04)  1.05 (0.33)  0.95 (-0.42) 
Observations  1179  1404  3243 
Note. Odds Ratios; z statistics in parentheses, * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001.  
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Figure S8. Distribution of prosocial choices for each other-regarding item. Dashed line at 
proportion = 0.5 indicates where the number of choices in favor of the prosocial and 
individualistic option was equal.  
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Table S20 
Study 1: Separate analysis for other-regarding and moral choices. Choice of right option 
predicted by position of target for self-determined (A), interrupted (B) and all trials (C). 
  (A) Self-determined 
OR (right option) 
 (B) Interrupted 
OR (right option) 
 (C) All trials 
OR (right option) 
  Social  Moral  Social Moral  Social Moral 
Target right  0.43*** 
(-4.99) 
0.45*** 
(-6.00) 
 2.85*** 
(7.53) 
4.03*** 
(9.93) 
 1.08 
(1.06) 
1.26** 
(3.21) 
Relative time 
advantage right 
 4.02*** 
(8.90) 
4.16*** 
(10.36) 
 1.95*** 
(5.46) 
2.84*** 
(7.05) 
 2.01*** 
(8.02) 
2.74*** 
(10.61) 
Confidence  0.98 
(-0.43) 
0.98 
(-0.46) 
 0.92* 
(-2.24) 
0.98 
(-0.63) 
 0.96 
(-1.56) 
0.98 
(-0.84) 
Trial number  0.99* 
(-2.52) 
1.00 
(-1.10) 
 1.00 
(1.58) 
1.00 
(0.60) 
 1.00 
(-0.27) 
1.00 
(0.46) 
Constant  3.09** 
(2.94) 
2.41** 
(2.66) 
 0.72 
(-1.48) 
0.48** 
(-2.83) 
 1.29 
(1.47) 
1.04 
(0.18) 
Observations  1211 1329  1464 1448  3356 3368 
Note. Odds Ratios; z statistics in parentheses, * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001.  
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Table S21 
Study 1: Likelihood for the classification as a self-determined choices (A) or a timeout (B) 
predicted by confidence level, importance, SVO angle, target choice, trial, position of chosen 
option and type of choice. 
  Other-regarding choices  Moral choices 
  (A) OR  
(self-determined) 
(B) OR  
(timeout) 
 (C) OR  
(self-determined) 
(D) OR  
(timeout) 
Confidence 
level 
 1.32*** (5.97) 0.91* (-2.42)  1.56*** (9.26) 0.91* (-2.55) 
Importance  1.00 (0.00) 1.00 (-0.04) 1.01 (0.20) 0.99 (-0.12) 
SVO angle  1.00 (-0.34) 1.00 (0.20) -  -  
Choice of 
target option 
 0.28*** (-11.37) 0.51*** (-5.78) 0.22*** (-12.04) 0.34*** (-8.32) 
Trial number  1.01** (3.26) 1.00 (0.89) 1.01*** (4.47) 1.00 (1.29) 
Choice of 
right option  
 1.30* (2.06) 1.12 (1.02) 1.40** (3.15) 1.11 (0.87) 
Prosocial 
option 
 1.35* (2.31) 0.84 (-1.57) -  -  
Constant  0.13*** (-5.89) 0.81 (-0.75) 0.05*** (-7.55) 0.74 (1.09) 
Observations  2583 2064  2777 2039 
Note. Odds Ratios; z statistics in parentheses, * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001. 
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Table S22 
Study 1: Choice of right option predicted by last fixation for (A) self-determined choices, (B) 
interrupted choices and (C) all trials. Model (1) does not include trial number as a control 
variable, (2) controls for trial number and (3) includes an interaction between trial number and 
last fixation. 
 
  (B) Interrupted 
  (1) (2) (3) 
Last fixation right  3.43*** (10.93)  3.44*** (10.96)  3.39*** (10.68) 
Relative time 
advantage right 
 
2.33*** (8.12) 
 
2.33*** (8.18) 
 
2.32*** (8.08) 
Confidence  0.95* (-2.16)  0.95* (-2.17)  0.95* (-2.25) 
Trial number  -  1.00 (1.58)  1.00 1.00+ 
Trial number × last 
fixation right 
 -  -  0.99** (-2.90) 
  (A) Self-determined 
  (1) (2) (3) 
Last fixation right  9.51*** (11.70)  9.45*** (11.65)  9.41*** (11.65) 
Relative time 
advantage right 
 
4.84*** (8.98) 
 
4.85*** (9.09) 
 
4.85*** (9.06) 
Confidence  0.96 (-1.05)  0.96 (-1.01)  0.96 (-1.01) 
Trial number  -  1.00* (-2.21)  1.00* 1.00* 
Trial number × last 
fixation right 
 -  -  1.00 (0.37) 
Constant  0.51* (-2.35)  0.62 (-1.55)  1.11 (1.28) 
Observations  2540  2540  2540 
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Constant  0.65** (-2.82)  0.59** (-3.16)  0.83*** (-3.94) 
Observations  2912  2912  2912 
 
  (C) All trials 
  (1) (2) (3) 
Last fixation right  4.36*** (15.93)  4.37*** (15.93)  4.37*** (15.93) 
Relative time 
advantage right 
 
2.39*** (10.59) 
 2.39*** (10.57)  2.39*** (10.58) 
Confidence  0.95** (-2.62)  0.95** (-2.65)  0.95** (-2.67) 
Trial number  -  1.00 (0.96)  1.00 (1.03) 
Trial number × last 
fixation right 
 -  -  1.00 (-1.32) 
Constant  0.65*** (-3.30)  0.62*** (-3.32)  0.92* (-2.12) 
Observations  6724  6724  6724 
Note. Odds Ratios; z statistics in parentheses, for (3) all variables are centered,* p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001.  
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Figure S9. Study 1: Effect of direction of last fixation on choice probability for (A) other- 
regarding choices in interrupted trials, (B) other-regarding choices in self-determined trials, (C) 
moral choices in interrupted trials and (D) moral choices in self-determined trials. Dotted lines 
indicate 95% confidence intervals. N = 116. 
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Table S23 
Study 1: Descriptive statistics of fixation number and duration for self-determined (A) and 
interrupted choices (B). 
  (A) Self-
determined 
 (B) Interrupted 
Fixation number  19 (5)  23 (4) 
Fixation duration (in ms)  108 (27)  106 (21) 
Observations  2497  2912 
Note. For fixation number, median and median average deviation (in parentheses) are reported due to a skewed 
distributions. For fixation duration, mean and standard deviation (in parentheses) are reported.  
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Table S24 
Study 1: Repeated measured linear regression using interrupted choice / self-determined choice 
to predict (A) fixation number and (B) fixation duration. 
  (A) Fixation number  (B) Fixation duration 
Interrupted  0.12*** (5.84)  -0.01*** (-3.80) 
Constant  3.03*** (125.13)  0.11*** (60.23) 
Observations  224  224 
Note. Unstandardized regression coefficients are reported, z in parentheses. Fixation number is log-transformed due 
to a skewed distribution. * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001. 
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Table S25 
Study 1: The influence of semantic differences on choosing the target option and on information 
search 
  (A) OR (target 
choice) 
 (B) Fixation number 
(log) 
 (C) Fixation 
duration 
Alternatives 
including verb 
 1.09 (1.22)  1.15*** (16.32)  -0.01*** (-8.89) 
Constant  0.97 (-0.60)  2.96*** (131.76)  -0.11*** (-66.13) 
Observations  5409  5409  5409 
Note. (A) Odds Ratios are reported, (B) and (C) unstandardized coefficients are reported; z statistics in parentheses, 
* p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001.  
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Table S26 
Study 1: The influence of semantic differences on choosing the right option and on the link 
between last fixation and subsequent choice. 
  (A) Self-determined 
OR (right option) 
 (B) Interrupted 
OR (right option) 
 (C) All trials 
OR (right option) 
Alternative 
including verb 
 
0.91 (-0.84) 
 
1.07 (0.77) 
 
0.97 (-0.46) 
Alternative 
including verb 
× Last fixation 
right 
 
0.92 (-0.35) 
 
0.92 (-0.42) 
 
0.88 (-0.90) 
Last fixation 
right 
 
9.44*** (11.55) 
 
3.44*** (10.94) 
 
4.37*** (15.92) 
Relative time 
advantage 
right 
 
4.82*** (9.01) 
 
2.33*** (8.09) 
 
2.38*** (10.41) 
Confidence  0.96 (-1.02)  0.95* (-2.16)  0.95** (-2.66) 
Trial number  1.00* (-2.18)  1.00 (1.57)  1.00 (0.96) 
Constant  1.11 (1.24)  0.83*** (-3.87)  0.93* (-2.07) 
Observations  2540  2912  6724 
Note. Odds Ratios; z statistics in parentheses, * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001. All variables are centered.  
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Table S27 
Study 1: Choice of right option predicted by character count and last fixation for self-
determined (A), interrupted (B), and all trials (C). 
 (A) Self-determined 
OR (right option) 
(B) Interrupted 
OR (right option) 
(C) All trials 
OR (right option) 
Character count 1.00 (-0.38) 1.00 (-0.25) 1.00 (-0.87) 
Last fixation right 9.41*** (11.62) 3.44*** (10.90) 4.37*** (15.89) 
Character count × 
Last fixation right 
0.99 (-0.74) 1.00 (-0.52) 1.00 (-0.89) 
Relative time 
advantage right 
4.79*** (8.91) 2.31*** (7.93) 2.38*** (10.30) 
Confidence 0.96 (-1.02) 0.95* (-2.16) 0.95** (-2.66) 
Trial number 1.00* (-2.19) 1.00 (1.57) 1.00 (0.96) 
Constant 1.11 (1.28) 0.83*** (-3.84) 0.93* (-2.06) 
Observations 2540 2912 6724 
Note. Odds Ratios; z statistics in parentheses. All variables are centered, * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001.  
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Table S28 
Study 2: Choice of right option predicted by character count and last fixation for the 
autonomous (A) and exogenous group (B). 
 (A) Autonomous 
OR (right option) 
(B) Exogenous 
OR (right option) 
Character count 1.00 (0.82) 1.00 (0.08) 
Last fixation right 10.86*** (10.98) 1.21* (2.16) 
Character count × Last 
fixation right 
1.00 (-0.24) 0.99 (-1.25) 
Relative time advantage 
right 
4.26*** (8.75) 0.85** (-2.65) 
Confidence 0.96 (-1.07) 1.00 (-0.06) 
Trial number 1.00 (0.20) 1.00 (0.29) 
Constant 0.71*** (-5.25) 0.99 (-0.14) 
Observations 2754 2932 
Note. Odds Ratios; z statistics in parentheses. All variables are centered, * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
